Manjša neenakost je predpogoj za več trga

There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which Mr Cowen mostly disregards: that redistribution provides insurance against economic dislocation and therefore softens resistance to globalisation. It’s worth pointing out that the world has experienced two great eras of globalisation. The first combined minimal redistribution with minimal political power for non-elites. The second combined universal suffrage with substantial redistribution. I don’t think it’s unreasonable to conclude that redistribution is the price democracies pay for globalisation.

And that makes perfect sense! Reducing barriers to trade generates net gains, but those gains will occasionally be distributed in highly unequal fashion. If gains are concentrated and no provision is made for redistribution, then a voting majority might well conclude that openness is a losing proposition. Mr Cowen seems to want voters to recognise that whether or not they personally are made better off by globalisation it is a good thing to support, because it enables the enrichment of poor areas of the globe. But few voters are content to have their economies run as charities (and a good thing for economists that they aren’t, as that would make a baseline assumption of rational self-interest look pretty absurd).

The more pleased globally minded egalitarians are with emerging-market trends over the past generation, the more concerned they ought to be with national income inequality. Mr Cowen’s piece looks like an effort to guilt elites into abandoning a realistic view of the political economy of globalisation by charging them with nationalism. Either that, or he is expressing what are essentially plutocratic concerns, hiding behind the gentler cloak of egalitarianism.

Vir: The Economist

 

One response

  1. Glede padca globalne neenakosti, na katerega se članek navezuje: http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/#uds-search-results

    Glede sistema redistribucije pa; potrebno je ločiti med splošnim in specifičnim egalitarnim sistemom (James Tobin). V zgornjem primeru je govora o splošnem; z redistribucijo ustvarjenega na globalnem (prostem) trgu slednjemu omogočimo ”učinkovito” (prosto) delovanje, hkrati pa centralni organ poskrbi za ustrezno enakost v družbi. Vseeno tak način spopadanja z neučinkovitostjo trga ni nujno najboljši.

    1. Ostaja problem izbire centralnega regulatorja (in ljudi v njem, institucija nikoli ne stoji neodvisno od človeške odločitve), ki bo skrbel za distribucijo. Ta problem se mi ne zdi zanemarljiv. Tudi v primeru Pikettyevega ukrepa globalnega davka na premoženje bi potrebovali podobno institucijo.
    2. S samo redistribucijo še vedno ne rešimo tržnim nepravilnosti: problem reševanja eksternalij in javnih dobrin, asimetričnost informacij, nepopolna konkurenca, itd.
    3. Z zgornjim ukrepom zagotovimo zgolj negativno svobodo (Isaiah Berlin), ne pa tudi pozitivne (omogočanje samo-odvisnosti in aktivne participacije, zmanjševanje hierarhičnih družbenih odnosov – basically equality of opportunity)
    4. A. Smith je napisal, da bo delavec s preozko industrijsko specializacijo izgubil na intelektualni kapaciteti in bo tako vedno lažje tarča eksploitacije delodajalca. Tako ostaja vprašanje sposobnosti posameznika za ”pametno” delovanje s svojim denarjom. Tu pridejo v igro specifični egalitarci, ki se zavzemajo za distribucijo dobrin samih in ne denarja.

    Verjetno se bi našel še kakšen argument proti. Kar sem hotel napisat je, da se z omogočenjem prostega trga in s preprosto distribucijo dohodkov ne znebiš trade-off med učinkovitostjo in enakostjo.

    Tej Gonza

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