Jebemti, je to stara pesem. Iz onih naših časov. Najbrž največji hit Leb i sol. Preden je Vlatko postal pripoznan kot glasbeni virtuoz….

V enem stavku: Vodstvo EU in ključni evropski politiki so se ves čas zavedali, da ne morejo zapleniti ruskih sredstev in na njihovi osnovi organizirati posojila Ukrajini, vendar so igrali to igro, da bi kot “manjše zlo” spravili skozi sicer politično nesprejemljivo skupno zadolžitev EU in mutualizacijo novega skupnega med članicami EU.

Teorija zarote?

No, madžarski, slovaški in češki predsedniki vlad niso padli na finto. Naš pa je.

The core idea was never really to confiscate the frozen Russian assets. From the very beginning, Brussels knew that this option was legally unworkable on a large scale, due to international pressure, the systemic risk to the legal security of sovereign assets, and the precedent it would set for third countries.

The narrative around “confiscation” served a different purpose: to deliberately confuse European public opinion and create a false political dilemma. Either one accepted confiscation — presented as morally necessary but legally fragile — or one accepted, as the “lesser evil”, the mutualisation of debt through a large loan backed by the EU budget.

What matters is that this mutualisation was never allowed during the financial crisis that hit Spain, Greece, and other southern European countries. At that time, the response was austerity, conditional bailouts, and the transfer of costs onto the weakest states, under the banner of “fiscal responsibility” and an outright rejection of eurobonds.

Today, by contrast, a de facto mutualisation of risk has been imposed — not to stabilise European economies in distress, but to finance an external war, shifting the risk directly onto EU taxpayers.

The contrast is striking:

when the problem was internal, mutualisation was impossible;

when the objective is geopolitical, it suddenly becomes acceptable and urgent.

From this perspective, the debate over Russian assets was instrumental, not substantive. It was used to prepare the political and emotional ground for approving a measure that, in any other context, would have been unthinkable within the European Union.

The strategy did not change.

 The narrative did — to achieve the same outcome.

Madžarski predsednik vlade Viktor Orban je razkril bistvo perverzne logike tega vojnega posojila EU iz skupne malhe Ukrajini. S podelitvijo vojnega kredita, imajo države EU interes za podaljšanje vojne in ustvarjanje iluzije, da Ukrajina lahko zmaga. Imajo interes za podaljšanje vojne do eluzivnega “končnega poraza Rusije”, ko bi bila Rusija kot poraženska prisiljena sprejeti vse pogoje in pristati na reparacije Ukrajini, iz katerih bi nato Ukrajina odplačala to evropsko posojilo. Pogoji posojila namreč predvidevajo ničelne obresti in poplačilo šele po koncu vojne na osnovi ruskih reparacij. Države EU imajo zato interes za podaljševanje vojne v neskončnost, sicer izgubijo teh 90 milijard evrov.

Glede na to, da Rusija po nobeni teoriji ne more izgubiti te vojne, bodo EU države naredile vse, da zminirajo mirovni proces. Da se izognejo finančni izgubi. Perverzna logika, vendar tako je. In Orban je svojo državo zaščitil pred tem, da pokrije to posojilo, ki ga Ukrajina seveda nikoli ne b mogla vrniti. Tudi slovaški in češki predsednik vlade sta naredila enako.

Kaj je naredil naš predsednik vlade na evropskem vrhu? Implicitno je povečal slovenski javni dolg za dobrih 700 mio evrov, kolikor bo odpadlo na Slovenijo od tega neodplačljivega posojila Ukrajini.

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For the first time in the history of the European Union, 24 member states have jointly granted a war loan to a country outside the Union. This is not a technical detail but a qualitative shift. The logic of a loan is clear: whoever lends money wants it back. In this case, repayment is not tied to economic growth or stabilisation, but to military victory.

For this money to ever be recovered, Russia would have to be defeated. That is not the logic of peace but the logic of war. A war loan inevitably makes its financiers interested in the continuation and escalation of the conflict, because defeat would also mean a financial loss. From this moment on, we are no longer talking merely about political or moral decisions, but about hard financial constraints that push Europe in one direction: into war.

The Brusselian war logic is therefore intensifying. It is not slowing down, not easing, but becoming institutionalised. The risk today is greater than ever before, because the continuation of the war is now coupled with a financial interest.

Hungary is deliberately not stepping onto this dangerous path. We do not take part in initiatives that make participants interested in prolonging the war. We are not looking for a fast track into war, but for an exit towards peace. This is not isolationism, but strategic sobriety. This is in Hungary’s interest and, in the long run, in Europe’s interest as well.

Bitka za prevlado v UI ni v čipih, ampak v teravatih kapacitet in teravatnih urah energije na voljo za uporabo umetne inteligence. In v ceni te energije. Zmagala bo država, ki bo zagotovila dovolj velike kapacitete za stabilno in stanovitno proizvodnjo elektrike ter hkrati najnižje cene elektrike. Podatkovnih centrov se ne da poganjati na solarne panele in baterije, ker je proizvodnja elektrike nestanovitna, njena cena pa bistveno previsoka. Zato se podatkovni centri selijo v bližino jedrskih elektrarn, trije največji ameriški ponudniki (Google, Microsoft, Amazon) pa investirajo v jedrske elektrarne.

Vendar bodo to bitko zmagali kitajski ponudniki. KItajska je v zadnjih 15 letih izgradila več kapacitet za proizvodnjo elektrike kot ves preostali svet skupaj. Kitajska gradi 30 novih jedrskih elektrarn, ZDA nobene. Podatkovni centri na Kitajskem plačujejo 3 cente za kilovatno uro, v Ameriki pa 3-krat več.

In seveda, več kot očitno je, da je Evropa že zdavnaj odpadla iz te igre za umetno inteligenco. Na solarne panele in vetrrnice in po ceni 30 centov na kilovatno uro ne moreš poganjati podatkovnih centrov.

Zelena norost je v Evropi ubila ne samo tradicionalno industrijo, pač pa preprečuje tudi razvoj in razmah industrij prihodnosti. Pritožbe pošljite političnim elitam, ki vodijo Evropo v propad.

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Spodaj je nekaj fragmentov izidov včerajšnjega dnevno-nočnega dogajanja v Bruslju. Tisti, ki pišejo vzhičene komentarje (nemški kancler Merz in vodstvo EU) imajo dobre razloge za to – kamuflirati morajo včerajšnji popolni poraz in dejstvo, da so zpravno vprašljivo odločitvijo za skupno financiranje ukrajinske luknje obsodili EU na počasno finančno smrt. EU bo edini financer Ukrajine v naslednjih letih, Ukrajina ne more vrniti niti evra in EU bo prisiljena ukrajinsko proračunsko luknjo financirati v nedogled (50 milijard evrov na leto) ali pa jo poslati v stečaj. Vsako leto bo dobra četrtina proračuna EU šla v Ukrajino. To je finančno nevzdržno za EU in bo bodisi finančno bodisi politično razgnalo EU.

Seveda pa je to bolje kot evropski in globalni finančni sistem takoj poslati v spiralo navzdol z nezakonito zaplembo tujih monetarnih rezerv (nekaj, česar si ZDA niso nikoli drznile niti v 45 letih najostrejših sankcij proti Iranu).

Če bi se namesto tega lotili diplomacije z namenom končati vojno, bi bil finančni račun bistveno nižji in evropsko gospodarstvo bi dobilo pospešek z anagažiranjem pri obnovi Ukrajine.

Zato Slava EU! 

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Zadnje čas je svet poln neumnih izjav, toda tale izjava Marja Lepa, predstojnika Centra za raziskave mobilnosti, je zmagovalna. Po tej logiki ne bi smeli nikoli, ne prej, ne zdaj in ne v prihodnje, izgraditi nobene prometnice, kajti to bi lahko omogočilo, da lahko ljudje pobegnejo iz revščine. Kajti po slabši prometni povezavi niso mogli pobegniti, ali pa ne v takšnem obsegu.

Alan Ford v najbolj žlahtni obliki.

Tretja razvojna os (3RO) je ključni državni infrastrukturni projekt, namenjen izboljšanju prometne dostopnosti regij, ki so prometno najbolj odrezane – Koroške, Savinjske, Zasavske, Posavske ter Jugovzhodne Slovenije – z osrednjim delom države in ključnimi tranzitnimi koridorji. Te regije trpijo zaradi najdaljših dostopnih časov do avtocest, najnižjih ravni produktivnosti, občutnega podjetniškega zastoja ter izrazitih demografskih izzivov.

Državni prostorski načrti za ključne odseke tretje razvojne osi so bili sprejeti med letoma 2012 in 2017. Prva gradbena dela na severnem delu trase so se začela šele jeseni 2020, uradni začetek gradnje hitre ceste na Koroškem pa je sledil 24. avgusta 2021. Začetek gradnje severnega kraka je tako zamujal med 4 in 9 leti, odvisno od posameznega odseka in od časa sprejetja prostorskega akta. Na južnem delu, med Novim mestom, Malinami in Belo krajino, se zaradi večkratne razveljavitve gradbenega dovoljenja dejanska gradnja še vedno ni začela, pri čemer začetek gradnje zaostaja že za približno 13 let glede na prvotne načrte. Začetka gradnje ni mogoče pričakovati pred letom 2028.

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Russia may confiscate $127 billion in Western assets in response to the use of its frozen assets to aid Ukraine, writes the Financial Times.

This threat has alarmed countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Austria, and is being considered at the EU level, sources say.

According to the Kiev School of Economics, the Kremlin has already confiscated or frozen the assets of at least 32 Western companies due to previous disputes, resulting in losses of at least $57 billion.

Russia may confiscate local subsidiaries of European companies in accordance with a decree signed by Putin in September, which introduces an accelerated nationalization procedure. The Kremlin justified this decision as a way to quickly respond to “hostile actions” such as the confiscation of EU assets.

Belgian officials believe that Euroclear will be the first victim of Russia’s potential retaliatory measures, as its clients’ assets worth about €17 billion are still blocked there and are at risk.

The publication writes that 2,315 Western companies are still actively operating in Russia. These include the Russian branches of banks such as Austria’s Raiffeisen and Italy’s UniCredit, which made significant profits during the war and cannot withdraw them due to a ban on dividend payments.

According to the Kyiv School of Economics, foreign companies earned $19.5 billion in profits in Russia last year.

The confiscation of Russian assets could affect Western investors who owned shares in Russian companies traded on the stock exchange before the invasion, as well as Western companies with stakes in Russian corporations or operating in the country.

Also at the beginning of the war, Russia banned Western investors from selling their Russian securities and withdrawing the proceeds. Dividends and coupons are held in so-called Type C accounts under Russian control. They can be confiscated.

BP’s dividends from its 19.75% stake in Rosneft, according to a former employee of the Central Bank of Russia, Alexandra Prokopenko, are likely to be about 340 billion rubles, and according to a court decision in 2024, JPMorgan had 243 billion rubles in Russian assets “mainly” in Type C accounts.

“This is one of Moscow’s trump cards. If Europe takes any action against Russia’s reserves, Russia can simply transfer the funds from Type C accounts to the budget,” said Prokopenko. “This gives them a source of direct income when they are experiencing a deficit and overspending on defense.”

This step also worries European countries and increases their doubts about the feasibility of issuing a reparation loan secured by frozen Russian assets.

Last week, the Italian government supported the EU’s decision to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, but also expressed concern about the potential risks of using them to finance Ukraine.

Italian parliamentarian Claudio Borghi from the ruling coalition party “Lega” warned of the consequences if the EU implements its plans.

“How can you think that the actual theft of another country’s money will not lead to further disaster?” said Borghi to FT. “The first consequence will be that Russia will feel entitled to confiscate all foreign assets.”

Austria is also concerned that Moscow may attempt to nationalize Raiffeisen’s subsidiary, Austria’s largest bank, which earned $2.9 billion in revenue in Russia last year.

“This is uncharted legal territory, and, honestly, there is a growing lack of understanding of why the Commission simply does not conduct more negotiations with member states and, at least, make them feel that their concerns are being taken seriously,” said an Austrian official.