Evropski kaos, ki se je ponovno demonstriral prejšnji konec tedna, seveda nikogar ne preseneča. Razen morda evropskih politikov. Je tipično stanje za disfunkcionalno EU. Na evropskem vrhu, ki naj bi trajal dva dni, so hoteli potrditi 40 milijardni paket vojaške pomoči za Ukrajino, vendar so pozabili, da morajo vse podrobnosti dogovoriti pred sestankom in da je sestanek namenjen zgolj slikanju ob podpisu dogovora. Nič ni bilo iz dogovora o 40 milijardah evrov pomoči. Iz 40 milijard se je izcimil predlog o 5 milijardah evrov, vendar tudi o tem ni bilo dogovora. Kajti večina držav ne bi dala svojega denarja, nekatere bi dale evropski denar, nekatere bi dale orožje. Potreben bo nov evropski vrh na to temo.

Podobna zgodba je bila glede pogajalskega procesa – evroposki politiki so se pritoževali, da se Trump in Putin pogovarjata mimo njih in da niso vključeni v ppgajalski proces, nakar se niso mogli dogovoriti, kdo bi se sploh ppgajal v imenu EU. Zunanjepolitična predstavnica  EU Kaja Kallas se je počutila prizadeto, ker niso pomislili, da bi to lahko bila ona.

Ob tem je zanimiva ambicija, da bi se na nevarnost ruske agresije v tako disfunkcionalni Evropi radi pripravili v obdobju 10 let. Torej se morajo s Putinom dogovoriti, da naj počaka 10 let, preden se odloči napasti Nemčijo ali kogarkoli pač.

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For a brief moment there, it seemed that the performative threat of an “imminent invasion” by Putin would make the European Union less dysfunctional than it always is (and indeed, when it comes to agreeing to have German debt fund everyone’s prosperity for a few years, if it meant agreeing that “Putin man bad”, with hundreds of billions in new debt issuance, there was shocking agreement across Europe). It didn’t last however, and on Thursday EU leaders tussled over weapons deliveries to Kyiv and who would represent them in US-led diplomacy as the bloc struggled to formulate a strategy on Ukraine.

As Bloomberg reports, an EU summit in Brussels was unable to agree on delivering €5 billion ($5.4 billion) to secure ammunition for Ukraine this year, as members including France and Italy balked at committing to specific financial volumes. A number of European leaders will meet again in Paris on March 27 to try to drive the process forward, but they too will fail to agree (unless Germany agrees to foot the entire bill).

“The objective for me on Thursday is first of all for there to be a renewed and explicit commitment, and perhaps one that is a little more specific, on short-term support for Ukraine,” French President Emmanuel Macron said late Thursday as leaders filed out, and Macron failed to achieve his objective.

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Janan Ganesh, kolumnist in urednik pri Financial Timesu, je v svoji nedavni kolumni z naslovom »Europe must trim its welfare state to build a warfare state«, objavljeni 5. marca 2025, zapisal, da bodo morale evropske države za povečanje obrambnih zmogljivosti zmanjšati izdatke za socialo, predvsem za pokojnine in zdravstvo. Trdi, da je tradicionalna evropska socialna država nevzdržna ob trenutnih varnostnih zahtevah, zlasti ob demografskih spremembah in fiskalnih omejitvah.

Na njegovo mnenje so se odzvali številni komentatorji. Med drugim Judith Kirton-Darling in Isabelle Barthès, predstavnici sindikalne zveze industriAll Europe, opozarjata, da bi bilo zmanjševanje socialne blaginje za financiranje obrambe lahko kontraproduktivno, saj bi lahko oslabilo notranjo stabilnost in varnost. Opozarjata na zgodovinske primere, ko so varčevalni ukrepi pripeljali do političnega ekstremizma:

»Varčevanje ni imelo zgolj gospodarskih, temveč tudi politične posledice. Desetletje po veliki recesiji analiza 200 evropskih regionalnih volitev kaže neposredno povezavo med fiskalno konsolidacijo in uspehom političnih skrajnežev. Voditelji EU razmišljajo o sprožitvi klavzule o izjemnih okoliščinah v fiskalnih pravilih, da vojaški izdatki ne bi šteli v omejitve porabe EU. A močni navzven bomo le, če bomo močni navznoter.«

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Temu se moramo upreti.

Janen Ganesh (Financial Times):

Europe must trim its welfare state to build a warfare state. There is no way of defending the continent without cuts to social spending.

Michael Roberts:

So so-called ‘liberal capitalism’ needs to survive and that means cutting living standards for the poorest and spending money on going to war. From welfare state to warfare state.

Največjo nevarnost sedanjega časa predstavlja kvazi-liberalna elita na oblasti, ki nas želi prepričati, da nam preti vojaška nevarnost iz Rusije in nevarnost totalitarizma iz Kitajske, zaradi česar moramo omejiti svobodo govora in demokratični izbor na volitvah in zaradi česar moramo namesto v tehnološki razvoj vlagati navzgor neomejena sredstva v orožje in zaradi česar se moramo odpovedati socialni državi, da bi lahko imeli vojaško državo.  Največja nevarnost sedanjega časa ne preti iz Moskve ali Pekinga, ampak iz Bruslja in od kvazi-liberalne elite, ki kot mesečarji sledijo zmešancem v Bruslju.

Norost je, da imamo fiskalno zavoro za vlaganja v družbeno infrastrukturo, za vlaganja v razvoj in za financiranje  ključnih javnih storitev, medtem ko sprostimo fiskalno zavoro za vlaganja v orožje. To ni samo norost, to je kriminal.

Progresivci se moramo organizirano upreti  tej norosti in temu kriminalu nad demokracijo in socialno državo.

Naša državljanska dolžnost je, da zaščitimo socialno državo, da zaščitimo državo blaginje in da namesto za orožje javna sredstva namenimo za družbeno infrastrukturo, za zdravstvo, izobraževanje in razvoj in s tem za našo prihodnjo blaginjo!

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The current discussion of a Mar-a-Lago accord presumes substantial inflows into US financial assets from governments seeking to hold safe global assets —
But there were no such flows in the US balance of payments in the fourth quarter.

And the fourth quarter isn’t an outlier — the runup in the US current account deficit in 2024 (please take note @IMFNews) was financed privately, official (official = foreign central bank and SWF) demand for US assets was modest!

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Nova nemška vlada načrtuje velik, bilijonski stimulus za spodbuditev nemškega gospodarstva, ki že tri leta stagnira. Toda za uspeh tega infrastrukturno-vojaškega keynesianizma Nemčija potrebuje nizke cene energije, kar pomeni, da potrebuje poceni ruski plin in da se odpove dosedanji kvazizeleni energetski politiki.

V javnosti bilijonski (1000-milijardni) stimulus paket nove nemške vlade, za katerega je bilo treba spremeniti v ustavi zapisano dolžniško zavoro in ki jo je, paradoksalno, izglasoval še parlament v stari sestavi, ker je obstajal realni strah, da nova koalicija zanj ne bi uspela zagotoviti potrebne dvotretjinske večine, popularno imenujejo “Merzev whatever it takes stimulus“. To je referenca na Draghijev “whatever it takes” program kvantitativnega monetarnega sproščanja s strani ECB (z začetkom v marcu 2015), ki je prek vpliva na znižanje obrestnih mer naredil prostor za fiskalno politiko perifernih držav (predvsem Italije in Španije) in s tem rešil evro pred razpadom. To nakazuje, kako velika so pričakovanja v zvezi s tem programom.

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Iz nove publikacije, naročene s strani ECON komisije v evropskem parlamentu: Europe’s policy options in the face of Trump’s global economic reordering (marec 2025).

In this paper, we propose and analyse four scenarios of a second Trump administration’s economic policy and its impact on Europe, ranging all the way from moderate tariffs to full trade war, a full multilateral breakdown with the US leaving the IMF down to a more cooperative exchange rate realignment agreement. We assess two trade scenarios quantitatively and outline broader policy shocks and their economic consequences. Our findings highlight significant challenges for the ECB, requiring responses to trade disruptions, financial instability, and potential global economic reordering. We offer specific policy recommendations for the ECB to navigate these uncertainties.

Conslusions

Trump’s economic policies pose serious risks of trade and financial disruption. An escalating trade war, coupled with retaliatory measures and global exchange rate volatility, could severely impact the economic outlook. The ECB would be forced into uncharted territory, balancing inflationary pressures with slowing growth, creating difficult trade-offs and heightened uncertainty.

A period of economic turmoil could eventually lead to a new global economic agreement. If the crisis leads to international policy coordination, the EU may need to undertake major adjustments to its macroeconomic policy mix, including exchange rate strategy. In its 25-year history, neither the EU nor the ECB has negotiated such an agreement, meaning they would have to establish new policy coordination mechanisms and activate treaty provisions on exchange rate policy for the first time.

A worst-case scenario could see the collapse of the multilateral order, forcing Europe into a greater global financial role. If the US were to withdraw from the WTO and IMF, it could trigger a systemic shift akin to the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 1970s. This would require European institutions to take on greater responsibility for global financial stability. The ECB, in particular, would need to expand its swap and repo operations, acting as a liquidity provider on a much broader scale, including to non-EU and non-bank actors.

The ECB must prepare for multiple economic and financial contingencies. The central bank will need to refine its inflation-targeting framework to account for external shocks, carefully calibrate its balance sheet reduction to avoid excessive financial tightening, and strengthen its financial backstops. It may also need to deepen coordination with EU fiscal authorities, particularly if a large-scale macroeconomic adjustment becomes necessary. In a scenario where the US politicises dollar liquidity or retreats from multilateral institutions, the ECB could face new responsibilities in stabilising global financial markets – requiring a strategic expansion of its crisis-management toolkit.

The ECB and European institutions must urgently prepare for these uncertain but increasingly probable scenarios.

Revija Foreign Policy (ki je morda še bolj jastrebska od revije Foreign Affairs) je v zadnji številki odkrila realpolitiko oziroma (kot ji oni rečejo) geopolitiko. V bistvu je cela številka namenjena ponovnemu odkrivanju realizma v mednarodnih odnosih. V svetu, v katerem sta se pomen in vloga Zahoda močno zmanjšala.

 Za pokušino – uvodni članek z istim naslovom kot zgoraj secira evropsko prebujenje v nov svet realpolitike, ki jo je povsem šokiral. nenadoma se je zbudila brez varuha in dojela, da je v tem novem svetu nepomembna in nebogljena. Stvari se dogajajo mimo nje. Lahko se samo repenči doma na svojem pragu, toda to nikogar ne zanima.

Jamie Galbraith (University of Texas) je naredil odlično analizo kaotičnosti trumpizma. Težko je bolje opisati kaotičnost ukrepanja in kaos, ki ga je povzročila reakcionarna psolovna elita, ki je prevzela oblast v ZDA. Na dolgi rok bo s temi ukrepi, ki kratkoročno škodijo šibkejšim (zaposlenim in potrošnikom) prizadela predvsem lastne interese. Tako kot komunisti, tako kot zeleni, tudi poslovneži nikoli ne bi smeli imeti odločilnega vpliva v vladi. Ker so ekstremisti. Nekaj njihovih idej je dobrih, toda njihov celotni, enostranski in ekstremistični program je katastrofa za družbo in gospodarstvo. Poglejte Slovenijo, poglejte Nemčijo, poglejte Argentino, poglejte Ameriko…

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What to make of the blur of news, revolutionary rhetoric, panicky fundraising texts, economic indicators, the plunging stock market, and, of course, President Trump’s address to a joint session of Congress on March 4, 2025? Are we on the brink of a socioeconomic Armageddon? Or is there—as the great Tallulah Bankhead once said, “less in this than meets the eye”?

Leaving aside the buckets called “culture wars” and “foreign policy,” we may distinguish eight distinct forces at work in Trump’s economics. They are (a) the targeted destruction of specific regulatory agencies, (b) random disruptions of the federal civil service, (c) old-fashioned Reaganism, (d) tariffs, (e) migration, (f) energy, (g) the military, and (h) the general effect of rash and unpredictable policymaking—otherwise called uncertainty and chaos.

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Vsi se trudimo razumeti smisel v ozadju Trumpovega kaotičnega razmontiravanja globalne trgovinske ureditve prek uvajanja visokih carin. Robert Lighthizer je v prvem Trumpovem mandatu (2017 – 2020) opravljal funkcijo predstavnika ZDA za trgovino (USTR) in imel osrednjo vlogo pri oblikovanju ameriške trgovinske politike v času Trumpove administracije. Lighthizer poskuša razložiti racio za Trumpovimi carinami, čeprav…

• (0:00) Why Do We Need to Reinstitute Tariffs?
• (6:10) The Slow Death of America’s Working Class
• (13:35) Donald Trump’s Plan to Fix the Economy
• (14:26) Was There an Organized Effort to Destroy America’s Free Market?
• (19:52) The Trifecta of Stupid
• (26:12) We Are in an Economic Emergency
• (32:16) The Three Ways to Balance Global Trade
• (34:45) Can America Be the World’s Biggest Manufacturing Power Once Again?
• (38:47) Why Lighthizer’s View Differs From Establishment Economists
• (49:13) How Washington and Big Business Benefit From the Death of the Middle Class
• (56:44) The Two Parts to Trump’s Tariff Plan
• (1:03:25) Will We See Inflation Due to Tariffs?
• (1:07:50) The Economic War With China
• (1:11:49) How China Is Trying to Avoid Trump’s Tariffs
• (1:25:50) Reestablishing an Economic Relationship With Russia
• (1:31:34) The Lies You’ve Been Told About the Nasdaq