Hasan Ahmadian, professor of Middle East Studies at the University of Tehran, laid out Iran’s view of the current negotiations during Al Jazeera’s discussion on the upcoming US-Iran talks in Geneva:

His main arguments:

Why close Hormuz:

Ahmadian said the closure came on the second day of peak “Israeli savagery” in southern Lebanon. Iran had actually shown restraint, he suggested, holding back from a larger military response it could have launched, and instead using the strait to make a point: the agreement “cannot be divided” into pieces that each side picks from.

Why not boycott talks with U.S.:

Asked why Iran didn’t simply refuse to attend the upcoming talks in Geneva, Ahmadian said that would have sent the wrong signal, letting Washington think “Hormuz is over and we’ve moved on.” Closing the strait, by contrast, makes clear that if one side reneges on any single clause, the other will suspend a clause too, before talks can advance.

The deal is binding:

Ahmadian pushed back on the idea that the MOU is just a loose statement of intent. He said it contains, in its Article 13, five specific steps both sides must complete before negotiations even begin, one of which is a ceasefire in Lebanon. The US, he acknowledged, had met some obligations, lifting its naval blockade and letting Iranian oil exports resume, but Israel’s attacks on Lebanon continued, so Iran responded by suspending another of the five steps: keeping Hormuz open.

Why the US conceded in the MOU:

Ahmadian said the episode exposes a US that, for all its power, “has no appetite for risk.” Washington fought a war it was unwilling to lose a single soldier in, he argued, which is why it keeps offering concessions it may dislike. The strait has now become an international crisis the US cannot disown, because it created it.

Hezbollah is not a bargaining chip:

Rejecting the idea that Hezbollah is a mere proxy Iran can trade away, Ahmadian called the group part of Iran’s “national security” and “an extension of Iran itself,” not just an ally. He said there is no precedent for Iran abandoning an ally to its enemies. He contrasted Lebanon with Gaza, which he said Iran could do little to save because it was sealed off by both Israel and Arab states, whereas Lebanon cannot be besieged the same way.

Lebanon and Gaza are both part of Iran’s plans:

Ahmadian noted Lebanon is named three times in the memorandum’s first clause, and again in Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s statement explaining the deal to the Iranian public, which frames it around the interests of Iran and “the resistance front.” He added that Gaza is covered too, since the text calls for halting the war “on all fronts.”

Supporting the resistance has cost Iran, not enriched it:

Responding to the charge that Iran exploits the Palestinian cause cheaply, Ahmadian countered that backing the resistance has been “hugely costly.” Had Iran walked away from it, he said, it “would have been crowned queen of the region” as it was before the 1979 revolution, arguing its choices reflect sacrifice.

A new Iranian posture:

Ahmadian said Iran has left behind its long era of “strategic patience.” Its harder line toward the US, its strikes on Israel, and its move to defend Lebanon all reflect what he called a new “strategic reciprocity,” responding to force with force, that will shape Iranian policy going forward.

The real story is Arab absence:

Ahmadian argued Iran is influential in the region because it finds a vacuum to fill. The deeper problem, he said, is a “huge Arab exposure” that has left the region “a playground” for others. He pointed at Egypt and the Gulf states, asking what they had actually done, and said that while Iran can be criticized endlessly, “the Arab” performance “is the scandal.”