On 29 January 2026, I was on the “Deep Dive” with Lt. Col. (ret.) Danny Davis. We had an excellent discussion on what President Trump’s options are in a war against Iran. We both agreed that he has no good military option at this point or for the foreseeable future, which is not to say Trump will not attack. But all the evidence indicates that he would be foolish to do so. Indeed, it is quite clear that the Israelis, who asked him not to attack on January 14th, when he appeared ready to do so, still have reservations about the wisdom of an attack.

It is worth noting that the Israelis launched major attacks by themselves against Iran on 19 April 2024 and 26 October 2024. They then launched major attacks with the United States against Iran during the 12-day war in June 2025. Today, Israel is apparently planning to sit on the sidelines while the US attacks Iran by itself.

What is going on? Netanyahu tried hard to drag the Biden administration into attacking Iran with Israel in 2024, but failed. Biden and his lieutenants understood that a war with Iran was not in the American national interest. Netanyahu succeeded, however, in getting Trump to join forces with Israel and attack Iran in June 2025. Now he has helped maneuver Trump into contemplating a US-only war against Iran, although it appears that the Israelis are getting cold feet. Someone is being played for a sucker.

Below is the segment of the show dealing with a possible attack on Iran.

Razprave o morebitnem ameriško-izraelskem napadu na Iran se pogosto začnejo in končajo pri vojaški tehnologiji. Koliko letal, koliko raket, koliko prestreznikov. Ta perspektiva je zavajajoča. Ne zato, ker bi bila napačna, temveč zato, ker zgreši bistvo sodobnih konfliktov: zmaga ni več funkcija ognjene moči, temveč funkcija vzdržljivosti, stroškov in politične ekonomije konflikta.

Če pogledamo suha dejstva, je razmerje vojaških zmogljivosti jasno. Združene države in Izrael imajo popolno prevlado v zraku, satelitsko izvidovanje, natančno vodenje ognja in večslojno protiraketno obrambo. Iran na drugi strani nima primerljive zračne sile, ima pa nekaj drugega: veliko količino razmeroma poceni napadalnega orožja – balistične in križarske rakete ter brezpilotne letalnike – in doktrino, ki je zgrajena okoli množičnosti in izčrpavanja.

Tu se začne problem za napadalce. Obrambni sistemi, kot so Železna kupola, Davidova frača in Arrow, delujejo. A delujejo po ceni, ki je ekonomsko nevzdržna v daljšem časovnem obdobju. Prestrezna raketa stane od več deset tisoč do več milijonov evrov. Dron ali enostavna raketa, ki jo prestreza, pa pogosto nekaj tisočkrat manj. To ni tehnični, ampak ekonomski problem.

Če bi Iran izvedel enkraten, omejen povračilni napad, bi ga obramba absorbirala. Če pa bi sledila serija napadov, raztegnjena čez več tednov, bi v ospredje stopile omejitve, o katerih vojaški načrtovalci neradi govorijo: zaloge prestreznikov, proizvodni roki, vzdrževanje sistemov in človeški faktor. ZDA lahko proizvajajo orožje, vendar ne v realnem času. Zaloge pa niso neskončne, še posebej v razmerah, ko so že obremenjene zaradi drugih kriz.

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To so res neverjetne razlike v učinkovitosti med človeško in umetno inteligenco: za enako kognitivno aktivnost človeški možgani porabijo 12 W energije (kot varčna žarnica v eni uri), umetna inteligenca pa 2.7 GW oziroma 225 milijonkrat več energije.

Dokaz, kako učinkovita je bila evolucija glede razvoja energetsko varčnega biološkega računalnika v naših glavah.

Your brain is running on just 12 watts right now while processing this sentence. An AI system would need 2.7 billion watts to do the same thing.

That’s not a typo. The human brain operates on roughly the same amount of power as a dim light bulb, yet it can recognize faces, solve complex problems, create art, and experience emotions simultaneously. Meanwhile, artificial intelligence systems require massive data centers consuming enough electricity to power entire cities just to simulate a fraction of what your brain does effortlessly.

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