Iranski napad na Izrael v noči na nedeljo je imel predvsem piarovski namen. Po izraelskem napadu na poslopje iranske ambasade v Damasku, kjer so bili ubiti visoki častniki iranske vojske, je Iran “moral” izvršiti povračilno akcijo, da si ohrani svoj obraz. To pa je naredil na tak način, da bi povzročil čim manj škode Izraelu in da ne bi izzval izraelskih povračilnih ukrepov. Iran je napad napovedoval, nato pa ga izvršil s počasnimi droni, raketami in balističnimi raketami, ki so jih izraelske, ameriške, britanske in jordanske sile brez težav sestrelile že nad tujimi ozemlji. Le nekaj raket je zadelo vojaške cilje v Izraelu (letališči Nevatim in Ramon z najsodobnejšimi radarji (kar je bil najbrž signal Irana, kaj lahko naredi, če želi)). Že tekom “napada” je iransko diplomatsko predstavništvo pri OZN sporočilo, da je Iran s tem izvršil svojo akcijo in da je s tem zanj zadeva končana.

Torej Iran je izvršil povračilni napad, da bi ohranil svoj obraz v mednarodni skupnosti in da ne bi izzval povračilnih ukrepov Izraela (ob hkratnem signalu, kaj lahko sledi) oziroma da ne bi privedel do večje eskalacije konflikta in regionalne vojne, v katero bi se zapletle tudi ZDA in zaveznice obeh strani. Uradni Washington je, kot pravilno ocenjuje The Economist, zadovoljen s tovrstnim razpletom:

So Iran has launched its retaliation against Israel. It amounts, we’ve observed, to the opposite of shock and awe. Yes, it was unprecedented for hundreds of slow-moving drones, as well as faster missiles, to fly towards Israel directly from Iranian soil. But the vast majority of them were easily shot from the sky, by Israeli forces or their allies or neighbours. So far, it appears, not a single person has died as a result.

Perhaps Binyamin Netanyahu will feel the need, in turn, to respond to this. I hope not. Iran’s leaders, despite posturing intended for a domestic audience, have signalled they want the direct exchanges to stop here. Israel’s own act, earlier this month, when it bombed an Iranian consulate in Damascus and killed a top Iranian general, was a grave blow but also a provocative one. America and other allies who helped to defend Israel this weekend want no wider regional war.

Vendar pa to ne pomeni, da je konflikta med Izraelom in Iranom s tem tudi zares konec in da ni več nevarnosti za regionalno vojno.

Problem namreč leži tako v interpretaciji tega dogodka s strani izraelskih oblasti kot v širših interesih izraelskih oblasti. Prvič, izraelska vlada in vojaški vrh si tudi želita ohraniti svoj obraz v mednarodni skupnosti, zato je (tudi sodeč po kriznih sestankih vrha države in odobritvi Knesseta napada na Iran) mogoče pričakovati izraelski povračilni napad. Izrael nima težav z napadi na sosednje države tudi brez povoda. Tokrat ima “dober” povod in težko verjamem, da ga ne bi “izkoristil”. To je v naravi te države.

In drugič, potrebno je razumeti širše interese izraelskih oblasti. Izrael je namreč – po mnenju večine analitikov – izgubil vojno s Hamasom, hkrati pa si je z brezkompromisnim in ciljanim pokolom civilnega prebivalstva v Gazi zapravil praktično skoraj vse mednarodne simpatije. Izraelski predsednik vlade Netanyahu za svoje preživetje potrebuje zmago v tem konfliktu. To lahko dobi bodisi le tako, da izvede totalni napad na Rafo in da pobije ali prežene več kot 1.4 milijona Palestincev iz Gaze ter nato razglasi zmago nad Hamasom. Ali pa tako, da svoj poraz s Hamasom zasenči s sprovociranjem regionalne vojne, v katero bi pritegnil ZDA in V. Britanijo, kjer bi se na koncu lahko slikal na podestu z zmagovalnimi silami.

Toda računica glede slednjega se Izraelu lahko tudi ne izide. In sicer, če mu s povračilnimi napadi na Iran (ter Sirijo in Libanon) ne bi uspelo zanetiti regionalne vojne, v katero bi vpletel tudi ZDA. Če se mu to ne posreči in če se “kloftanje z raketami” z Iranom nadaljuje v nekaj iteracijah, se lahko Izrael vojaško izčrpa, ker bo slejkoprej izčrpal svoj protizračni arzenal. Izraelu bo prej zmanjkalo raket kot Iranu. In ne bo jih mogel več veliko dobiti od zahodnih zaveznikov. Žrtev tega “kloftanja z raketami” pa bo Ukrajina, ker bo ostalo manj raket zanjo.

Spodaj je dobra analiza z nekaj opcijami. Meni se sicer vse skupaj zdi povsem nepotrebno in nezrelo “sabljanje z raketami” nedoraslih odraslih politikov.

Tonight Iran’s expected answer for the Israeli attack on the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, took place. Iran attacked Israel with several hundreds of missiles and drones, as well as with simultaneous MLRS strikes from Iranian proxies in Lebanon and maybe Syria. How successful was this strike and what are the risks for escalation?

It’s easy to get carried away in the middle of an ongoing attack, but it’s important to try to analyse things with a level head. There was much anxiety tonight that this was the beginning of the Third World War, but that’s still a bit premature to claim that.

During the night reports said that thousands of missiles and drones attacked all over Israel. You might get a thousand if MLRS-missiles fired by Hizbollah are included. According to Israeli sources 36 Cruise Missiles (CM:s), 110 Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM:s) and 185 drones attacked Israel. The main targets seems to have been several Israeli military installations, maybe those that were involved in the Israeli attack on Damascus. One confirmed target was the Ramon airbase in southern Israel, which was hit by at least 4 missiles.

Iran claimed that the attack was according to the UN Charter, and that it was an answer to the Israeli attack on Iranian (diplomatic) territory in Damascus. Now Iran says that they and Israel are even. Israel on the other side says that they will answer in kind, which Iran will see as an escalation.

During the attack Israel got some direct military support from US, UK and Jordanian military assets. Together with the Israeli Iron Dome AD (Air Defence) shield most of the missiles and maybe all of the drones were shot down. The actual number of missiles that got through is unclear but numbers wary from 7 to a couple of dozens. The drones were probably mainly intended to act as diversions, forcing the IDF to use up valuable AD assets.

The United States probably wants to avoid getting drawn into a larger regional conflict. Especially with high tension both on the Korean peninsula and around Taiwan. US military assets near Israel will probably continue in helping defend Israeli territory, saying that they defend US military personnel on the ground in Israel. But the US will probably avoid taking part in any offensive operations towards Iran, at least for the time being.

A potential problem for Israel in a prolonged conflict are the numbers of AD missiles they have. The Iron Dome is only effective as long as Israel has a lot of AD missiles. During the Gaza war, Israel has gotten a lot of deliveries of weaponry from the US, since Israel has a limited capability in a war of attrition.

But the question arises, how much advanced AD can the US send to Israel? Much of these resources might be needed in potential conflicts with China/PRC and North Korea/DPRK. But some AD resources will probably be sent from the US, but not near the numbers needed to replace the Israeli usage of AD missiles, even during last night.

The main loser on the escalating conflict is probably Ukraine. Ukraine seems to have used up most of its AD resources and are in dire need of replacements. With an increased need for AD missiles in many places around the World, Ukraine will probably be last in the queue to get replacements. Which will only increase the Russian superiority in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

What will happen now? Much depends on actual Israeli losses tonight. For the time being only one casualty is reported from Israel. If that’s true it might limit an Israeli retaliatory response. But Israel will respond, and Iran will respond to that Israeli response. So there will be an escalation, but the question arises, can the US, Russia and China convince both parties to de-escalate? Maybe, by reducing the scope of the retaliatory strikes step by step until they fade out. Neither side wants to lose face and appear weak.

Vir: Mikael Valtersson