Spodaj je nekaj odlomkov iz članka v zadnjem The Economistu o “presenetljivi” odpornosti ruskega gospodarstva na vojno in sankcije. Članek je tradicionalna analiza, kot bi se je lotili na IMF za katerokoli državo na svetu. In v tem je njegova težava – članek ne upošteva dveh ključnih elementov: specifičnosti ruskega gospodarstva in geopolitike.

Prvič, kot sem v zadnjih dveh letih že neštetokrat napisal, praktično nemogoče je sankcionirati državo, ki je globalno velik dobavitelj “sistemskih dobrin”, kot sta nafta in plin, ki sta ključna inputa za vsako gospodarstvo. Brez energije ni gospodarske aktivnosti, pomanjkanje energije pa povzroči inflacijski šok, zato bodo države vedno našle način, da pridejo do energije. In Rusija ni imela težav prodati svojega plina in nafte ter hkrati dosegati še ekstra dobičkov. Kdor je mislil, da bo drugače, je slab ekonomski analitik.

In drugič, zahodni politiki in analitiki so spregledali ključna geopolitična dejstva, in sicer da je Rusija velesila in da se je globalno gospodarsko težišče premaknilo proti Kitajski, ki pa jo hkrati ZDA želijo s trgovinskimi in tehnološkimi vojnami ter političnimi provokacijami glede Tajvana zaustaviti. Posledica je – sicer predvidljiva in napovedana – nočna mora za ZDA, da sta se povezali in močno integrirali dve največji državi na svetu, ki to ne bi smeli in pred čemer so svarili klasiki geopolitične doktrine. In da sta s seboj v navezo potegnili še druge velike države “globalnega Juga” (BRICS+), ki imajo poln kufer ameriškega vmešavanja, pridiganja in izsiljevanja. Kdor je mislil, da bo drugače, je slab politični analitik, ki je prešprical klasike ameriške geopolitične doktrine (George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski) in realizma v mednarodnih odnosih (John Mearsheimer). 

In kaj zdaj, ko je (predvidljivo) propadla obstoječa strategija, in ko rusko gospodarstvo robustno raste, ko proizvede na dan za 3-krat več orožja in municije kot vse zahodne države skupaj, ko je Rusija demonstrirala superiornost v sodobnem bojevanju (droni, motenje signala, supersonične rakete, uničevalec satelitov), ko je Rusija preusmerila prodajo plina in nafte v druge države in ko je 100 milijard uvoza iz zahodnih držav zdaj povsem nadomestil uvoz iz Kitajske? Kakšna je nova strategija, ko je Ukrajini de facto zmanjkalo za boj spodobnih mož in na fronto v gotovo smrt pošiljajo 18-letnike, ženske in starce. Bo NATO poslal svoje sile v zahodno Ukrajino (katere?) in tvegal jedrski spopad? Kaj bo po Trumpovi zmagi na predsedniških volitvah v ZDA?

Kakšna je strategija? Jo sploh imajo?

In the two years since Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy has repeatedly defied the doomsayers. A financial collapse, widely predicted in the spring of 2022, never came to pass. The economy fell into recession, but it was less severe than expected and did not last long. Inflation was the most recent scare. Last year prices accelerated rapidly; economists believed they could spiral out of control. Even Mr Putin was worried. In February he urged officials to give “special consideration” to rising prices.

Once again, however, the Russian economy appears to be proving the pessimists wrong. Data to be published on March 13th are expected to show that prices rose by 0.6% month-on-month in February, down from 1.1% at the end of last year. On a year-on-year basis inflation is probably no longer rising, having hit 7.5% in November. Many forecasters expect the rate to fall to just 4% before long, and households’ expectations of future inflation have flattened. The result of Russia’s presidential election, which begins on March 15th, is a foregone conclusion. If it was competitive, these figures would do Mr Putin no harm.

…

Yet Russia still seems to be heading for a “soft landing”, in which inflation slows without crushing the economy. The performance of the economyis now in line with its pre-invasion trend; GDP grew in real terms by more than 3% last year. Unemployment remains at a record low. And there is little evidence of corporate distress; indeed, the rate of business closures recently hit an eight-year low. The Moscow Exchange is hoping to see more than 20 initial public offerings this year, up from nine last year. The latest “real-time” data on economic activity are reasonably strong. Consensus forecasts for GDP growth this year of 1.7% look too pessimistic.

Russia’s economic resilience is in part the consequence of past stimulus. In recent years corporations and households have built up large cash balances, allowing them to continue spending even in the face of high inflation, and avoid default in the face of high borrowing costs. As in other parts of the world, falling demand for labour has mostly resulted in a decline in unfilled vacancies rather than in a lower number of people in employment. Figures from HeadHunter, a recruitment site, suggest that the ratio of open positions to jobseekers has stopped rising. Having struggled to find workers in recent months, bosses are reluctant to let people go unless they absolutely must.

Sanctions-busting has also juiced the economy. Russian production facilities formerly owned by Westerners have reopened under new management, points out the central bank in a recent report. At the start of the war, sanctions made it hard for Russian firms to source inputs, delaying production. Now, though, companies have set up durable supply chains with “friendly” countries. Well over half of goods imports come from China, twice the share from before the invasion.

As new trading relationships have bedded in, Russian exporters have dared to raise prices, supporting revenues and profits. The discount on oil Russia offers to Chinese customers, for instance, has fallen from more than 10% in early 2022 to about 5% today. And it is not just oil. Mr Putin boasts about soaring ice-cream exports to China, noting last week that he “treated my friend, President Xi Jinping”, to a lick.

As every Russian knows, inflation is never truly defeated. Central-bank officials continue to fret that inflation expectations remain too high. The biggest worry is that the rouble may depreciate, either because of lower oil prices, another round of serious sanctions or if China loses interest in supporting Mr Putin. These are serious concerns. Nevertheless, the world’s pariah economy is once again back on track.

Vir: The Economist