Povzetek s komentarjem na Moon of Alabama. Vojaška zmaga v tej poletni ukrajinski ofenzivi je bila možna samo v računalniških simulacijah, s katerimi so se igrali v Pentagonu. Realni izid je bil absolutno predvidljiv naprej. Kaj sledi?

1. Ruski počasni vojaški valjar, ki bo počasi zmlel nepripravljene ukrajinske obrambne linije in preostanek vojaških kapacitet. Rusiji se ne mudi, lahko si vzame leta časa.
2. Tenzija med Zalužnijem in Zelenskim bo vodila bodisi do vojaškega prevrata v Ukrajini bodisi do bega Zelenskega in prevzema oblasti s strani Zalužnega (do volitev je še daleč). Odhod Zelenskega odpira možnost za mirne rešitve vojne.
3. Pogajanja z Rusijo, ki menda že potekajo (kot poroča Seymour Hersh) na ravni vojaških poveljnikov (Zalužni in Gerasimov).
4. Ameriški beg iz Ukrajine: razglasili bodo zmago, odšli in pozabili na vse skupaj. Kot običajno. Napad na Gazo je način, kako pozornost svetovne javnosti preusmeriti in jo pripraviti, da pozabi na Ukrajino.
5. Samo mir je priložnost, da se Ukrajina spet postavi na noge.

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The Washington Post has produced a long, two part piece, about the failed ‘counter-offensive’ in Ukraine. It dispenses equal blame on the U.S. and British planners of the whole mess and the Ukrainian execution of it.

The bullet points from the first part:

Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine (archived)

Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:

• Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.
• U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training.
• U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.
• The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut.
• The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.
• Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance.
• As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.

And from the second part:

In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls (archived)

Key findings from reporting on the campaign include:

• Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience.
• Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.
• The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions.
• Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield.
• In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone.

All those points played a role.

My personal ones:

• Both, the Ukraine and its supporters, systematically underestimated Russian capabilities. (And still do.)
• Satellite reconnaissance showed Russian defense preparations on the level of the Battle of Kursk. There the German Wehrmacht, after way too long preparations, failed to break the Russian lines. The unlearned lesson from 1943: When you see defense lines like these, try something else.
• Battle simulations and table top war games have a ‘moral factor’ input for each side. Setting your sides’ factor to 10 and the enemy’s factor to 0, as the U.S. and UK obviously did, will let you win every time – but has no relation to reality.
• Air support would not have helped. Russian air defenses are too strong to counter it.
• The decision to use barely trained, ‘green’ brigades without any fighting experience was a serious error.
• Not to use smoke grenades and, in general, means of deception, was not reasonable at all.
• To have half of the new troops, the more experienced part, fight Zelenski’s already lost battle for Bakhmut, was a major political mistake.

All together made sure that the so called ‘counter-offensive’ never had a chance to take off. The bickering now is just an attempt to put the blame for the failure onto the other side of the table.

The Ukrainian General Zaluzny has learned from the battle. He now puts up somewhat realistic numbers to let the U.S. understand how small its chances to win really are:

Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi asked Pentagon chief for 17 million rounds of ammunition

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was informed during a visit to Kyiv that Ukraine needed 17 million rounds of ammunition and that US$ 350-400 billion worth of assets and personnel would be required to liberate the country.
…
Quote from a senior Defence Forces official: “Austin was told 17 million rounds of ammunition were needed. He was stunned, to put it mildly, because you wouldn’t be able to collect that many rounds in the whole world.”

The Ukrainian army does not have the ten thousands of barrels required to fire 17 million rounds. Nor has it the men to feed those imaginary guns.

Zaluzny obviously thinks that the war is lost and done with. And that it is time for politics that pursue peace:

In addition, according to a source, Austin also said Zaluzhnyi had complained privately to American generals about interference from the President’s Office [..]: “Austin told us privately that Zaluzhnyi was always complaining to his generals about the President’s Office and how it obstructed him. Well, obviously the president learned about those conversations too. And that isn’t conducive to trust.”However, the President’s Office is inclined to believe that Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal would facilitate his political career.

It is high time for the Biden administration to wrap this whole thing up. Do the usual thing: declare victory, leave and forget-about-it.

Whatever happens then will be left for the footnotes.

Vir: Moon of Alabama