Napoved Mikaela Valterssona, nekdanjega pripadnika švedske vojske, ki se je zelo izkazal v dosedanjih analizah poteka vojne v Ukrajini. Seveda so to zgolj napovedi na podlagi predpostavk. Je pa dobro poznati različne analize in ne živeti v svetu lastnih iluzij.

It’s nearly impossible to predict the development in the war in detail, since there are an infinite amount of outcomes, but I will try, at least partially. In general terms you can be sure that the war will not end in 2024 and that it will turn more and more in Russia’s favour. How much, will depend on the support from the western  countries. If western support continues at current levels the russian superiority will grow significantly already early in 2024. If western support at least reach the same levels it had earlier in 2023, the growing russian superiority might not be obvious until late in 2024.

Several others have predicted the development of the war in 2024. Both @Suriyakmaps and @WeebUnionWar have the same view as me, when it comes to a growing russian superiority, but they are more cautious when it comes to territorial changes. In 2023 the territorial gains on both sides have been minimal. Since neither side are so superior as to assure success in offensives against the other side, it’s easy to assume that the stalemate from 2023 will continue in 2024.

I don’t share that sentiment. I believe that russian air and artillery superiority, combined with larger forces on the ground will make it possible for the RuAF to advance much farther in 2024 than in 2023. But that doesn’t mean that russian armies will sweep through the steppes of Ukraine in a blitzkrieg. The strategy of UkrAF will also be important. If they squander their resources on ill advised offensives, the possibility increases that russian counteroffensives break through the ukrainian defences. Lack of resources and reserves is already a major problem for UkrAF.

Some might accuse me of being too optimistic when it comes to russian ability to advance, but as I said above, I don’t believe in gigantic russian conquests in 2024. I believe that something like 10-30 000 km2 (1,5-4 % of the territory of Ukraine) might be taken by RuAF in 2024. There are three main areas of possible russian advances.

The main area are the entire eastern front from Kupyansk in the north, down to Vuhledar in the south. RuAF will probably be able to reach the Oskil river and establish the river as an easily defendable western flank in the north. If Russia succeeds in doing that, UkrAF will be forced to retreat from most of their forward positions near Svatove and Kreminna. Another consequence will be that the Siversk “salient”, will become an real salient. With russian forces both in the directions of Bakhmut and Lyman, Siversk will be very hard to defend and most probably abandoned.

In the Bakhmut area, as well in all areas where UkraF has counterattacked, RuAF will try, and probably succeed, in taking back lost territories. West of Bakhmut, RuAF will probably reach the canal east of Chasiv Yar.

Further south, the most important area is Avdiivka. The area in itself is not especially large at around 150 km2. The importance is that Avdiivka is a fortress and if it falls, there are no good defences behind it. UkrAF will try to hold Avdiivka as long as possible to gain time to establish a new defenceline from Konstantinovka in the north to Kurakhove, or even to Vuhledar, in the south. After the fall of Avdiivka, RuAF will be able to bypass much of the ukrainian defencelines in South Donetsk.

The other two areas of possible russian advances are in Northeastern Kharkiv oblast and along the long russo-ukrainian border west of Kharkiv. In NE Kharkiv Russia could gain a sparsely populated area of 10 000 km2 without any larger risks in a fairly easy operation. They could also establish a buffer zone of 10-30 km rather easily along the thinly defended 500+ km border east of Kharkiv.

This prognosis is built on that both players use their cards wisely and that Ukraine at least get some more western support, than today’s dismal levels. In worst case scenario for Ukraine, all this could happen before the autumn of 2024.

What about Dniepr left bank…?

The main scenario 8s that ukrainian force’s return to the west bank in a couple of months. But an other alternative is that Russian forces retreat to better defensive positions around 20 km back. The reason for that is to lure UkrAF  to send larger forces over the Dniepr at the same time as they keep the bridges over Dniepr destroyed. The result would be a ukrainian bridgehead hard to supply and russian forces out of range from ukrainian artillery. After large losses the RuAF would probably wipe out that bridgehead during spring 2024. During the winter the bridgehead could serve as a morale booster for the Ukrainians, but at a high cost.

I believe RuAF want to take Kharkov, Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, but I also believe that they want to avoid a frontal assault on these cities. When the time is ripe they will try to encircle the cities. If that happens autumn 2024 or during 2025 is the question.

Russia will neither be able to, or want to, take the entire Ukraine. Most of Ukraine will probably be a neutral bufferstate between NATO and Russia. The only nations in real danger of Tussian incursions are non-NATO Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan.

Vir: Mikael Valtersson*, twitter

* Former officer Swedish Armed Forces/Air Defence, former defence politician and chief of staff Sweden Democrats. Current political and military analyst.