Kako se častno umakniti iz ukrajinske vojne, kako priznati, da se je kljub obilni vojaški podpori Zahoda ukrajinska ofenziva razvila v (absolutno predvidljiv in nujen) popoln fiasko in kako priznati, da je za Ukrajino optimalna rešitev čimprejšnji konec vojne, teritorialna in gospodarska konsolidacija zahodnega dela Ukrajine v zameno za teoritorialne koncesije Rusiji na jugu in vzhodu, brez da bi Rusiji s tem dvignili njeno pogajalsko moč? To je ključna dilema političnih elit v Washingtonu in še dveh ali treh glavnih donatorskih držav. In ker nočejo Rusiji dati zadovoljstva zmage in ji dvigovati pogajalske moči, je morebiten začetek pogajanj o mirni rešitvi ukrajinske vojne v uradni politiki še vedno absoluten tabu. Spodaj je dober opis ujetosti v ta tabu v New York Timesu.

Iz tega tabuja se nakazujeta dva izhoda. Prvi je, da se bo narativa o “(delni) uspešnosti ukrajinske ofenzive” nadaljevala še nekaj časa (čeprav je Ukrajina pred dnevi v boj poslala še zadnjo izmed 12-ih brigad, ki jo je še imela v rezevi), in prav tako narativa, da bodo zahodne države pomagale Ukrajini “dokler bo potrebno”, vse dokler situacija na bojišču ne pokaže, da Ukrajina nima več nobenega vojaka, ki bi ga še lahko poslala v gotovo smrt (do zdaj jih je, po mnogih ocenah, od začetka ofenzive umrlo med 47 in 50 tisoč). Do takrat pa bodo zameriške obveščevalne službe prek zahodnih medijev pripravile teren, da so pogajanja edino smiselna, pri čemer bodo krivdo za neuspeh prevalile na Ukrajino (včerajšnji odstop ukrajinskega ministra za obrambo Reznikova je treba razumeti v tej smeri).

Drugi pa je, da bodo – ker se Putin trenutno ni pripravljen začeti pogajati pod nobenimi pogoji, razen že predstavljenimi – v igro poskušale poslati posrednike iz tretjih držav. Predvsem Kitajsko. Spomnite se, kako so pred meseci, ko je Kitajska lansirala pogovore o možnosti mirovnih pogajanj, ZDA v trenutku “ubile” to iniciativo. No, zdaj bo Kitajska prišla prav, češ da edina lahko prepriča Rusijo v pogajanja, po katerih bi Rusija morala dati večje koncesije, kot jih je zdaj pripravljena. No, ZDA imajo pri tem težavo – v zadnjem letu so povsem zminirale diplomatske odnose s Kitajsko, Kitajska pa je medtem okrepila svoje politično, gospodarsko in vojaško sodelovanje z Rusijo. In ker ZDA Kitajsko izrinjajo iz globalizacije, se Kitajska strateško še toliko bolj navezuje na Rusijo.

Torej, vso srečo pri teh naporih.

Tudi jaz, ki sem najbolj navijal za hitro mirno rešitev (in to od 5. marca lani), sem postal pesimističen, da je hitra mirna rešitev za vojno v Ukrajini sploh še možna. Drugače rečeno, da je možna pred popolnim vojaškim in političnim kolapsom Ukrajine. Kar pa lahko traja še pol leta ali pa nekaj let. Na žalost in veliko škodo za Ukrajino in njeno prihodnost.

Stian Jenssen, the chief of staff to the secretary general of NATO, recently had his knuckles rapped when he commented on possible options for an end to the war in Ukraine that did not envision a complete Russian defeat.

“I’m not saying it has to be like this, but I think that a solution could be for Ukraine to give up territory and get NATO membership in return,” he said during a panel discussion in Norway, according to the country’s VG newspaper. He also said that “it must be up to Ukraine to decide when and on what terms they want to negotiate,” which is NATO’s standard line.

But the damage was done. The remarks provoked an angry condemnation from the Ukrainians; a clarification from his boss, Jens Stoltenberg; and ultimately an apology from Mr. Jenssen.

The contretemps, say some analysts who have been similarly chastised, reflects a closing down of public discussion on options for Ukraine just at a moment when imaginative diplomacy is most needed, they say.

Western allies and Ukrainians themselves had hung much hope on a counteroffensive that might change the balance on the battlefield, expose Russian vulnerability and soften Moscow up for a negotiated end to the fighting, which has stretched on for a year and a half.

…

The conditions on the battlefield raise the question of what might be done off it, these officials and analysts say, even if neither side appears open at the moment to talks. Others fear that too open a conversation may be interpreted by Moscow as a weakening of resolve.

But given that even President Biden says the war is likely to end in negotiations, Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, believes there should be a serious debate in any democracy about how to get there.

Yet he, too, has also been criticized for suggesting that the interests of Washington and Kyiv do not always coincide and that it is important to talk to Russia about a negotiated outcome.

“There is a broad and increasingly widespread sense that what we’re doing now isn’t working, but not much of an idea of what to do next, and not a big openness to discuss it, which is how you come up with one,” he said. “The lack of success hasn’t opened up the political space for an open discussion of alternatives.”

“We’re a bit stuck,” he said.

With the counteroffensive going so slowly, and American defense and intelligence officials beginning to blame the Ukrainians, Western governments are feeling more vulnerable after providing so much equipment and raising hopes, said Charles A. Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown University and a former American official.

The American hope, he said, was that the counteroffensive would succeed in threatening the Russian position in Crimea, which would put Ukraine in a stronger negotiating position. That has not happened. “So the political atmosphere has tightened,” he said, “and overall there is still a political taboo about a hardheaded conversation about the endgame.”

Mr. Kupchan knows of what he speaks. He and Richard N. Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs in April, urging Washington and its allies to come up with “a plan for getting from the battlefield to the negotiating table,” and were widely criticized for doing so.

That criticism worsened considerably when the two men, together with Thomas E. Graham, a former American diplomat in Moscow, had private conversations with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, to explore the possibility of negotiations.

When the fact of those conversations leaked, there was a major outcry. While the three men have agreed not to discuss what was said, the reaction was telling, Mr. Kupchan said.

“Any open discussion of a Plan B is politically fraught, as Mr. Jenssen found out the hard way, as do we who try to articulate possible Plan B’s,” he said. “We get a storm of criticism and abuse. What was somewhat taboo is now highly taboo.”

If the counteroffensive is not going well, now would be the time to explore alternatives, he said. Instead, he suggested, Mr. Stoltenberg and others were simply doubling down on slogans like supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes.”

German officials are eager for a negotiated solution and are talking about how Russia might be brought to the negotiating table, but are only doing so in private and with trusted think tank specialists, several of them said. But the officials also understand that they can’t push Ukraine in any way, because they don’t want Russia to smell weakness.

Still, there is a desire in Berlin as in Washington that the war not continue indefinitely, in part because political willingness for indefinite military and financial support for Ukraine is already beginning to wane, especially among those on the right and far right, who are gaining ground.

But for many others, the suggestion of a negotiated solution or a Plan B is too early and even immoral, said Constanze Stelzenmüller of the Brookings Institution. Mr. Putin has shown no interest in talking, but the younger generation of officials around him are, if anything, even harder-line, she said, citing a piece in Foreign Affairs by Tatiana Stanovaya.

“So anyone who wants to articulate a Plan B with these people on the other side is facing a significant burden of proof question,” she said. “Putin has said a lot of times he won’t negotiate except on his own terms, which are Ukraine’s obliteration. There is no lack of clarity there.”

Any credible Plan B would have to come from the key non-Western powers — like China, India, South Africa and Indonesia — that Russia is depending upon telling Moscow it must negotiate.

Vir: Steven Erlangen, New York Times