Zgodba nemške pospešene deindustrializacije: ko tehnologija 19. stoletja in neinovativnost trčita na visoke cene energije

17 julija, 2023 By in gospodarstvo

Ta članek v Politicu je precej poljuden, vendar v grobem pojasni zgodbo nemške deindustrializacije v zadnjih letih, ki se je zaostrila z začetkom vojne v Ukrajini in porastom cen energije. Prvič, v osnovi je nemška industrija tehnološko zastarela (temelji na mehaniki) in nepripravljena na električni oziroma digitalni prehod. Najbolj plastičen primer je dosedanji biser nemške industrije – avto: nemška podjetja niso sposobna preklopiti iz motorja z notranjim izgorevanjem z 20,000 sestavnimi deli na električni avto s tremi ključnimi komponentami (elektro motor, baterija, digitalni krmilni sistem). Drugič, ta tradicionalna industrija je energetsko intenzivna in potrebuje fosilna goriva (zemeljski plin in električno energijo v industriji in naftne derivate za pogon avtomobilov), vlade Angele Merkel pa so z lansiranjem Energiewende (spodbujanje obnovljivih virov energije s subvencijami in zapiranje jedrskih elektrarn) podvojile cene električne energije in prizadele podjetja, ki jim je slednja glavni energetski vir.

Tretjič, Scholzeva vlada je s pridružitvijo ameriškim sankcijam proti Rusiji in posledičnim zmanjšanjem dobav ruskega plina ter kupovanjem nekajkrat dražjega ameriškega utekočinjenega zemeljskega plina odločilno vplivala na porast cen plina. Vsa nemška industrija, ki je odvisna od toplotne energije, je s tem postala nekonkurenčna. Tudi po tem, ko so borzne cene plina upadle, so še vedno 2 do 3-krat dražje kot pred ukrajinsko vojno. Četrtič, s priključitvijo ameriškim sankcijam proti Rusiji so nemška podjetja izgubila del trga, nemški izvoz v Rusijo se je na mesečni ravni zmanjšal za okrog 2 milijardi dolarjev. In petič, geopolitika je Nemčijo postavila na stranski tir. V bitki med ZDA in Kitajsko Nemčija kratkovidno sledi ZDA, ki pa z IRA zakonom in doslej nedovoljenimi subvencijami nepošteno spodbuja ameriška podjetja in privablja investicije evropskih podjetij, tudi nemških.

Standort Nemčija je pred resno grožnjo kolapsa. Zaenkrat nemška vlada nekatera podjetja še zadržuje doma z velikimi subvencijami, vendar tudi te ne zadostujejo več. Ključni dejavniki so trenutno zanesljivost oskrbe z energijo in cene energije ter dostop do kitajskega trga.

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Shortfalls 

While EU officials have blamed the region’s looming deindustrialization on what they see as unfair policies in the U.S. and China that place European companies at a disadvantage, the problems in Germany run much deeper and are largely homemade. And they don’t have easy fixes. 

Put simply, the formula that made Germany Europe’s industrial powerhouse — a highly skilled workforce and innovative companies powered by cheap energy — has come undone.   

As a generation of baby boomers retires in the coming years, Germany is speeding toward a demographic cliff that will leave its companies without the engineers, scientists and other highly skilled workers they need to stay competitive in the global market. Within the next 15 years, about 30 percent of Germany’s workforce will reach retirement age. 

Compounding those demographic challenges are skyrocketing energy costs in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and Germany’s own efforts to combat climate change. 

By halting deliveries of natural gas to Germany, the Kremlin effectively removed the linchpin of the country’s business model, which relied on easy access to cheap energy. Though wholesale gas prices have recently stabilized, they’re still roughly triple where they were before the crisis. That has left companies like BASF, whose main German operation alone consumed as much natural gas in 2021 as all of Switzerland, with no choice but to look for alternatives. 

The country’s Green transformation, the so-called Energiewende, has only made matters worse. Just as it was losing access to Russian gas, the country switched off all nuclear power. And even after nearly a quarter century of subsidizing the expansion of renewable energy, Germany still doesn’t have nearly enough wind turbines and solar panels to sate demand — leaving Germans paying three times the international average for electricity. 

Death of Das Auto

Though the public at large appears blissfully unaware of the economic challenges that lie in store, those on the front lines have no illusions. 

“The geopolitical developments have made it abundantly clear that our economic model is no longer a guarantor of prosperity,” said Andreas Rade, the managing director of the Association for the German Auto Industry, the sector’s main lobbying arm. 

Neither is das Auto.

The car industry has buoyed Germany’s fortunes for more than a century and the country’s economic future rests in large measure on the ability of the sector — which accounts for nearly a quarter of its output — to maintain its hold on the luxury segment in a world of electric vehicles.  

It’s not looking good. While the companies have recently booked record profits with the help of pent-up demand in the wake of the pandemic, that boost looks more like a last gasp than renewal.

Long a source of national pride, the car industry has become Germany’s Achilles’ heel for reasons that have more to do with hubris than the country’s structural deficiencies. For years, companies like Mercedes, BMW and Volkswagen refused to let go of the combustion engine, dismissing Tesla and other early innovators as flashes in the pan.  

That strategic blunder opened the door not just to Elon Musk, but for China, which began investing substantial sums in electric vehicle development 15 years ago as the Germans pooh-poohed the idea, to build a substantial lead. Last year, Chinese producers accounted for about 60 percent of the more than 10 million all-electric cars sold worldwide.  

The Germans are already feeling the effects of their miscalculation.

Volkswagen, which has dominated the Chinese auto market for decades, lost its crown as the country’s largest automaker in the first quarter to BYD, a local competitor, amid a surge in EV sales. China is the world’s largest car market, accounting for nearly 40 percent of Volkswagen’s revenue.  

A recent study by insurer Allianz projected that if current trends hold with Chinese manufacturers increasing their market share in both China and Europe, European carmakers and suppliers could see their profits fall by tens of billions of euros by 2030, with German companies bearing the brunt.

Though German carmakers have undergone a collective foxhole conversion on EV’s and are racing to catch up, they still lack the competitive advantage they enjoyed for more than a century with combustion engines. Indeed, the essential technology in an EV isn’t the motor, which is off-the-shelf technology, but the battery, which relies on chemistry, not the mechanical engineering prowess that defined Vorsprung durch Technik.

What’s more, electric vehicles are increasingly evolving into rolling tech-entertainment capsules, with self-driving cars just around the corner. And if there’s one area in which Germany hasn’t excelled, it’s digital technology. That might explain why Tesla is now worth more than three times all the German automakers combined.  

“We definitely have innovation difficulties with German industry and a competitiveness issue,” said Jens Hildebrandt, who leads the German Chamber of Commerce in China.

For the economic relationship between Germany and China, that represents a sea change. For decades, the Chinese viewed German industry and engineering as a model. All of a sudden, it’s the Germans who are looking to China.

“The big Chinese auto companies will soon have to build their own factories in Europe and maybe even in Germany,” Hildebrandt said, adding that it was a trend that “can’t be reversed.”

Downward spiral

Given the economic headwinds, it’s perhaps no surprise that many of Germany’s biggest companies are on a path toward being German in name only.  

If that sounds far-fetched, consider the example of Linde, the industrial gases conglomerate. Until this year, the company, which started in the 1870s by developing refrigeration for breweries, was the most valuable blue-chip in Germany, with a market capitalization of about €150 billion. In January, it decided to exit the Frankfurt stock exchange in favor of its New York listing.  

The move followed the group’s 2018 merger with a U.S. competitor after which it decided to give up its downtown Munich headquarters and relocate to Dublin. In the course of the restructuring, Linde cut hundreds of jobs in its home country. Though Germany remains an important market, accounting for about 11 percent of revenue, it’s just one of many.  

What Linde illustrates is that big German companies can survive and thrive with or without Germany. As conditions in the fatherland worsen, they will simply move elsewhere. For Germany, however, that would mean fewer high-paying jobs and lower tax revenue, not to mention the threat of sustained economic decline and political instability. 

A recent surge in national polls by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) underscores those stakes. Though the AfD’s rise has been driven by growing frustration over migration, a sustained economic funk would likely give the party a further boost.

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In Germany, by contrast, Volkswagen has abandoned plans to build a new factory for the “Trinity,” a new electric SUV, opting instead to retool existing facilities. The carmaker, which has a stable of brands that also includes Audi and Porsche, decided not to build a second battery plant in its home state of Lower Saxony due to the high cost of electricity. In April, however, the company announced it would invest roughly €1 billion in an electric vehicle center near Shanghai. 

A recent survey of 128 German auto suppliers by the VDA, an industry group, found that not a single one planned to increase their investment in their home market. More than a quarter were planning to shift operations abroad.

Despite the country’s industrial exodus, Germany’s politicians are largely in denial about the looming political and economic challenges.

Industry lobbyists argue that the “interdependence” between China and Germany will be positive in the long run, but similar logic drove Berlin’s embrace of Russian natural gas — with disastrous consequences. And there’s no sign the German push into China is abating. Last year, German companies invested €11.5 billion in China, a record.

“What worries me is the asymmetry of the dependence,” Fratzscher said. “German companies have opened themselves up to blackmail because they are much more dependent on China than the other way around.”

For a taste of just how quickly national champions can get swept away by technology, they would do well to put in a call to Finland and enquire about Nokia, or Canada to ask about the fate of Research in Motion, the company behind the once-ubiquitous BlackBerry.

At some point, Germans will wake up to the dangers they face. The question is whether they will before it’s too late to do anything about it.

Either way, BASF will be ready. Asked recently what the company planned to do with the chemical plants it was shutting down at its German hub, Brudermüller, the CEO, tried to soften to blow, saying the company wouldn’t “demolish everything immediately.”

But he was more direct on another point: “We don’t need the space in Ludwigshafen at the moment.”

Vir: Politico