Originalni Washingtonski konsenz (WK) je bil namenjen temu, da postavi pravila državam v razvoju, ki jih morajo spoštovati v globaliziranem svetu. Skrival se je za strokovnostjo kao “empirično potrjenih” optimalnih ekonomskih konceptov, kot sta jih propagirali IMF in Svetovna banka, v resnici pa je šlo za podreditev  držav interesom ameriške “rules based” svetovne ureditve. Temeljil je na povsem prostem tržnem gospodarstvu, neovirani prosti trgovini in investicijah. Originalni WK je bil neoliberalizem, skondenziran v 10 točkah.

V novem Washingtonskem konsenzu je prejšnja “stroka” dala mesto geopolitiki oziroma nacionalni varnosti ZDA. V tem novem “Konsenzu” ni nobenega konsenza. Novi WK je ameriški protekcionizem. Prosti trg in neovirano globalno  trgovino je zamenjal enostranski ameriški protekcionizem izjemno slabega tipa, ki ima dva cilja. Prvi je omejiti Kitajsko v razvoju in da tehnološko, gospodarsko in vojaško ne bi prehitela ZDA. Drugi pa je ohraniti ameriško hegemonijo, dominantno vlogo v fragmentiranem, multipolarnem svetu. Oboje je ultimativni imperativ Washingtona, ne glede na ceno. “Nacionalna varnost” je odrinila in izrinila ekonomske argumente. Problem pa je, da se neokonzervativni kreatorji novega WK ne zavedajo, da bolj agresivno se ZDA zapirajo, da bi ohranile globalno prevlado, hitreje jo izgubljajo. Svet (še) ni pripravljen na protekcionizem iz 1960 ali 1970-ih let, države si večinsko še želijo globalizacije in trgovine, zato se obračajo h Kitajski, ki ima enak interes. V protekcionizmu vsi izgubljajo, vsak ekonomski učbenik s poglavji mednarodne ekonomike se trudi to pokazati. Globalizacija prek specializacije omogoča izkoriščanje lastnih primerjalnih prednosti. Vendar pa globalizacija, za razliko od originalnega WK, potrebuje tudi industrijsko politiko, torej državne politike, ki spodbujajo razvoj panog s primerjalnimi prednostmi.

The new Washington consensus is different to the old in three key respects. First, Washington is no longer the uncontested Rome of today’s world. It has competition from Beijing. The new consensus is thus largely confined to Washington itself rather than the swaggering US that set the global standards after the end of the Cold War. It is an American political consensus with Donald Trump its harshest exponent. He talks of how trade with China has created “American carnage” and led to the “rape” of America. Joe Biden’s language is far gentler but his enforcement is more rigorous. Biden’s policy is Trumpism with a human face.

Second, the new consensus is geopolitical. It does have economic tools, such as reshoring supply chains, prioritising resilience over efficiency, and industrial policy. But these are largely means to a national security end, which is to contain China. The old consensus was a positive sum game; if one country got richer others did too. The new one is zero sum; one country’s growth comes at the expense of another’s.

The third difference is that the new consensus is as pessimistic as the old one was optimistic. In that sense it is less intuitively American than what it replaced. The spirit of can-do has given way to a roster of can’t-dos. Today’s US cannot make trade deals, cannot negotiate global digital rules, cannot abide by WTO rulings and cannot support Bretton Woods reforms. Washington has lost faith in economic multilateralism.

Will the new consensus be effective? The ultimate test is whether China can variously be contained, engaged, competed and cajoled into accepting the US-led order. Today’s Washington subscribes to all of these approaches, some of which are more sophisticated than others. Biden himself focuses more on competition than cajoling. His aim is not to decouple from China but to create what Jake Sullivan, the US national security adviser, calls a “small yard” with a “high fence”.

That means America will continue to trade with China except in goods that can be used to upgrade China’s military, which means high-end semiconductors and anything that boosts China’s AI ambitions. It is not obvious where you can safely draw that line, which suggests Sullivan’s small yard will expand over time. Compared to the China hawks outside the Biden administration, however, Sullivan’s approach is nuanced and flexible. Yet it still begs the question: how can China be squeezed into a US-led order in which America itself has stopped believing?

Vir: Edward Luce, Financial Times