“In summary, Russia cannot rely on foreign financing to fund the war. But it can continue its invasion in the face of economic sanctions from the West, as long as its energy revenues do not fall too much and its FX reserves are not depleted too much; or its domestic economy does not contract so much that Russia’s citizens really cannot face any more. That could be years.
In contrast, with a much smaller economy, Ukraine is already destroyed domestically and does not have enough domestic or export revenues to fight this war; so it must rely on foreign funding. As long as that comes in sufficient amounts, it too can continue for years.
Both Ukraine and Russia are now war economies. By that I mean the state now controls the direction of the economy ie where production and investment are employed. The ‘free market’ is replaced by state control for the military effort.
But there is a difference between the two economies that will be expressed after the war ends – if it ever does. Post-war Ukraine, if the current government survives, is committed to a neo-liberal free market economy relying on foreign investment and companies taking over the main resources and being integrated into the EU. The model to follow will be that of Poland and Baltic states ie no welfare state to speak of; pensions reduced; no trade unions and labour rights; deregulation of markets; and ultimate reliance on capital transfers from the West.
In contrast, post-war Russia, assuming Putin or his cronies are still in power, will opt for a much more state-directed economy than before. Freewheeling oligarchs doing their own thing will not be tolerated (only Putin’s cronies) and key resources and investments will be closely controlled by the state.
Before the war, there was one thing in common for both countries: a high level of corruption between billionaires and politicians. That is unlikely to change, as recent revelations of corruption in the government of Ukraine have revealed. And don’t expect the EU to cleanse ‘free market’ Ukraine; after all, most of Eastern Europe’s states are riddled with corruption with little sanction and it seems that even EU parliament members are also engaged. As Bernie Sanders said recently: “Yes, Russia has oligarchs, but so does the US.” – and indeed everywhere.”
It’s just a year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I am not going to discuss the politics of this war in this post. There are plenty of sources for debate on this. Instead, I want to look at the economic consequences of the war for both Ukraine and Russia.

Let’s start with Ukraine. Back last year, an IMF staff report last March concluded that the country was paralysed.“With millions of Ukrainians fleeing their homes and many cities under bombardment, ordinary economic activity must, to a large extent, be suspended.”And over the last year, Ukraine has been destroyed by Russian bombing and arms. Thousands have died, millions have been displaced and/or fled the country. The economic base of the country is being annihilated.
Before the war, Ukraine was already a very poor country with a real GDP of just $160bn. Before this war is over, the physical loss…
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Roberts-a so skritizirali že komentatorji na njegovem blogu. Naj dodam:
Roberts vzame “zdravo za gotovo” podatke iz zahodnih virov in se sploh ne sprašuje o njihovi relevantnosti. Najbolj absurdna je tista o 200.000 ruskih žrtvah.
Drugič, nima kaj dosti pojma (tako kot mnogi akademiki) kako teče realna ekonomija. V Rusiji se danes dobi praktično vse. Lahko traja malo dlje, stane malo več, vendar se dobi. Sivi “neuradni” uvoz je praktično (in de facto) legaliziran. In na srednji rok situacija ne bo slabša, ampak boljša ker ne bo prišlo samo do uvozne substitucije, ki jo Mišustinova vlada zelo močno in učinkovito podpira, prihaja predvsem do zamenjave evropskega (zahodnega) uvoza z azijskim. Ne pozabimo: vse kar Zahod izvaža v Rusijo lahko Rusija kupi v Aziji. Zahod ni več “indispensable” kot je nekoč za ZDA rekel Obama.
Tretjič podcenjuje se tehnološko diverzifikacijo in tehnološki nivo ruske industrije. Tukaj so sicer velike razlike med sektorji. Vzemimo mikroeleketroniko. Sodobna mikroelektronika za vojaške aplikacije je večinoma na nivoju 90 nm. Obstajata 2 razloga. Ponavadi obsežno in dolgotrajno testiranje vojaške tehnike med katerim pride do zastarevanja predvsem elektronske opreme in drugič zaradi vojaških razlogov. Manjši gostejši čipi so bolj dovzetni za elektronsko motenje. Rusi so velemojstri na tem področju. Se spomnite prebega MIG 25 na Japonsko v 70-tih? Zahod se je superiorno režal ker je bila vsa elektronika v Mig-u analogna, pri tem pa pozabil, da je analogne sisteme bistveno težje motiti in da so v teh pogojih bistveno bolj stabilni.
Analogni sistem zaniha, digitalni pa se zruši. Če je digitalno, še ne pomeni, da je bolje. Fotonin EFCS-3 sistem za kontrolo ognja pri tankih je imel superiorno natančnost pa je imel analogni računalnik (ki ima v štartu vrsto prednosti v uravnavanju analognih procesov). Spomnim se, da je kljub naši vrhunski laserski tehniki, izraelce takrat najbolj zanimal prav naš analogni računalnik.
Novi ruski čipi dosegajo bistveno višje gostote, po nekaterih podatkih za maloserijsko proizvodnjo vse do 11nm lahko Rusi proizvedejo sami v lastnih tovarnah in z lastno tehnologijo. Rusi pa mikroelektronika? Da, samo na Zahodu vam niso nič povedali o tem. S tem da v dizajnu v ničemer ne zaostajajo (glej zadnje generacije njihovih Elbrus in Ararat procesorjev). To da jih ni na širših komercialnih trgih ne pomeni, da jih ni. Vojska in ključne državne institucije pa lahko plačajo tudi dražjo (maloserijsko) proizvodnjo. Pri tem pozabljamo, da lahko kvalitetnejši software v veliki meri kompenzira manjše zmogljivosti HW-a. Spomnim se obiska naše MBA šole pri nemškem proizvajalcu za avtomobilsko industrijo v 1992. Med kolegi je bil tudi Rus, strojni inžinir. Gostitelji so mu pokazali delovno postajo na kateri je tekel SW za analizo končnih elementov. Češ: “Pokaži čudo zaostalemu Rusu” . Moj ruski kolega, recimo mu Pavel, se je samo nasmejal in dejal: “Res so vaši procesorji 2 do 3 krat hitrejši , zato pa je naš SW, ki teče na njih 100 krat hitrejši.”
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To o SW vs HW pa potrdim iz lastnih večletnih izkušenj takoj. V osnovi sem univerzitetno izobražen računalničar, ki je podiplonsko zajadral v finance. Nekoč smo ob nezmogljivem HW ogromno časa porabili za optimizacijo algoritmov, danes ob poceni in visoko zmogljivem HW večina pozablja na optimizacijo, zgolj zlagajo že sprogramirane podprograme in funkcije…
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