V novem Der Spieglu so razdelani trije scenariji konca sedanje vojne v Ukrajini. Članek sledi trem scenarijem, ki jih je v začetku decembra lani v Washington Postu že razdelal Robert Wright (1. Ukrajina zmaga, 2. Rusija zmaga, in 3. Pat pozicija). Zanimivo je, kako so se v obdobju dveh mesecev zamenjali poudarki glede relevantnosti posameznih scenarijev. Čeprav se v Der Spieglu trudijo, da ne bi povsem odpisali prvega scenarija (možnosti zmage Ukrajine), pa v isti sapi navajajo tri ključne argumente, ki govorijo proti temu scenariju. Prvi je, da Ukrajina preprosto ne bo dobila potrebnega orožja, da bi se ubranila pred rusko ofenzivo, kaj šele, da bi izvedla uspešno protiofenzivo (letos spomladi bo dobila le nekaj deset obljubljenih tankov, 200 starih nemških tankov leopard 1 naj bi prišlo šele konec letošnjega leta, prav tako tistih nekaj ameriških abramsov; letal pa niti ZDA niti Nemčija in Francija nočejo poslati). Drugi argument je, da Ukrajina preprosto ne zmore dolgotrajne vojne proti Rusiji, ker je pač Rusija s 143 milijoni previvalcev in z 25 milijoni za vojno sposobnih moških bistveno večja in lahko angažira več vojakov in orožja, medtem ko na Zahodu tako podpora javnosti kot apetit političnih elit po sponzoriranju dolge vojne vztrajno usihata.

Putin’s military may not be particularly motivated, but he rules over a population of 143 million people, including 25 million men of military age. Ukraine’s population, by contrast, is just short of 40 million. According to a survey conducted by the independent polling agency Levada Center in Moscow, almost three-quarters of Russians support the “special operation” in Ukraine, as Putin insists it be called. Almost all serious opposition politicians are either dead, in exile or, as is the case with Alexei Navalny, locked away in a penal colony.

In the West, meanwhile, public opinion is far from steadfast. Whereas a clear majority of Germans supported weapons deliveries to Ukraine earlier in the war, only just over half are now in favor of sending tanks.

Tretji argument pa je, da bi ta vojaška ofenziva Ukrajine za osvoboditev okupiranih ozemelj trajala leta, v vmesnem času pa se utegnejo zgoditi politične zamenjave v ključnih državah zaveznicah (predvsem v ZDA utegne republikanski kandidat zmagati), s čimer bi usahnila politična podpora dolgotrajnemu financiranju vojaške pomoči Ukrajini in financiranju njenega proračuna. Brez močne vloge ZDA pa evrospki voditelji ne bodo dolgo vztrajali pri svoji načelnosti.

Glede drugega scenarija (ruska zmaga) nima smisla izgubljati besed, ker je Rusija svoje cilje v Ukrajini (zasedba ozemelj z rusko manjšino) večinoma že dosegla (sedanja ofenziva v Donetski regiji je namenjena polnemu zavzetju Donbasa). Težko, da bi kdo lahko Rusijo iz teh ozemelj pregnal z vojaškimi sredstvi v doglednem času (razen v primeru polne vključitve Nata v to vojno, kar pa bi pomenilo jedrski spopad).

Zanimiva je tudi razlika v poudarku med obema analizama glede tretjega scenarija. Medtem ko je Robert Wright pred dvema mesecema zgolj le agitiral za mirno rešitev kot najboljšo opcijo za končanje te vojne, pa Der Spiegel začasno rešitev za končanje “krvave dolgotrajne pat pozicije” (kot imenuje ta scenarij) že dokaj jasno opredeli. In sicer jo opredeli v skladu z objavljenim neuradnim predlogom ameriškega državnega sekretarja Anthonyja Blinkena, ki ga je konec januarja v Washington Postu objavil David Ignatius. Gre za t.i. “korejsko rešitev”. Se pravi, da bi se (podobno kot leta 1953 med obema Korejama) med sedanjimi zasedenimi ozemlji in preostalim delom Ukrajine oblikoval demilitarizirani pas (denimo 4-kilometrski pas nikogaršnje zemlje, posejan z minami). Na obeh straneh tega pasu pa bi se obe strani vojaško utrdili. Hkrati pa bi se reševanje statusa Krima zamaknilo za nedoločen čas.

“Prispevek” Der Spiegla k temu predlogu tretjega scenarija je, da ga poskuša prikazati kot predlog, ki naj bi najbolj ustrezal Putinu. Pri čemer navaja špekulacije anonimnih predstavnikov ameriškega State departmenta ter zunanjepolitičnih strokovnjakov, kako se bodo odzvale Ukraajina in druge države, če bi Putin prišel s “polresnim” tovrstnim predlogom.

V ozadju je bil očitno že dosežen “delovni” dogovor med ZDA in Rusijo, ki v resnici bijeta to bitko (na ukrajinskem ozemlju in prek življenj Ukrajincev) in zdaj se prek tovrstnih medijskih zapisov pripravlja teren za javnost, da bi sprejela tak scenarij kot najbolj logično oziroma celo optimalno rešitev.

Tukaj bi najbrž veljalo dodati, da se zahodnim državam glede dogovora o tretjem scenariju bistveno bolj mudi kot Putinu (kar priznava tudi Der Spiegel z aludiranjem na politiko izčrpavanja, ki jo je Rusija uspešno uveljavila tako proti Naapoleonu kot proti Hitlerju; Rusija si pač lahko privošči izgubiti več ljudi kot Ukrajina). Dlje kot se bo nadaljevala ta vojna, večji del Ukrajine bodo ruske sile (ob nezmožnosti ukrajinske obrambe) še dodatno zasedle.

Zveni kot brutalno hladna kalkulacija, toda lahko smo prepričani, da so v Washingtonu te kombinacije zelo trezno preigrali. Tudi ZDA so zmagale v tej vojni – Evropo so odklopile od ruskega plina in nafte in ji prodale svoj plin, Putina in Rusijo so dolgoročno diskreditirale, hkrati pa dobile dve novi članici Nata na meji z Rusijo (Finsko in Švedsko). Vse skupaj za ceno ene petine Ukrajine, vojaške izdatke za podporo Ukrajini pa bo unovčila ameriška vojaška industrija (samo ta teden so Poljski “odobrili” prodajo raketnega sistema HIMARS v vrednosti 10 milijard dolarjev). Jenkiji pač vedno zmagajo, za druge pa jim je bolj malo mar.

In še nekaj: na koncu se v Der Spieglu vprašajo, kaj narediti s Putinom. In nekako letargično ugotovijo, da je itak že star in da noben drug nov ruski voditelj ne bo bistveno manj avtokratski od njega.

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Starting a war is simple. Ending it, though, is quite a bit more difficult. At the beginning of almost every military conflagration is the illusion that one’s opponent will be relatively easy to defeat.

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Scenario 3: A Bloody Stalemate (with or without negotiations)

But what will happen if, as currently seems likely, neither side emerges victorious anytime soon?

There is one scenario for Europe and Ukraine that would likely be almost as distasteful as a Russian victory: a partially frozen conflict, a deep wound in Europe’s side with new skirmishes daily. It is a plight that Ukraine has known since 2014 in the Donbas, but it would be far larger in this instance.

“The Russians still think they can control of all of Ukraine. And the Ukrainians are not willing to give up territory that the Russians have taken since the beginning of the war on February 24, 2022,” says 

Russia expert Angela Stent. “In that sense, we are further away from a peace agreement than ever before.” That, in turn, has led many in the West to demand that Ukraine, especially, must be forced into a diplomatic solution. According to one survey, around half of Germans believe that the government in Berlin should be doing more to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, though it isn’t entirely clear what that might actually mean.

The end of the Korean War is seen by many as a model for a frozen conflict. In 1953, the armistice agreement created a 4-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone between the north and the south of the country, across which thousands of soldiers continue to face each other today. Lying between them are around a million landmines.

There are some in the U.S. administration who would like to see just such a solution for Ukraine – an outcome that would, they argue, involve “turning Ukraine into a porcupine.” The concept calls for Ukraine’s defenses to be upgraded to the point that Russia would no longer even dream of calling the country’s national borders into question – borders which will have been drawn as the negotiating table or which run along a cease-fire line.

For the time being, the political line adhered to by politicians in both Berlin and Washington continues to be that it is completely up to Ukraine to decide when the time for diplomacy has come. “We have to put the Ukrainians in the best possible position at the negotiating table,” says the senior State Department official. But a halfway serious offer from Putin would almost certainly unleash a debate in many countries that currently support Kyiv. “The challenge yet to come is: What happens if, at a later point, the Russian leadership chooses to offer some kind of cease-fire?” asks military expert Kofman. “That is when we will find out who is who.”

Putin could, for example, put forth a plan aimed at international recognition for the “people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk, and which delays any decision on the status of Crimea. There is nothing currently indicating that Kyiv would show interest in such an offer. But what if the war is still raging in fall 2024? And if the fate of a second Biden term in the White House hinges on his ability to obtain a cease-fire?

After all, one element of the logic of war is that the price of peace continues to go up the longer the conflict continues.

If a cease-fire agreement is reached, the result would likely be far from stable. And Ukraine would certainly demand far-reaching security guarantees from the West for any territory it might renounce. And even that would be difficult for Zelenskyy to sell as a victory. Under such a scenario, it would be virtually impossible for Ukraine to be accepted into NATO or the European Union.

The Minsk agreements of 2015 – mediated by the West – proved unable to calm the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with the deal never being fully accepted. And nobody in Ukraine is interested in another Minsk agreement, says Ukrainian political scientist Fesenko, as it carries the risk of a never-ending war. Yet exactly that scenario could be the most attractive from Putin’s perspective.

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The Question Remains: How Should the West Approach Putin?

A negotiated solution would be fragile at best. And it also wouldn’t address the core issue: Once the war is over, how should an aggressive Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin be dealt with?

Though erstwhile imperial powers in Europe like France and Britain seem to have come to terms with the loss of their former influence, imperial reflexes in many parts of Russian society appear to be alive and well, and not just because of Putin.

As such, Europe has to get used to the idea of having a hostile power on its eastern flank for the extended future. In Putin’s narrative, Russia is fighting a courageous defensive battle against Western imperialism. During the celebrations to mark the 80th anniversary of the siege of Stalingrad last week, the Russian president held forth on the “Nazi ideology” in modern guise that is threatening his country. As is so often the case, the climax of his speech was a barely disguised threat to deploy nuclear weapons.

In many ways, Putin is less predictable than the Soviet leaders who ruled the USSR in the second half of t

he 20th century. Men like Leonid Brezhnev waged proxy wars in Asia and Africa and armed the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. But in Europe, the Soviet Union was a status-quo power. Putin’s Russia, by contrast, is interested in redrawing the borders of the old continent.

Putin is 70 years old. Rumors have repeatedly made the rounds that he is suffering from cancer. But would Putinism disappear if the Russian leader were suddenly absent from the stage? Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, who works as a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, doesn’t believe that is terribly likely. The war against Ukraine may be Putin’s private obsession and only tolerated by the Russian elite out of opportunism, she says. But, she adds, even without Putin, “there would quite probably be an autocratic, resource-based government in Russia.”

Vir: Der Spiegel