Nekdanji namestnik ruskega ministra za finance in nekdanji namestnik guvernerja ruske centralne banke Sergey Aleksashenko, ki očitno ni naklonjen sedanji ruski politiki glede vojne v Ukrajini, v analizi ruskega proračuna za 2022 in 2023 pravi, da na žalost nič ne kaže, da bi bila Rusija zaradi nižjih cen nafte in plina v letu 2023 finančno prisiljena v prenehanje vojaške agresije v Ukrajini. Tudi če je ruski proračun za 2023 nekoliko preveč optimistično zastavljen, ker ne upošteva vsega povečanja predvidenih vojaških izdatkov, pa dejanski fiskalni prihodki naj ne bi odstopali od načrtovanih za več kot +/- 1% BDP in proračunski primanjkljaj naj ne bi presegel 3% BDP (za primerjavo: slovenski proračunski primanjkljaj v 2023 naj bi po optimistični verziji znašal 5.3% BDP). Ta primanjkljaj pa lahko ruska vlada brez težav pokrije iz akumuliranih sredstev državnega premoženjskega sklada, ki se polni s prihodki od izvoza energentov.
As a result, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to increase oil exports next year to match pre-war levels. The average price of Russian export oil in 2021 was $69 per barrel. The current rouble-dollar exchange rate is 15 percent higher than the 2021 average, which is likely to continue into the new year. These factors may reduce 2023 budget revenues from hydrocarbon production and exports by 15 to 20 percent ($22bn to $29bn) of 2021 levels.
In response to the expected drop in revenues, the government has announced an increase in taxes on oil and gas companies as well as on metal and coal producers. These could bring in enough revenue to compensate for up to 75 percent of the revenue reduction.
Thus, the risk of not reaching the planned revenues in 2023 remains, but it will be limited to 5-6 percent of total budget revenues, according to my estimates.
Enough money for the war, unfortunately
Although the budget is planned under high uncertainty, it cannot be called unstable. Under different circumstances, its revenues may turn out above or below the planned level. Still, the scale of this deviation, according to my assessment, does not exceed 1 percent of GDP ($17.2bn) in either direction.
Consequently, even if revenues are lower, the budget deficit would not exceed 3 percent of GDP ($52bn), which can be entirely financed from reserves (currently at $120bn).
At the same time, there seems to be no opportunity or desire on the part of Western countries to intensify sanctions pressure on Russia. This means the Russian budget would not face any sanctions-related shocks in 2023.
With all of this in mind, I do not foresee any major financial constraints that could force the Kremlin to radically change its aggressive policy towards Ukraine.
Vir: Sergey Aleksashenko, Al Jazeera