Kolikokrat bo treba še ponoviti očigledno, da bodo evropski “voditelji” skrenili z ameriškega kurza in začeli zasledovati lastne strateške, socialne in gospodarske interese? Že od začetka marca, ko se je zavezništvo Nato odločilo, da ne bo zaprlo zračnega prostora nad Ukrajino in torej neposredno posredovalo v Ukrajini, govorim, da so se s tem opcije tako za Ukrajino kot EU povsem spremenile. Da je treba čimprej doseči premirje v Ukrajini, priznati neodvisnost Krima in avtonomijo obeh proruskih regij ter (vojaško nevtralno) Ukrajino čimprej sprejeti v EU. Vendar evropski “voditelji” vztrajajo na ameriškem kurzu in še zaostrujejo sankcije proti Rusiji, ki so se izkazale ne samo kot neučinkovite, pač pa kot absolutno kontraproduktivne. Strel v koleno evropskih držav. Ekonomski samomor.

Če kaj, so trije meseci sankcij proti Rusiji pokazali, da rusko gospodarstvo prenese višji prag bolečine kot pa evropsko.

Če je bil namen sankcij, da povsem zaprejo finančne tokove, s katerimi Rusija financira svojo vojaško intervencijo v Rusiji, so povsem zgrešile namen. Ne morem si predstavljati, da imajo evropski “voditelji” tako slabe ekonomske svetovalce, ki ne poznajo treh ključnih in splošno znanih ekonomskih dejstev. Prvič, da se ruski proračun primarno polni prek prihodkov od izvoznih carin na izvoz nafte in plina (to je polovica proračunskih prihodkov) in da mora cena nafte znašati vsaj 50 dolarjev za sodček, da lahko Rusija izravna proračun.

Drugič, da je povpraševanje po nafti in plinu skorajda popolnoma neelastično, ponudba obeh energetskih virov je močno omejena, pogodbe o dobavah so dolgoročne, transport pa omejen s kapacitetami tankerjev in obstojem plinovodske infrastrukture. Zato energetske sankcije proti Rusiji samo še dodatno napihujejo že tako visoke cene nafte in plina po Covidu in še dodatno polnijo ruski proračun, ki dosega rekordne presežke v prvih štirih mesecih letos. Podobno rekorden je tudi ruski zunanjetrgovinski presežek. Rusija nima nikakršnih težav s prodajo morebitnih presežnih količin nafte in plina, saj Kitajska strateško polni svoje kapacitete, zato se je kitajski uvoz nafte iz Rusije letos že povečal za polovico,

In tretjič, da so ključne evropske države skorajda polovično odvisne od nabav ruskega plina, da srednjeročno ne morejo preiti na druge ponudnike, ker takšnih količin ni  mogoče nikjer nadomestiti in ker niti ne obstaja infrastruktura (plinovodi in LNG terminali), ki bi omogočala tovrstno zamenjavo dobaviteljev, če bi nadomestne količine obstajale. Pri čemer pa sta Nemčija in Italija s svojo polovično odvisnostjo od ruskega plina tako gospodarsko veliki in pomembni, da če prenehata uvažati ruski plin, njuni gospodarstvi kolapsirata (prenos šoka iz kemične, mineralne in jeklarske industrije po verigi v vse ostale panoge), s tem pa tudi evrsko gospodarstvo (prenos prek izvoznega šoka na vse trgovinsko povezane države).

Nekomu, ki pozna ta dejstva, je kristalno jasno, da energetske sankcije proti Rusiji ne morejo delovati na zmanjšanje njene finančne sposobnosti za financiranje njene vojaške intervencije v Ukrajini, ampak jo finančno le še krepijo.

K temu pa je treba dodati najprej komponento surovinske in prehranske odvisnosti od Rusije in Ukrajine. Obe sta veliki ponudnici nekaterih ključnih surovin (od niklja, cinka, kobalta do gnojil) ter pšenice in koruze. Ukrajinski silosi so polni pšenice, vendar te zaradi ruske pomorske blokade severnomorskih pristanišč ni mogoče transportirati do kupcev. In naprej, polovica ukrajinskih polj bo letos ostala neobdelana. Nadaljevanje vojne v Ukrajini pomeni veliko pomanjkanje in astronomske cene žitaric in hrane, že letos pomeni, da bodo nekatere (predvsem afriške) države soočene s stradanjem in umiranjem milijonov ljudi. IMF govori o 40 do 80 milijonih ljudi, ki bodo letos stradali. Naslednje leto bo še huje.

Nato je k temu treba dodati še dodatno, z vojno spodbujeno inflacijo. Po post-Covidnem odpiranju je delno zaradi povpraševalnega šoka, predvsem pa zaradi ponudbenega šoka (pomanjkanje ključnih surovin, komponent in energentov ob povečanem povpraševanju po začetku ponovnega odpiranja gospodarstev) prišlo do izbruha inflacije. Če se je lani ta izbruh inflacije zdel še kot prehodni šok, je vojna v Ukrajini iz njega naredila trajni šok, ki lahko vztraja še dolgo. Zdaj pa pride ključni negativni element v to zgodbo: ker se centralne banke bojijo previsoke inflacije, bodo po njej udarile z edinim instrumentom, ki ga imajo na voljo, to je z dvigom vodilne obrestne mere; s tem pa bodo zaustavile investicije in zasebno porabo, ohladile gospodarstva pod ničlo in jih ob povišani inflaciji poslale naravnost v stagflacijo – v obdobje hkratne recesije in visoke inflacije. V kaos. Pri čemer pa ključnega vzoka za inflacijo (rast cen surovin, energentov in zdaj še hrane) centralne banke seveda ne morejo rešiti.

Le kako lahko evropski “voditelji” ignorirajo ta dejstva in še globlje rinejo v napačno smer? Je v ozadju ideologija, neznanje, norost ali zgolj to, da je Evropa marionetna figura v rokah ZDA? V tem primeru Evropa očitno igra “koristnega idiota” v strateški igri ZDA proti Rusiji, ki z dobavami orožja Ukrajini iz nje dela trajni evropski Afganistan. Toda v tej še eni ameriški igrici bodo ceno plačali zgolj gospodarstva in prebivalci Evrope, Ukrajine in Rusije ter mnogih afriških držav. Amerike in Kitajske se kriza ne bo dotaknila, vsaj ne na začetku in tako močno. Končni zmagovalec te ameriške igrice pa bo Kitajska, ki pametno strateško igra. Prišlo bo do strateške naveze med Rusijo in Kitajsko, ki bosta skupaj kontrolirali dominanten delež v svetovni ponudbi ključnih surovin, energentov in hrane ter v proizvodnji končnih izdelkov.

Po treh mesecih in pol je boljkotne jasno, da je Rusija vojno v Ukrajini dobila. Dosegla je še več ciljev, kot si jih je zadala, saj je ob zasedbi obeh proruskih regij vzpostavila še širok pas kopenske povezave med Rusijo in Krimom, zasedla velik del najbolj rodovitnih ukrajinskih polj ter Ukrajini zaprla večino severnomorskih povezav s svetom. Rusija lahko v pogajanjih v znak popuščanja del teh zasedenih ozemelj in pristanišč spet prepusti Ukrajini, in še vedno bo dosegla več, kot je zahtevala v pogajanjih ob začetku vojne.

Čas je za streznitev in spremembo kurza. Če kdo res hoče kaznovati Putina, ga lahko najbolj učinkovito tako, da zaustavi vojno v Ukrajini in da cene nafte (ter posledično plina) spet spusti pod raven 50 dolarjev za sodček. Samo to lahko Rusijo spravi v bankrot in posledično z oblasti odnese Putina.

Le kako, da nihče od evropskih “voditeljev” in njihovih svetovalcev ne premore toliko zdrave pameti?

Če ne bodo evropski “voditelji” spremenili kurza, ga mora vsaj slovenska vlada. In sicer pri plinu. Nisem pristaš Orbana in Vučića, nasprotno, toda če sta madžarski in srbski predsednik do sedaj kaj naredila prav, je to parcialni dogovor z Rusijo o dolgoročnih dobavah plina, in to po zaklenjenih nizkih cenah. Slovenska vlada lahko in bi morala ravnati enako. Gre za slovenske strateške interese, gre za interese slovenskih potrošnikov in gospodarstva ter zaposlenih. Vztrajanje na evropskem kurzu vodi v ekonomski samomor.

Na srečo se kanček zdrave pameti začne pojavljati tudi v medijih. Spodaj je nekaj pasusov iz komentarja Larryja Elliotta, urednika za gospodarstvo v Guardianu, o perverznosti ekonomskih sankcij proti Rusiji, ki bolijo zgolj Evropo in o tem, da je s to norijo treba prenehati, saj bo prej uničila Evropo kot Rusijo.

The perverse effects of sanctions means rising fuel and food costs for the rest of the world – and fears are growing of a humanitarian catastrophe. Sooner or later, a deal must be made.

It is now three months since the west launched its economic war against Russia, and it is not going according to plan. On the contrary, things are going very badly indeed.

Sanctions were imposed on Vladimir Putin not because they were considered the best option, but because they were better than the other two available courses of action: doing nothing or getting involved militarily.

The first set of economic measures were introduced immediately after the invasion, when it was assumed Ukraine would capitulate within days. That didn’t happen, with the result that sanctions – while still incomplete – have gradually been intensified.

There is, though, no immediate sign of Russia pulling out of Ukraine and that’s hardly surprising, because the sanctions have had the perverse effect of driving up the cost of Russia’s oil and gas exports, massively boosting its trade balance and financing its war effort. In the first four months of 2022, Putin could boast a current account surplus of $96bn (£76bn) – more than treble the figure for the same period of 2021.

When the EU announced its partial ban on Russian oil exports earlier this week, the cost of crude oil on the global markets rose, providing the Kremlin with another financial windfall. Russia is finding no difficulty finding alternative markets for its energy, with exports of oil and gas to China in April up more than 50% year on year.

That’s not to say the sanctions are pain-free for Russia. The International Monetary Fund estimates the economy will shrink by 8.5% this year as imports from the west collapse. Russia has stockpiles of goods essential to keep its economy going, but over time they will be used up.

But Europe is only gradually weaning itself off its dependency on Russian energy, and so an immediate financial crisis for Putin has been averted. The rouble – courtesy of capital controls and a healthy trade surplus – is strong. The Kremlin has time to find alternative sources of spare parts and components from countries willing to circumvent western sanctions.

When the global movers and shakers met in Davos last week, the public message was condemnation of Russian aggression and renewed commitment to stand solidly behind Ukraine. But privately, there was concern about the economic costs of a prolonged war.

These concerns are entirely justified. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given an added boost to already strong price pressures. The UK’s annual inflation rate stands at 9% – its highest in 40 years – petrol prices have hit a record high and the energy price cap is expected to increase by £700-800 a year in October. Rishi Sunak’s latest support package to cope with the cost-of-living crisis was the third from the chancellor in four months – and there will be more to come later in the year.

As a result of the war, western economies face a period of slow or negative growth and rising inflation – a return to the stagflation of the 1970s. Central banks – including the Bank of England – feel they have to respond to near double-digit inflation by raising interest rates. Unemployment is set to rise. Other European countries face the same problems, if not more so, since most of them are more dependent on Russian gas than is the UK.

The problems facing the world’s poorer countries are of a different order of magnitude. For some of them the issue is not stagflation, but starvation, as a result of wheat supplies from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports being blocked.

As David Beasley, the executive director of the World Food Programme put it: “Right now, Ukraine’s grain silos are full. At the same time, 44 million people around the world are marching towards starvation.”

In every multilateral organisation – the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations – fears are growing of a humanitarian catastrophe. The position is simple: unless developing nations are energy exporters themselves, they face a triple whammy in which fuel and food crises trigger financial crises. Faced with the choice of feeding their populations or paying their international creditors, governments will opt for the former. Sri Lanka was the first country since the Russian invasion to default on its debts, but is unlikely to be the last. The world appears closer to a full-blown debt crisis than at any time since the 1990s.

Putin has rightly been condemned for “weaponising” food, but his willingness to do so should come as no surprise. From the start, the Russian president has been playing a long game, waiting for the international coalition against him to fragment. The Kremlin thinks Russia’s threshold for economic pain is higher than the west’s, and it is probably right about that.

If proof were needed that sanctions are not working, then President Joe Biden’s decision to supply Ukraine with advanced rocket systems provides it. The hope is that modern military technology from the US will achieve what energy bans and the seizure of Russian assets have so far failed to do: force Putin to withdraw his troops.

Complete defeat for Putin on the battlefield is one way the war could end, although as things stand that doesn’t appear all that likely. There are other possible outcomes. One is that the economic blockade eventually works, with ever-tougher sanctions forcing Russia to back down. Another is a negotiated settlement.

Putin is not going to surrender unconditionally, and the potential for severe collateral damage from the economic war is obvious: falling living standards in developed countries; famine, food riots and a debt crisis in the developing world.

The atrocities committed by Russian troops mean compromising with the Kremlin is currently hard to swallow, but economic reality suggests only one thing: sooner or later a deal will be struck.

Vir: Larry Elliott, The Guardian