Paul Krugman si je, podobno kot Thomas Philippon prejšnji teden, dal malce duška glede Nemčije. Naredil je primerjavo nemškega pridiganja perifernim EU državam glede fiskalne vzdržnosti pred dobrim desetletjem in neizprosnemu jeklenemu pritisku na Grčijo, da izvede brutalno fiskalno varčevanje, ki je Grčiji pobralo 21% BDP in brezposelnost dvignilo na 27% ter uničilo ogromno človeških usod, medtem ko nemška vlada danes ni pripravljena sprejeti precej manjše žrtve, da bi se odpovedala uvozu ruskega plina. Zelo učinkovita poanta. Moraliziranje se Nemčiji vrača kot bumerang. Problem je le v tem, ker je Grčijo Nemčija lahko prisilila v stradanje njenega prebivalstva, medtem ko Nemčije danes nihče ne more prisiliti k prenehanju uvoza ruskega plina.

Je pa res, da bi bila danes žrtev za Nemčijo tudi primerljivo velika, če bi se čez noč odločila odpovedati ruskemu plinu. Kot sem pokazal pred tedni, imajo modelske ocene nemških ekonomistov, ki jih navaja tudi Krugman, vgrajeno modelsko napako – ne morejo oceniti učinka tega, če nekega ključnega inputa za gospodarstvo (kot je plin) nenadoma sploh ni več na voljo. Če plina ni več, se zaustavijo proizvodnja celuloze in papirja, kovin, kemikalij, kamna, gline in stekla, plastike, rafinerije nafte in živilskopredelovalna industrija, ki porabijo 84% vse industrijske porabe naravnega plina. Te panoge pa proizvajajo ključne inpute za predelovalne industrije. Če torej zmanjka polovica plina, lahko velik del nemškega gospodarstva zapre obrate in pošlje ljudi domov. Dokler se bodisi ne zagotovijo nadomestne količine plina (v petih letih) ali dokler nemško gospodarstvo ne uvede novih tehnologij, ki bodo namesto plina kot energent uporabljale elektriko.

Aja, Nemčija je zaprla jedrske elektrarne in nadomestno energijo ter energijo za regulacijo elektroenergetskega sistema pridobiva iz plinsko parnih elektrarn. Torej, da bi Nemčija nadomestila uporabo plina v industriji z elektriko potrebuje še več plina, da bi proizvedla to elektriko.

Zelo smart.

What strikes me — a parallel that for some reason I haven’t seen many people drawing — is the contrast between Germany’s current reluctance to make moderate sacrifices, even in the face of horrific war crimes, and the immense sacrifices Germany demanded of other countries during the European debt crisis a decade ago.

As some readers may remember, early last decade much of southern Europe faced a crisis as lending dried up, sending interest rates on government debt soaring. German officials were quick to blame these countries for their own plight, insisting, with much moralizing, that they were in trouble because they had been fiscally irresponsible and now needed to pay the price.

As it turns out, this diagnosis was mostly wrong. Much of the surge in southern European interest rates reflected a market panic rather than fundamentals; borrowing costs plunged, even for Greece, after the president of the European Central Bank said three words — “whatever it takes” — suggesting that the bank would, if necessary, step in to buy the debt of troubled economies.

Yet Germany took the lead in demanding that debtor nations impose extreme austerity measures, especially spending cuts, no matter how large the economic costs. And those costs were immense: Between 2009 and 2013 the Greek economy shrank by 21 percent while the unemployment rate rose to 27 percent.

But while Germany was willing to impose economic and social catastrophe on countries it claimed had been irresponsible in their borrowing, it has been unwilling to impose far smaller costs on itself despite the undeniable irresponsibility of its past energy policies.

I’m not sure how to quantify this, but my sense is that Germany received far more and clearer warning about its feckless reliance on Russian gas than Greece ever did about its pre-crisis borrowing. Yet it seems as if Germany’s famous eagerness to treat economic policy as a morality play applies only to other countries.

To be fair, Germany has moved on from its initial unwillingness to help Ukraine at all; Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany claims, although the Germans deny it, that he was told there was no point in sending weapons because his government would collapse in hours. And maybe, maybe, the realization that refusing to shut off the flow of Russian gas makes Germany de facto complicit in mass murder will finally be enough to induce real action.

But until or unless this happens, Germany will continue, shamefully, to be the weakest link in the democratic world’s response to Russian aggression.

Vir: Paul Krugman, New York Times