Velike napake “majhne države”

Mariana Mazzucato in Giulio Quaggiotto sta upravičeno kritična do praks nekaterih razvitih držav, na čelu z V. Britanijo in ZDA, ki  v mantri “zmanjševanja države” in “stradanja zveri” s prakso javno-zasebnih partnerstev (JZP) in koncesij outsourcale nekatere ključne javne storitve: od tehnologije, do zdravstva in oskrbe starejših. JZP so, kot sem tukaj že večkrat pokazal, itak eden največjih sodobnih nategov, s katerimi služijo le zasebne finančne ustanove in konzultantske hiše. Pod pretvezo, da je treba zmanjšati javne izdatke, vlade (in občine) sklenejo dolgoročne pogodbe z zasebnimi ponudniki, kar na prvi pogled polepša bilance, ker ni investicijskega odhodka, vendar pa nato 20 ali 30 let prihajajo visoki računi od zasebnikov. Skupen strošek investicije ali izvajanja neke javne storitve prek JZP pa je občajno nekajkrat dražji, kot če bi država sama investirala v nek projekt ali sama organizirala neko javno storitev. Ker pač lastniki zasebnih ponudnikov zahtevajo visok donos, ta pa ne sme biti manjši od 8-10% na letni ravni.

Toda finance so samo en vidik problema outsourcanja storitev. Ključni problem se pokaže v slabši kvaliteti zasebnih storitev (dobiček pred skrbjo za kvaliteto) ter v izrednih razmerah. V slednjih države, ki so outsourcale ključne javne storitve, niso v stanju hitro reagirati na razmere in zagotoviti ustrezne ravni storitev. Korona kriza je bila dober test, pokazala je, da so se s situacijo bolje soočile države z več javnega zdravstva in z boljšo organizacijo vseh drugih osnovnih sistemov v državi. Vlade iz držav s filozofijo “majhne države” so podcenjevale problem, pričakovale, da se bo čudežno rešil sam in tako zaradi nepripravljenosti plačale višjo ceno v obliki človeških življenj.

Decades of privatization, outsourcing, and budget cuts in the name of “efficiency” have significantly hampered many governments’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis. At the same time, successful responses by other governments have shown that investments in core public-sector capabilities make all the difference in times of emergency. The countries that have handled the crisis well are those where the state maintains a productive relationship with value creators in society, by investing in critical capacities and designing private-sector contracts to serve the public interest.

Unfortunately, for the last half-century, the prevailing political message in many countries has been that governments cannot – and therefore should not – actually govern. Politicians, business leaders, and pundits have long relied on a management creed that focuses obsessively on static measures of efficiency to justify spending cuts, privatization, and outsourcing.

As a result, governments now have fewer options for responding to the crisis, which may be why some are now desperately clinging to the unrealistic hope of technological panaceas such as artificial intelligence or contact-tracing apps. With less investment in public capacity has come a loss of institutional memory (as the UK’s government has discovered) and increased dependence on private consulting firms, which have raked in billions. Not surprisingly, morale among public-sector employees has plunged in recent years.

Consider two core government responsibilities during the COVID-19 crisis: public health and the digital realm. In 2018 alone, the UK government outsourced health contracts worth £9.2 billion ($11.2 billion), putting 84% of beds in care homes in the hands of private-sector operators (including private equity firms). Making matters worse, since 2015, the UK’s National Health Service has endured £1 billion in budget cuts.

Outsourcing by itself is not the problem. But the outsourcing of critical state capacities clearly is, especially when the resulting public-private “partnerships” are not designed to serve the public interest. Ironically, some governments have outsourced so eagerly that they have undermined their own ability to structure outsourcing contracts. After a 12-year effort to spur the private sector to develop low-cost ventilators, the US government is now learning that outsourcing is not a reliable way to ensure emergency access to medical equipment.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s successful approach to COVID-19 has emerged as a striking contrast to the US and UK responses. Among other things, the Vietnamese government was able to amass low-cost testing kits very quickly, because it already had the capacity to mobilize academia, the army, the private sector, and civil society around a common mission. Rather than simply outsourcing with few questions asked, it used public research and development funding and procurement to drive innovation. The resulting public-private collaboration enabled rapid commercialization of kits, which are now being exported to Europe and beyond.

New Zealand is another success story, and not by coincidence. After initially adopting the outsourcing mantra in the 1980s, the New Zealand government changed course, embracing a “spirit of service” and an “ethic of care” across its public services, and becoming the first country in the world to adopt a wellbeing budget. Owing to this vision of public management, the government adopted a “health first, economy second” approach to the current crisis. Rather than seeking herd immunity, it committed early to preventing infection.

The contrasts between the US and UK, on the one hand, and Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand, on the other, offer important lessons. Far from retreating into the role of fixer of market failures and outsourcer of services, governments should invest in their own critical faculties. The pandemic has laid bare the need for more state productive capacity, government procurement capabilities, symbiotic public-private collaboration.

In any crisis – financial, public-health, or climate-related – a lack of choice drastically limits the public sector’s room to maneuver. After years of pursuing a misguided governance model, policymakers around the world surely are lamenting the lack of in-house know-how and resources to deploy the digital tools needed to save lives. Effective governance, it turns out, cannot be conjured up at will.

Vir: Mariana Mazzucato in Giulio Quaggiotto, Project Syndicate

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