Zelo dober zapis Grega Ipa v WSJ, da ni toliko problem v globalizaciji (prostem pretoku blaga, storitev, kapitala in tudi ljudi), kot je problem v “globalizmu” kot ideologiji “elite iz Davosa”, da so prosta trgovina in prosti tokovi kapitala svetinja in da so nacionalne institucije, kultura in meje obsoletne. Zamenjala naj bi jih globalna ureditev in globalna kultura. No, tudi če globalizem ne bi bil ideologija, ne igra bistvene vloge, dokler ga kot ideologijo prepoznavajo populistična gibanja in ga jemljejo kot tarčo, ki jo je treba uničiti in “zadeve” spraviti spet nazaj v okvir nacionalnih meja.
In ja, vstop (potiskanje) Kitajske v WTO (2001) in uvedba evra (1999) kot dve največji globalistični dejanji zadnjih dveh desetletij, sta bili napaka. V fundamentih sta spremenili svet, kot smo ga poznali in lahko kontrolirali v okviru nacionalne suverenosti. Ključno vprašanje je, ali in s kakšnimi stroški je ti dve dejanji mogoče anulirati? Je mogoče svetovno ureditev zavrteti nazaj v stanje pred letom 1999? Je mogoče nazaj potegniti stare meje?
Če pogledate hitro širitev mejnih ograj v Evropi ter obeh Amerikah, je to seveda banalno mogoče. Toda fizične (bodeče ali visoke) mejne ovire niso tisto, kar bi reševalo problem globalizacije in globalizma, ki “sta šla predaleč“. So zgolj zbanalizirana in necivilizirana oblika izražanja nemoči politične elite.
Supporters of these disparate movements are protesting not just globalization—the process whereby goods, capital and people move ever more freely across borders—but globalism, the mind-set that globalization is natural and good, that global governance should expand as national sovereignty contracts.
The new nationalist surge has startled establishment parties in part because they don’t see globalism as an ideology. How could it be, when it is shared across the traditional left-right spectrum by the likes of Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, George W. Bush and David Cameron?
But globalism is an ideology, and its struggle with nationalism will shape the coming era much as the struggle between conservatives and liberals has shaped the last. That, at least, is how the new nationalists see it.
Little unites the new nationalists other than their shared antipathy toward globalism. Mr. Trump’s economic program is as far to the right as Ms. Le Pen’s is to the left. Nor do they have credible plans for replacing the institutions of globalization that they want to tear down, as Britain’s confused exit from the EU demonstrates.
But globalists would be wise to face their own shortcomings. They have underestimated the collateral damage that breakneck globalization has inflicted on ordinary workers, placed too much weight on the strategic advantages of trade and dismissed too readily the value that many ordinary citizens still attach to national borders and cultural cohesion.
By the 2000s, globalism was triumphant. The World Economic Forum had evolved from a cozy management-oriented workshop in the Swiss town of Davos to an extravagant summit for elites. The late political scientist Samuel Huntington applied the caustic label “Davos man” to those who see “national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing.” For globalists, this was a badge of honor, symbolizing not just an outlook but a lifestyle of first-class departure lounges, smartphones and stock options.
This is also when globalists overreached. In 2000, Mr. Clinton blessed China’s entry into the WTO. Echoing Truman, he predicted China’s membership was “likely to have a profound impact on human rights and political liberty.”
It didn’t. China adhered to the letter of its WTO obligations while systematically violating their spirit with discrimination against foreign investors and products and an artificially cheap currency. A wave of Chinese imports wiped out 2 million American jobs, according to one widely cited 2016 study, with no equivalent boom in U.S. jobs linked to exports to China. Meanwhile, China became more repressive at home and antagonistic abroad. By behaving quite differently from other members of the global trading club, China has undermined support for it.
Globalists in Europe also overreached. In 1999, 11 EU members joined the euro, the crowning achievement of European unity. Economists warned that Italy, Spain and Greece couldn’t compete with Germany without the safety valve of letting national currencies periodically devalue to offset their faster-rising costs. Sure enough, their trade deficits ballooned, but low-cost euro loans at first made them easy to finance. The loans proved unsustainable, and the resulting crisis has still not run its course. One result: In Italy, the populist 5 Star Movement, which is jostling for first place in the polls, has promised a nonbinding referendum on membership in the euro.
Globalists were blind to the nationalist backlash in part because their world—entrepreneurial, university-educated, ethnically diverse, urban and coastal—has thrived as whiter, less-educated hinterlands have stagnated. Similar splits separate London from the rest of England and the EU’s capital cities from the countryside of continental Europe.
Many globalists now assume that the discontent is largely driven by stagnant wages and inequality. If people are upset about immigration, they reason, it is largely because they fear competition with low-wage workers.
In fact, much of the backlash against immigration (and globalism) is not economic but cultural.
In 2014, Steve Bannon—Mr. Trump’s top strategist and the former leader of Breitbart News, a fiery conservative site that is fiercely opposed to immigration and multiculturalism—acknowledged that Ms. Le Pen’s National Front and its British counterpart, the UK Independence Party, “bring a lot of baggage, both ethnically and racially.” Nonetheless, Mr. Bannon saw them as fellow travelers. He said, “The working men and women in the world…are just tired of being dictated to by what we call the party of Davos.”
Indeed, one 2012 study found that Europeans’ opposition to immigration was driven less by pocketbook concerns than by worries about how changes to “the composition of the local population” would affect “their neighborhoods, schools and workplaces.” The last big U.S. backlash against immigration came during the Roaring Twenties, the last time that the foreign-born share of the population stood as high as it is today, at 13%.
Even as committed a globalist as Mr. Obama has come to acknowledge this. Democrats, he told Rolling Stone the day after the election, must recognize that “for the majority of the American people, borders mean something.”
Vir: Greg Ip, WSJ