Paul Krugman o tem, kako je “odgovorno varčevanje” ( da bi z zmanjšanjem deficitov zmanjšali javni dolg) privedlo do povsem nasprotnega učinka – do povečanja javnega dolga, ker je varčevanje v procesu ubilo gospodarsko rast. In na krivce za te “neodgovorne učinke” lahko seveda zelo hitro pokažemo s prstom. Tudi pri nas. Kjer nekateri, tudi novinarji, še vedno niso dojeli. Vsem pa očitno manjka osnovnih znanj makroekonomije. Tega, kar študente širom po svetu učimo v prvih letnikih študija.
When economic crisis struck in 2008, policy makers by and large did the right thing. The Federal Reserve and other central banks realized that supporting the financial system took priority over conventional notions of monetary prudence. The Obama administration and its counterparts realized that in a slumping economy budget deficits were helpful, not harmful. And the money-printing and borrowing worked: A repeat of the Great Depression, which seemed all too possible…, was avoided.
Then it all went wrong. … In 2010, more or less suddenly, the policy elite on both sides of the Atlantic decided to stop worrying about unemployment and start worrying about budget deficits instead.
This … was very much at odds with basic economics. Yet ominous talk about the dangers of deficits became something everyone said because everyone else was saying it, and dissenters were no longer considered respectable…
Yet there’s growing evidence that we critics actually underestimated just how destructive the turn to austerity would be. Specifically, it now looks as if austerity policies didn’t just impose short-term losses of jobs and output, but they also crippled long-run growth. …
What this suggests is that … austerity had truly catastrophic effects, going far beyond the jobs and income lost in the first few years. In fact, the long-run damage … is easily big enough to make austerity a self-defeating policy even in purely fiscal terms: Governments that slashed spending … hurt their economies, and hence their future tax receipts, so much that even their debt will end up higher…
And the bitter irony … is that this catastrophic policy was undertaken in the name of long-run responsibility, that those who protested … were dismissed as feckless.
There are a few obvious lessons from this debacle. “All the important people say so” is not, it turns out, a good way to decide on policy… Also, calling for sacrifice (by other people, of course) doesn’t mean you’re tough-minded.
But will these lessons sink in? Past economic troubles, like the stagflation of the 1970s, led to widespread reconsideration of economic orthodoxy. But one striking aspect of the past few years has been how few people are willing to admit having been wrong about anything. It seems all too possible that the Very Serious People who cheered on disastrous policies will learn nothing from the experience. And that is, in its own way, as scary as the economic outlook.
Vir: Paul Krugman, New York Times