Recesije in potencialni output: Mar slepimo sami sebe?

O tej raziskavi sem pisal že lani. Standardni modeli predvidevajo, da output (BDP) po recesijah raste hitreje od trendnega, kar pomeni, da tekoča rast kmalu zapolni izpad rasti v času recesije. Vendar pa raziskave v zadnjih letih kažejo, da temu ni tako (Oulton & Sebastiá-Barriel, 2013; Furceri & Mourougane, 2012; Abiad et. al., 2009; Haltmaier, 2012). Raziskava Robert, Munyan & Wilson (Federal Reserve Board, 2015) Potential Output and Recessions: Are We Fooling Ourselves? na podlagi podatkov za 40 let in za 23 razvitih držav kaže, da se po recesijah BDP ne vrne na prejšnje trajektorije rasti in da torej tekoča rast BDP ne nadomesti izpada BDP med krizo. Še posebej to velja za globoke recesije, ki sledijo finančnim krizam. “Luknjo” med trendnim in dejanskim BDP ne zapolni tekoča rast BDP, pač pa revizije (popravki) trendnega (potencialnega) BDP navzdol. Robert, Munyan & Wilson pokažejo, da je za počasnejšo rast po krizah krivo predvsem uničenje dela produktivnih kapacitet v času daljše recesije, predvsem na strani delovne sile (zmanjša se participacija delovne sile). Ključen je torej “učinek histereze” na trgu dela (Blanchard & Summers, 1986), ko daljša recesija ali dolgo obdobje nizke rasti trajno s trga umakne del delovne sile.

Spodaj je abstract raziskave in dve zanimivi sliki, ki kažeta “neželjeno resnico”, da se BDP ne vrne na prejšnje stopnje rasti in da “luknjo” zapiramo predvsem s popravljanjem ocen potencialnega outputa navzdol.

This paper studies the impact of recessions on the longer-run level of output using data on 23 advanced economies over the past 40 years. We find that severe recessions have a sustained and sizable negative impact on the level of output. This sustained decline in output raises questions about the underlying properties of output and how we model trend output or potential around recessions. We find little support for the view that output rises faster than trend immediately following recessions to close the output gap. Indeed, we find little evidence that growth is faster following recessions than before; if anything post-trough growth is slower. Instead, we find that output gaps close importantly through downward revisions to potential output rather than through rapid post-recession growth. The revisions are made slowly (over years) – a process that leads to an initial underestimation of the effect of recessions on potential output and a corresponding under-prediction of inflation.

Potential_actual_GDPGDP RevisonsVir: Robert, Munyan & Wilson (2015) Potential Output and Recessions: Are We Fooling Ourselves?

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