Se je grška kapitulacija splačala?

Hvala, dobro vprašanje.

Prvo vprašanje je seveda, ali bo Grčija sploh dobila priložnost za kapitulacijo. Nemški finančni minister Schaueble je čez vikend via FAZ objavil načrt, da bi Grčija morala začasno za 5 let izstopiti iz evra. Kar je v svojem bistvu neumnen in nelogičen predlog. Če bi izstopila (in plačala ceno za izstop), zakaj bi se kasneje sploh želela vrniti?! Kdo si pa še želi biti v monetarni uniji z Nemčijo?! Problem, ki ga imajo države v evrski uniji, je, da v visoki travi, kamor so vrgle ključ od evra pred desetletjem in pol, ključa ne morejo najti.

In po današnjem drugem dnevu “otroškega vrtca” je očitno, da je atmosfera med “partnerji” povsem zastrupljena. Schauebleja, katerega osnovna motivacija je očitno in zgolj le še kaznovanje Grčije, je moral miriti in prekinjati celo Mario Draghi, predsednik ECB. Toda prav daleč od Schauebleja niso tudi nekateri drugi ministri, predvsem finski ter “vzhodnoevropski”, kjer tudi naš minister pridno asistira nemškemu “wahnsinnu”.

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Dr Schäuble’s Plan for Europe: Do Europeans approve? – Article to appear in Die Zeit on Thursday 16th July 2015

Yanis Varoufakis

Pre-publication summary: Five months of intense negotiations between Greece and the Eurogroup never had a chance of success. Condemned to lead to impasse, their purpose was to pave the ground for what Dr Schäuble had decided was ‘optimal’ well before our government was even elected: That Greece should be eased out of the Eurozone in order to discipline member-states resisting his very specific plan for re-structuring the Eurozone.

  • This is no theory.
  • How do I know Grexit is an important part of Dr Schäuble’s plan for Europe?
  • Because he told me so!

I wrote this article not as a Greek politician critical of the German press’ denigration of our sensible proposals, of Berlin’s refusal seriously to consider our moderate debt re-profiling plan, of the European Central Bank’s highly political decision to asphyxiate our government, of the Eurogroup’s decision to give the ECB the green light to shut down our banks.

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Ozadje “grškega deala”: With partners like these you don’t need enemies

Razpadanje “evropskega partnerstva” pri živem telesu. Nemcem se je očitno odtrgalo. Malce ozadja po izboru Reutersa

Such was the “tough, even violent” atmosphere, in the words of one participant, that after an overnight break the German and French finance chiefs, Wolfgang Schaeuble and Michel Sapin, sat down to clear the air between them before resuming on Sunday.

Schaeuble also crossed swords with ECB governor Mario Draghi, snapping at the Italian central banker “I’m not stupid!”

“It was crazy, a kindergarten,” said a source describing the overall course of nine hours of talks on Saturday among weary ministers attending their sixth emergency Eurogroup in three weeks. “Bad emotions have completely taken over.”

Schaeuble and others seemed to favour a “Grexit”, another participant said. The European Central Bank’s Draghi seemed “the strongest European” in the room, most opposed to the risky experiment of cutting Greece loose and braving Schaeuble’s ire by interrupting him during a discussion on Athens’ debt burden.

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Krugman o “grškem dealu”: Eurogroup list of demands is madness

Se ne bi mogel bolj strinjati:

Even if all of that is true, this Eurogroup list of demands is madness. The trending hashtag ThisIsACoup is exactly right. This goes beyond harsh into pure vindictiveness, complete destruction of national sovereignty, and no hope of relief. It is, presumably, meant to be an offer Greece can’t accept; but even so, it’s a grotesque betrayal of everything the European project was supposed to stand for.

Can anything pull Europe back from the brink? Word is that Mario Draghi is trying to reintroduce some sanity, that Hollande is finally showing a bit of the pushback against German morality-play economics that he so signally failed to supply in the past. But much of the damage has already been done. Who will ever trust Germany’s good intentions after this?

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Evro in izgubljeni ključi: najboljša definicija evra

… kar sem jih doslej slišal:

Evro je ultra-fiksirana valuta: države so se zaklenile v začetne menjalne tečaje med nacionalnimi valutami in nato vrgle ključe v globoko travo. Danes pa vse več držav prečesuje to travo in tiho išče ključe.

Ali po domače rečeno, zaklenili smo se v nevzdržni zapor in zdaj nihče ne ve, kako bi iz njega pobegnil.

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Vikend branje

Blanchard on Greece: Past Critiques and the Path Forward

So Olivier Blanchard – whom I respect very much in his role as a research director of IMF – keeps saying, what we (IMF and the troika) did in Greece, in particular the forced fiscal adjustment, was absolutely necessary given the circumstances and real time information, but Greece’s governments failed to deliver reforms and we underestimated the fiscal multipliers. Greece debt is increasingly unsustainable, but we have to continue with this medication, more reforms are needed, taxes should be increased and pensions slashed. Failing to do this would require higher amount of haircut for EU governments, which is not politically feasible.

Eeee, this amounts to saying ‘Nevermind our great research over the past 4 years showing that fiscal austerity has a contractionary impact on GDP and that structural reforms have neutral or negative impact on growth over the short or medium term, we should impose even more fiscal austerity and more structural reforms on Greece, otherwise the creditors would be unhappy‘.

Is this a clash between the academic honesty and policy making in the world of politics?

iMFdirect - The IMF Blog

IMG_0248By Olivier Blanchard

All eyes are on Greece, as the parties involved continue to strive for a lasting deal, spurring vigorous debate and some sharp criticisms, including of the IMF.

In this context, I thought some reflections on the main critiques could help clarify some key points of contention as well as shine a light on a possible way forward.

The main critiques, as I see them, fall under the following four categories:

  • The 2010 program only served to raise debt and demanded excessive fiscal adjustment.
  • The financing to Greece was used to repay foreign banks.
  • Growth-killing structural reforms, together with fiscal austerity, have led to an economic depression.
  • Creditors have learned nothing and keep repeating the same mistakes.

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Mario Draghi pomagal Grčiji pri goljufanju, da pride v evro, zdaj jo meče ven?

Nerodna stvar. Se spomnite, kako je Grčija pred desetletjem in pol goljufala pri prikazovanju višine javnega dolga, da je lahko prišla v evro? Takrat ji je pomagal predvsem Goldman Sachs. Denimo leta 2001 je z grško vlado naredil zamenjavo (swap) dolga (v višini 2.8 mlr €), nominiranega v dolarjih in jenih v evre – vendar po zgodovinskem tečaju. S tem je grški javni dolg izpadel manjši kot v resnici. Kdo naj bi takrat nadzoroval in osebno podpiral to operacijo? Mario Draghi, takratni podpredsednik in izvršni direktor Goldman Sachs International.

Ni še konec. Leta 2012 je Bloomberg bil pravno bitko z ECB, naj dovoli dostop do dveh dokumentov, ki opisujeta mehanizme, kako je Grčija z različnimi triki prek mednarodnih finančnih inštitucij frizirirala javni dolg. Takrat je ECB zavrnila dostop do dokumentov, rekoč:

the European Central Bank said it can’t release files showing how Greece may have used derivatives to hide its borrowings because disclosure could still inflame the crisis threatening the future of the single currency.

Kdo je bil takrat predsednik ECB? Mario Draghi.

Zanimivo. In nerodno hkrati. Spodaj so podrobnosti, objavljene na portalu Zerohedge:

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Političnost, ne pa neodvisnost ECB

Kot sem zapisal v prejšnjem postu, je ECB glede Grčije ravnala izrazito politično, ko je grške banke odrezala od običajne likvidnosti, ko je grški vladi de facto onemogočila tekoče refinanciranje prek zakladnih menic in ko je grškim bankam zaprla tudi izredno likvidnostno pomoč. Si predstavljate, da bi se kaj takšnega lahko zgodilo denimo Škotski v primeru zmage SNP in potencialne možnosti referenduma o neodvisnosti Škotske? Bi Bank of England škotske banke odrezala od likvidnosti? Simon Wren-Lewis iz univerze v Oxfordu pravi, da ne.

ECB je ravnala politično. Ravnala je kot ena izmed “strank v postopku”, kot članica trojke, z namenom prisiliti Grčijo v podpis vsiljenega in škodljivega sporazuma. ECB ni ravnala kot neodvisna inštitucija, ampak motivirana s političnimi interesi. In to ni naredila prvič, kot pravita monetarna strokovnjaka Paul De Grauwe in Charles Wyplosz ter prekoračila svoj mandat. Nadaljujte z branjem

Intervju insiderja o ozadju grških “pogajanj”: kako so inštitucije fiskalno in finančno “waterboardale” Grčijo

Če ste spremljali kriminalne metode mučenja ameriških ujetnikov v Guantanamu, ste zasledili tudi metodo “waterboardinga“. Gre za simulacijo utapljanja ujetnika na deski, da bi ga telesno in psihično zlomili. No, takšni metodi fiskalnega in finančnega waterboardinga sta Grčijo od februarja letos, kot v intervjuju razkriva eden izmed grških pogajalcev, podvrgli Evropska komisija (EK) in ECB. Grčijo sta podvrgli simulaciji finančnega utapljanja. S to razliko, da zvezani žrtvi nista polivali vode po glavi, pač pa ste zvezani žrtvi odrekli tekočino – finančno likvidnost. Takoj ko je bila imenovana nova vlada pod vodstvom Syrize, so vladi in bankam zaprli (skoraj) vse finančne pipice in jih podvrgli finančni suši. Poglejte si metode.

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