Pred časom sem že pisal, da so sindikati sicer pain-in-the-ass, vendar pa so opravljali koristno funkcijo pri omejevanju prevelike disperzije plač. Po domače rečeno, večja moč sindikatov je vplivala na manjše razlike v dohodkih. Prav zmanjšana moč sindikatov je eden izmed dejavnikov, ki je v procesu intenzivne globalizacije ob povečani relokaciji industrije iz razvitih držav proti jugu in proti Aziji pomembno vplivala na povečanje nenakosti v razvitih državah.
To slednje zdaj ugotavlja tudi še sveža študija raziskovalcev IMF Florence Jaumotte in Caroline Osorio Buitron, ki ugotavljata, da manjša sindikalna zastopanost zaposlenih v razvitih državah v obdobju 1980 – 2010 lahko pojasni ne samo plače zaposlenih z nizkimi in srednjimi plačami, pač pa tudi porast dohodkov zgornjih 10%. Spodaj je kratek izvleček iz njune raziskave.
Preden se kdo preveč razhudi, zakaj je povečanje razlik v plačah v razvitih državah problematično, naj samo navedem, da to samo po sebi sicer ne bi bil problem. Tisti, ki več vlagajo v svoje znanje ali ki so bolj podjetni, seveda morajo zaslužiti v skladu s tem. Problem pa nastane, če naraščajo samo plače v zgornjih 25%, 10% ali 5%, medtem ko plače spodnjih 60 ali 70% populacije realno stagnirajo, ker njihovih prejemkov nihče ne ščiti, kot se je zgodilo v ZDA. To posledično vpliva na stabilnost agregatnega povpraševanja, saj glavnina prebivalstva ne more trošiti. Oziroma lahko troši samo prek povečanega zadolževanja (kreditne kartice, stanovanjski in nepremičninski krediti), kar je v ozadju izbruha ameriške finančne krize. Dodatna težava je, da v primeru pretežno zasebnega šolstva, kot je v ZDA, otroci rojeni staršem v spodnjem delu distribucije ne morejo priti do ustrezne in kvalitetne izobrazbe, s čimer je omejena njihova socialna mobilnost. S tem pa je tudi omejena rast proizvodnega potenciala nacije. Problem v (neprimerni) razdelitvi lahko tako postane velik makroekonomski problem.
Traditional explanations for the rise of inequality in advanced economies are skill-biased technological change and globalization, which have increased the relative demand for skilled workers, benefiting top earners relative to average earners. But technology and globalization foster economic growth, and there is little policymakers can or are willing to do to reverse these trends. Moreover, while high-income countries have been similarly affected by technological change and globalization, inequality in these economies has risen at different speeds and magnitudes.
As a consequence, economic research has recently focused on the effects of institutional changes, with financial deregulation and the decline in top marginal personal income tax rates often cited as important contributors to the rise of inequality. By contrast, the role played by labor market institutions—such as the decline in the share of workers affiliated with trade unions and the fall in the minimum wage relative to the median income—has featured less prominently in recent debates. In a forthcoming paper, we look at this side of the equation.
We examine the causes of the rise in inequality and focus on the relationship between labor market institutions and the distribution of incomes, by analyzing the experience of advanced economies since the early 1980s. The widely held view is that changes in unionization or the minimum wage affect low- and middle-wage workers but are unlikely to have a direct impact on top income earners.
While our findings are consistent with prior views about the effects of the minimum wage, we find strong evidence that lower unionization is associated with an increase in top income shares in advanced economies during the period 1980–2010 (for example, see Chart 2), thus challenging preconceptions about the channels through which union density affects income distribution. This is the most novel aspect of our analysis, which sets the stage for further research on the link between the erosion of unions and the rise of inequality at the top.
Economic research has highlighted various channels through which unions and the minimum wage can affect the distribution of incomes at the bottom and middle, such as the dispersion of wages, unemployment, and redistribution. In our study, however, we also consider the possibility that weaker unions can lead to higher top income shares, and formulate hypotheses for why this may be the case.
So the main channels through which labor market institutions affect income inequality are the following:
Wage dispersion: Unionization and minimum wages are usually thought to reduce inequality by helping equalize the distribution of wages, and economic research confirms this.
Unemployment: Some economists argue that while stronger unions and a higher minimum wage reduce wage inequality, they may also increase unemployment by maintaining wages above “market-clearing” levels, leading to higher gross income inequality. But the empirical support for this hypothesis is not very strong, at least within the range of institutional arrangements observed in advanced economies (see Betcherman, 2012; Baker and others, 2004; Freeman, 2000; Howell and others, 2007; OECD, 2006). For instance, in an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development review of 17 studies, only 3 found a robust association between union density (or bargaining coverage) and higher overall unemployment.
Redistribution: Strong unions can induce policymakers to engage in more redistribution by mobilizing workers to vote for parties that promise to redistribute income or by leading all political parties to do so. Historically, unions have played an important role in the introduction of fundamental social and labor rights. Conversely, the weakening of unions can lead to less redistribution and higher net income inequality (that is, inequality of income after taxes and transfers).
Bargaining power of workers and top income shares: Lower union density can increase top income shares by reducing the bargaining power of workers. Naturally, top income shares are mechanically influenced by what happens in the lower part of the income distribution. If deunionization weakens earnings for middle- and low-income workers, this necessarily increases the income share of corporate managers’ pay and shareholder returns. Intuitively, the weakening of unions reduces the bargaining power of workers relative to capital owners, increasing the share of capital income—which is more concentrated at the top than wages and salaries. Moreover, weaker unions can reduce workers’ influence on corporate decisions that benefit top earners, such as the size and structure of top executive compensation.