Ključno vprašanje, ki smo si ga ob četrtkovi nepričakovani in radikalni potezi švicarske centralne banke (SNB) zastavljali ekonomisti, je: Kaj je SNB vedela več kot vsi ostali?

(Naj osvežim spomin: SNB je z nenadno potezo umaknila vezavo franka na evro v razmerju 1.20 in uvedla negativno obrestno mero na depozite v višini 0.75%. Ta radikalna poteza je povzročila potres na finančnih trgih.)

V zadnjih dneh je krožilo nekaj teorij (glej Brunnermeier & James, Wren-Lewis, Krugman 1 in Krugman 2, etc.), toda najbolj smiselno teorijo je danes objavila Frances Coppola v Forbesu. V sredo je z objavo mnenja generalnega pravobranilca evropskega sodišča (ECJ), Pedra Cruza Villalona, ECB dobila (legalno) prosto pot za program odkupovanja obveznic (QE). Isti dan (v sredo) pa je po poročanju Reutersa predsednik ECB Mario Draghi dobil tudi politično zeleno luč od nemške kanclerke Angele Merkel za program QE (po katerem bi posamezna nacionalna centralna banka odkupovala nacionalne državne obveznice). Edina ovira za lansiranje tega programa je bila torej le še – švicarska vezava franka na evro. Namreč logika programa ECB je, da s poplavo svežega denarja razveljavi vrednost evra. Toda ta ukrep bi bil neučinkovit, če bi SNB ob vzdrževanju fiksnega tečaja na evro takoj pokupila vse sveže količine evrov, ki bi jih na trg poslala ECB. Naj spomnim, da je s temi ukrepi SNB v zadnjih treh letih napihnila svojo bilanco na 86% BDP, kar je daleč največja izpostavljenost katerekoli centralne banke.

Vse to navaja na to, da so bile prejšnji teden aktivnosti evropskega sodišča, ECB in SNB med seboj usklajene in da imajo podporo nemške vlade. Vprašanje pa je  seveda, ali so velikanski stroški, ki jih bo ta akcija imela (valutna vojna, izgube imetnikov kreditov v frankih, zlom konkurenčnosti švicarskih izvoznikov …) upravičeni iz vidika željenih učinkov (spodbuditev inflacije). Kmalu bomo vedeli.

This action has without question been very costly. So why did the SNB do it?

Frankly, I don’t buy the SNB’s “cap is no longer needed” story. If the currency peg was really redundant, market reaction would have been far less extreme. Nor do I agree with Marcus Brunnermeier and Harold James that this was due to domestic political worries about SNB solvency. In my view this is all about ECB QE – and about the power dynamics between central banks.

…

The Advocate General’s opinion, although it concerns OMT, clears the way for ECB QE. Despite many people’s misgivings, QE is now sure to go ahead, if only because no-one has a better idea.

But there was another obstacle to QE. As John Authers points out in the FT, the SNB’s purchases of euros have not only prevented the appreciation of the franc, they have also supported the Euro. The ECB has openly admitted that what it calls the “exchange rate channel” – i.e. weakening the currency – is a means by which QE could achieve its effects in the Eurozone. But it would be pointless for the ECB to flood the market with euros only to see the SNB hoover them all up again. Somehow, the ECB had to persuade the SNB to stop supporting its currency.

Central banks cannot be broken by markets when defending a rising currency (though they can when defending a falling one). But they can be broken by a central bank with more firepower. The ECJ Advocate General’s opinion was a game changer. No way is the most powerful central bank in the world going to allow the minnow on its border to derail its hard-won QE program. The SNB, considerably smaller than the ECB and subject to both democratic and legal constraints, had no choice but to end its Euro purchases or face destruction of its balance sheet to no purpose.

But why did the SNB act so precipitously? After all, at the time of the SNB’s action the ECB had not announced QE. Surely the SNB could wait until it did so?

No, it could not. It had to act when it did. On Friday January 16^th, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that on the same day as the ECJ Advocate General published his opinion, the ECB President, Mario Draghi, had presented his proposed QE programme to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The presentation gave details of the size of the programme, the approach (NCBs to buy their own government bonds) and limitations (Greek bonds excluded). Der Spiegel’s report, apparently authorized by a German government official, was an official leak of the ECB’s intended QE programme. In effect, the ECB announced QE as soon as the SNB got out of the way. This can’t possibly be coincidence.

But how did the SNB know that it had to act as soon as the ECJ Advocate General’s opinion was published? And why did the SNB’s action include a rate cut that could only be intended to defend against rapid inflows of capital, which would be expected if ECB QE was imminent, rather than simply “being considered”? As my colleague Raoul Ruparel rightly asks, what did the SNB know that no-one else did? Did it merely guess that ECB QE would not be far behind – or was it told? Did the ECB inform the SNB about Draghi’s meeting with Merkel? In short, did the ECB tell the SNB to remove the cap in order to clear the way for ECB QE? 

Vir: Frances Coppola, Forbes