Trump očitno lomi odpor Zelenskega. In očitno ga bo zlomil še bolj učinkovito in vehementno, kot je zlomil evropske “pogajalce” glede trgovinskega sporazuma. Vprašanje časa je, kdaj bo Zelenski popustil. Kako hitro bo popustil, se bo videlo po tem, koga bodo zaprli prej: njegovega šefa predsednikovega urada Yermaka ali šefa preiskovalcev (NABU). In naslednje vprašanje po tem bo, v katero državo se bo po zatočišče zatekel Zelenski. No, slednje je bolj retorične narave, saj je Izrael naravna izbira za takšne tipe. Tam ga že čaka njegov največji kompanjon v korupciji Mindich.

Tole je uvod v famozni članek Robina Hardinga v Financial Timesu, ki je ta teden razburkal ekonomsko javnost in ki je podlaga za mojo današnjo kolumno v Dnevniku »Kako preživeti v dobi kitajske prevlade«.

On a recent trip to mainland China, I found myself posing the same question, again and again, to the economists, technologists and business leaders who I met with. “Trade is an exchange. You provide something of value to me, and in return, I must offer something of value to you. So what is the product, in the future, that China would like to buy from the rest of the world?”

The answers were revealing. A few said “soyabeans and iron ore” before realising this was not much help to a European. Some observed that Louis Vuitton handbags are popular and then went on to talk about the export prospects for fast-rising Chinese luxury brands. “Higher education” was another common answer, qualified sometimes with the observation that Peking University and Tsinghua are harder to get into, and more academically rigorous, than anything on offer in the west.

Several of the economists, who had perhaps pondered the issue already, jumped ahead to a different point altogether: “This,” they said, “is why you should let Chinese companies set up factories in Europe.”

It is a train of thought that gives away the real answer to the question. Which is: nothing.

There is nothing that China wants to import, nothing it does not believe it can make better and cheaper, nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to. For now, to be sure, China is still a customer for semiconductors, software, commercial aircraft and the most sophisticated kinds of production machinery. But it is a customer like a resident doctor is a student. China is developing all of these goods. Soon it will make them, and export them, itself.

Vzdržal se bom komentarja

The EU has essentially admitted that it shot itself in the foot.

Due to the introduction of 19 sanction packages against Russia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have suffered chronic effects.

Tourists and investors have left, trade has decreased, inflation has risen, real estate prices have started to fall, and enterprises cannot obtain loans.

Why Europe and the United States Must Pivot From Defensive Trade Measures to Strategic Industrial Reconstruction

Brad Setser’s observation on Robin Harding’s recent FT analysis captures the essence of China’s trade model: excluding iron ore and oil, China’s vision of trade is one-way — all exports, almost no imports. This is not merely a statistical pattern; it is a reflection of a deliberate national strategy to reinforce industrial self-sufficiency while deepening global export dominance. Setser’s conclusion is blunt: “Beijing isn’t leaving Brussels or Berlin with much of a choice.”

If Europe and the United States wish to preserve a viable industrial base, they must abandon illusions about “managing” China through diplomatic signaling, WTO cases, or draconian tariffs. China now possesses the technological autonomy, material independence, scale and cost advantage to withstand Western pressure — and Western economies are the ones most vulnerable to escalation.

Understanding the Challenge: China’s Asymmetric Trade Model

China now imports primarily energy, food, raw materials, and selected high-tech components, while exporting increasingly competitive mid-tech and industrial goods under its own brands. This technological shift—both in production methods and industrial organization—has enabled China to outperform and displace Western firms in their home markets and globally.

This structural shift leaves Western industrial bases exposed. The EU and U.S. face declining trade balances / rising trade deficits, declining manufacturing capacity, completely exposed supply chains, and shrinking technological leadership in several sectors. Traditional policy tools — tariffs, export controls, WTO litigation — have yielded negligible results.

The key question is therefore not how to stop China, but how to rebuild ourselves.

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Rusijo je treba povabiti in vključiti v evro območje. Tako bomo z eno potezo uničili njeno industrijo. Res genialen predlog Yanisa Varoufakisa. Rusija lahko kljubuje sankcijam. Laho se ubrani tudi pred jedrskim napadom. Toda evro (skupna monetarna politika, skupna valuta in fiskalne omejitve) in članstvo v EU (skupna energetska in podnebna politka, skupna politika konkurence in državnih pomoči in ostale skupne bedarije) bi ubila še zadnjo trohico impulzov v ruski industriji. Če imajo te ženske, ki vodijo EU, vsaj trohico razuma, morajo razmisliti o tem zlobnem načrtu.

Andrew Korybko

Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned earlier the same day as Bloomberg’s report that the Brits are hellbent on discrediting Trump in order to undermine his latest peace efforts for resolving the conflict from which they profit.

Bloomberg shared what it claimed to be the transcripts of calls between Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Putin’s top foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov as well as between Ushakov and Putin’s other advisor Kirill Dmitriev about the Ukrainian peace process. The gist of the Witkoff-Ushakov call was Witkoff’s proposal to have Putin suggest a Gaza-like 20-point peace deal for Ukraine during an upcoming call with Trump while the Ushakov-Dmitriev one implied that the leaked draft was Russian-influenced.

Ushakov declined to comment on his talks with Witkoff but said that “Somebody tapped, somebody leaked, but not us” whereas Dmitriev flat-out described his purported call with Ushakov as “fake”. For his part, Trump defended Witkoff’s alleged “coaching” of Ushakov on how Putin should deal with him by reminding everyone “That’s what a dealmaker does. You got to say, ‘Look, they want this – you got to convince them with this.’ That’s a very standard form of negotiations.”

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Dve zadnji sliki, povezani z avtomobilsko proizvodnjo. Prva slika kaže odločitev Volkswagna, da bo električne avtomobile v celoti razvijal in proizvajal na Kitajskem – “Made in China, for Europe”. Ker so stroški razvoja za polovico nižji. (več v članku v Financial Timesu)

“In China, we can now run software, hardware, and full-vehicle validation processes in parallel, shorten decision loops, and bring innovations to maturity much faster.”

VW plans to reduce the headcount at its German factories by 35,000 by 2030.

VW says it can halve EV development costs with ‘Made in China’ car

Druga slika kaže enormno razvojno in proizvodno učinkovitost BYD, ki postaja standard kitajske avtomobilske industrije. Bere se kot reklama: 45 patentov na dan, čas sestavljanja 51 sekund. Toda če ste na drugi strani, zaposleni v evropski avtomobilski industriji, bodisi pri glavnih proizvajalcih ali pri njihovih dobaviteljih, vam ta “reklama” zamrzne kri v žilah. Ob tej organizaciji in učinkovitosti evropska avtomobilska industrija nima več zelo dolge prihodnosti. Tudi če pade zahteva glede prepovedi proizvodnje avtomobilov z notranjim izgorevanjem do leta 2035.

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Za razumevanje pomena teh besed (glejte spodnji članek) je seveda treba vedeti, kakšna strateška osebnost je bil George F. Kennan. 

Kennan je bil eden najvplivnejših ameriških diplomatov in strateških mislecev 20. stoletja. Najbolj znan je kot arhitekt politike zadrževalne strategije (containment), ki je temeljila na ideji, da je treba širjenje sovjetskega vpliva omejiti z dolgoročno, premišljeno in vztrajno politično ter gospodarsko močjo Zahoda. Svoj znameniti »Long Telegram« (1946) in članek “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (članek je bil prvotno objavljen anonimno v reviji Foreign Affairs julija 1947 pod psevdonimom “X”, vendar je bilo avtorstvo hitro razkrito in je postalo splošno znano) je napisal v času, ko je bilo v ZDA veliko nejasnosti glede namer Sovjetske zveze. Kennan je v teh analizah opozoril, da ni nevarnosti neposredne vojaške agresije po Evropi, temveč dolgoročne, politično-ideološke ekspanzije Sovjetske zveze, ki jo je mogoče omejiti s stabilnimi institucijami, močnimi ekonomijami in strateško potrpežljivostjo. S tem je postavil intelektualne temelje hladne vojne.

Njegova vizija je bila bistveno bolj zadržana, diplomatska in realistično uravnotežena kot kasnejši militarizirani pristopi ameriške zunanje politike. Kennan je opozarjal proti pretiranemu širjenju ameriških obveznosti in bil ostro kritičen do širitve Nata in je svaril, da bo premik ameriške vojaške infrastrukture proti ruskim mejam ustvaril odpor in konflikt, ne pa varnosti. Kljub temu da mnogi njegovi predlogi niso bili v celoti upoštevani, je pustil globoko zapuščino kot mislec, ki je zagovarjal strateško zmernost, razumevanje zgodovinskega in kulturnega konteksta in primat diplomacije pred silo. Zgodovina ga pogosto potrjuje kot enega najpronicljivejših in najdaljnovidnejših geopolitičnih analitikov svojega časa.

George Kennan je že v devetdesetih letih postal eden najostrejših kritikov odločitve ZDA, da razširijo Nato proti vzhodu, še posebej na območja nekdanje sovjetske sfere. Širitev je označil kot “najbolj usodno napako ameriške politike po hladni vojni”. Opozarjal je, da bo Rusija to razumela kot strateško grožnjo, ne glede na to, kdo vodi Kremelj, in da bo Zahod s tem sprožil ravno tiste napetosti, pred katerimi naj bi Nato ščitil. Kennan je poudarjal, da bi moral biti cilj povojne politike integrirati Rusijo v evropsko varnostno arhitekturo, ne pa jo izolirati in potiskati v defenzivo. Menil je, da bo širitev Nata spodkopala demokratične sile v Rusiji, okrepila nacionalistične ter varnostno-vojaške kroge in dolgoročno destabilizirala odnose med Vzhodom in Zahodom. Današnji konflikti in geopolitične napetosti pogosto potrjujejo njegovo svarilo ter njegov status izjemno daljnovidnega geopolitičnega misleca.

Tako vprašanje Piersa Morgana in še bolj odgovor Jeffreya Sachsa sta na mestu. Resnično bi bilo treba kaznovati velike države in Izrael za njihov mednarodni kriminal.

To vprašanje in odgovor imata samo eno napako: kdo bo to naredil oziroma kdo bi to sploh lahko naredil? In tukaj se skriva catch: nekatere države so “prevelike”, so preveč močne, da bi jih lahko kdo kaznoval. Kdo si upa kaznovati ZDA? Kdo si upa kaznovati Izrael (pod ameriško in židovsko zaščito)? Kdo lahko kaznuje Rusijo? (upajo si že, toda ali jo efektivno res lahko kaznujejo?) Kdo si upa kaznovati Kitajsko? (kar je pravkar demonstrirala)

Torej, ali bo Rusija kaznovana za njen zločin nad Ukrajino? Ja, tako, kot so bile ZDA kaznovane za svoj zločin nad Irakom, Libijo, Afganistanom itd. in tako, ko bo Izrael kaznovan za svoj genocid nad Plalestinci.