Former UN weapons inspector and US Marine intelligence officer Scott Ritter breaks down Iran’s missile breakthrough in a stunning analysis. He reveals how a prior 12-day war gave Iran the edge to dismantle advanced defenses across the Middle East. This exposes massive vulnerabilities in global security, leaving experts questioning everything.

IRAN’S MISSILE MASTERSTROKE

➡️ Before, Iran needed drone swarms to overwhelm defenses—now, single missiles slip through effortlessly. ➡️ Ritter explains: The 12-day war was Iran’s intel goldmine, studying US and Israeli shields like THAAD and Aegis. A fact that Prof. Marandi @s_m_marandi

  repeatedly emphasised at the time.

➡️ They dissected radar links, F-35 feeds, and unified systems, turning data into unbeatable tactics.

THE CODE CRACKED

➡️ “These are some of the smartest people in the world,” Ritter says, noting Iran’s drone hijacks like the Beast of Kandahar.

➡️ At war’s end, precise “leaker” missiles hit every target, forcing Netanyahu’s shaky truce call to Trump.

➡️ No mass attacks needed now—just superior tech that evades hunters, striking Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Israel, and more.

DEFENSE FAILURE EXPOSED

➡️Casualties mount, including American military in Bahrain, as Iranian missiles overwhelm.

➡️ Ritter warns: This mirrors a US-Russia clash, but with nuclear risks—”Missile defenses don’t work.” 

➡️A $1.5 trillion US defense budget? “An empty fraud,” he declares, swamped by Iran’s precision.

THE SILVER LINING

➡️ Nobody wanted this war, but US humiliation could spark arms control over failed “Golden Dome” pursuits.

🔄 Ritter predicts: “This is the end of the Trump administration,” demanding a diplomacy rethink.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Iran’s tech triumph shatters defense illusions, urging a shift from spending to smart peace. Adapt now, or face irreversible global threats.

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago):

President Trump is now facing the weight of history.

For over a century, leaders have tried to use airpower to force regime change from the sky. The theory is always the same: strike leadership targets, shock the system, fracture the regime, avoid a ground war.

It feels decisive. Clean. Controlled.

The record is brutal.

Airpower alone has never produced positive regime change. I don’t mean rarely. I mean never.

I document every major case in Bombing to Win, and I’ve returned to this question repeatedly in Foreign Affairs, including last summer in writing on Iran. The pattern is consistent: air campaigns aimed at political transformation almost always harden the target instead.

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Članek (s kolegom Dragom Babičem) v Sobotni prilogi Dela:

Slovenija se še vedno rada vidi kot zgodbo o uspehu: kakovost življenja je visoka, socialna varnost solidna, neenakosti razmeroma nizke. A Poročilo o razvoju 2025 razkriva neprijetno resnico – ta blaginja vse bolj stoji na mestu, brez razvojne dinamike, ki bi jo lahko dolgoročno ohranila. Produktivnost že več kot desetletje zaostaja, investicije v znanje, digitalizacijo in ljudi so prenizke, tehnološko prestrukturiranje prepočasno, realna konvergenca z EU pa se po letu 2020 ustavlja. Slovenija se je ujela v paradoks: visoko raven blaginje financira predvsem s prerazporejanjem, ne z ustvarjanjem nove dodane vrednosti.

Nizka (in še pešajoča) gospodarska rast je posledica predvsem nizke rasti produktivnosti, ta pa je posledica nizke investicijske in inovacijske dinamike. Obstoječa gospodarska struktura je zapadla v trajno nizko investicijsko depresijo (investicije glede na BDP so danes za 5 % BDP nižje kot v povprečju let 1995-2008 in celo nižje kot leta 1995.  Slovenija danes ni med tehnološko vodilnimi državami in ne ustvarja lastnih globalno prepoznavnih tehnoloških prvakov; uspešni startupi so redki, po pravilu so zgodaj prodani tujim lastnikom ali se v fazi rasti preselijo v razvojno bolj podporna okolja. Razlog ni pomanjkanje znanja ali talentov, temveč strukturna razdrobljenost inovacijskega sistema, ki ne zagotavlja neprekinjenega toka od izobraževanja in raziskav do gospodarstva, financiranja in rasti.

Potrebna je reforma inovacijskega sistema, ki mora prinesti prehod k zavestnemu oblikovanju sistema, ki spodbuja ustvarjalnost kot temeljni družbeni proces. To zahteva dolgoročno usklajevanje izobraževalne, raziskovalne, gospodarske in finančne politike ter jasno vlogo države kot povezovalnega arhitekta, ki omogoča neprekinjen prehod od ustvarjanja idej do dodane vrednosti. Šele inovacijski sistem, ki ustvarjalnost prepozna kot skupno družbeno infrastrukturo in ne jemlje inovacij kot stranski produkt trga, lahko Sloveniji zagotovi trajno konkurenčnost in ohranjanje blaginje.

Več v Sobotni prilogi Dela.

Mark Zuckerberg is on trial in Los Angeles right now, and Meta’s own internal research is being used against him. Dozens of internal studies, leaked by whistleblowers and unearthed through litigation, show the company documented in their own words what Instagram does to teenagers.

The conclusions are damning. They knew it was addictive. They knew it was harming mental health. They knew teens felt powerless to stop using it. And then they went looking for ways to make it more compelling.

A 2020 internal slideshow cited neuroscience and adolescent brain development… not to protect kids, but to identify “opportunities.”

This is Big Tech’s tobacco moment. And just like tobacco, there’s an internal memo that says exactly that. Read what Meta knew (and when they knew it) in this piece by @smiddendorp22:

Preverba z @grok te trditve potrjuje:

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Iskreno – moraš biti precej usekan, da pomisliš, da bi prehitre dirkače s športnimi avti na cestah lovil z električnim avtom (kjer pritisneš na gas in se ti baterija sprazni kot dyson sesalec pri turbo sesanju) z dosegom 200 km (Tesla Y ima pri pri stalni hitrosti 200 km/h doseg 170–220 km) …

… ali da boš nasprotnika granatiral ali raketiral na “okolju prijazen način” iz električega tanka ali električnega letala.

Trump, karkoli si o njemu mislimo, je na to temo razvil dobro parodijo:

»They want our army tanks to be all electric so that when we go into enemy territory blasting the hell out of everybody we do it… environmentally friendly.«
»The battery is so big you’d have to have a truck behind it…«

John Mearsheimer:

On 25 February 2026, I appeared on Glenn Diesen’s podcast to talk about whether the US is likely to attack Iran, especially in light of his State of the Union address the previous evening (February 24). I made the argument that one could read Trump’s address to signal that he is moving away from attacking Iran. Of course, one cannot be confident that is the case, but his rhetoric certainly pushes in that direction.

Trump emphasized in his talk that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons, but that he has yet to hear these “secret words” from Iran: “we will never have a nuclear weapon.”

The Iranian Foreign Minister, however, said just before Trump’s address that “Our fundamental convictions are crystal clear: Iran will under no circumstances ever develop nuclear weapons.” That statement should satisfy Trump’s demand.

It is important to note that Trump did not demand that Iran give up its: 1) nuclear enrichment capability; 2) ballistic missiles; 3) support for Hamas. Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Those non-demands certainly facilitate a deal.

And then there is the broader context. First, every country in the world except for Israel is pushing Trump not to attack Iran, including America’s Gulf allies who usually have adversarial relations with Iran. Second General Caine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has effectively told Trump that there is no good military option and if he attacks he runs the risk of getting into a protracted war the US cannot win. Third, his political advisors are telling him not go to war. Trump is already in deep trouble in the polls and there is a real danger that the Democrats will take both houses of Congress in the November elections. A failed war in Iran will just make a dangerous situation worse.

There are only two major actors pushing for war against Iran: Israel and its extraordinarily powerful lobby in the US. They may succeed in pushing Trump to start a war, in which case this will be another war for Israel.

Dodatno k temu, kar pravi Mearsheimer: Trumpova strategija je bila kot vedno – pritisniti na nasprotnika z vsemi močmi, dokler ta ne poklekne in pristane na pogoje izsiljevanja. No, Iranci niso pokleknili in zdaj Trump čaka na face-saving rešitev, ki jo je nakazal prejšnji teden in dodatno potrdil v svojem state-of-the-union govoru – torej, da Iranci sveto obljubijo, da ne bodo razvili jedrskega orožja in da bo Trump lahko rekel: super, vidite, kakšen dober deal sem dosegel. In poslal vojsko nazaj domov.

Problem je seveda, da Trump boljše rešitve nima. V regiji nima dovolj vojaških kapacitet za resno in dolgotrajno bojevanje z Iranom (ob napadu na Irak leta 2003 so Američani v regijo poslali 6 letalonosilk, zdaj pa le 2; in ameriški generali in izraelski obveščevalci ocenjujejo, da je kapacitet dovolj za največ en teden zmernih letalskih napadov), kaj šele vojaškega korpusa, ki bi ga lahko poslal neposredno na teren v Iran, da zavzame Teheran in “obglavi” režim.  Iran ni Irak in zdajšnje priprave Američanov na napad in zajetje Irana preprosto niso na potrebni ravni za dosego cilja.

No, tudi te vojaške kapacitete, ki jih je Trump poslal v regijo, bodo težko pomagale, saj imajo same s seboj preveč problemov. Ena izmed obeh letalonosilk (G: Ford) se duši v lastnih fekalijah in se je morala zateči v ameriško bazo na Kreto na popravilo “kanalizacije”. Notranji viri poročajo, da se je problem s fekalijami zaostril zaradi upora osebja na letalonosilki, ki so na poziciji že 8 mesecev (namesto običjanih 6) in ki ne želijo vojskovanja, pač pa iti domov, zato so “pomagali” pri zamaševanju wc-jev z raznimi oblačili. Ob takšni morali vojske je seveda težko začeti resno bitko, tudi če bi generali ocenili, da lahko prinese jasno zmago.

Ameriški generali svarijo pred velikimi žrtvami na ameriški strani v primeru napada na Iran

Izraelski “obveščevalci” pa svarijo, da imajo ameriške sile v regiji dovolj kapacitet le za 4 do 5 dni intenzivnega zračnega napada na Iran.