The fall of Andriy Yermak –  Zelensky’s fixer, enforcer, gatekeeper, and indispensable ally, isn’t a “corruption scandal.” It’s Washington slapping the table. NABU, the U.S.-trained attack dog of Ukrainian politics, didn’t raid the Presidential Office by accident. It raided to remind Zelensky that the war isn’t his to command, the peace process isn’t his to veto, and the leash around Bankova Street is held in Washington, not Kiev and certainly not European chihuahuas.

Because the real story isn’t Yermak’s resignation. The real story is the West turning on itself over how to end a war Russia has already won.

The fall of Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s most loyal ally and the de facto power manager of Ukraine, is not a scandal. It is a strike from above. NABU, the U.S.-funded, U.S.-trained anti-corruption bureau, didn’t raid the home and office of Ukraine’s most powerful unelected official by coincidence. And in any other country, his resignation after a corruption raid would be a political scandal. In Ukraine, it’s a geopolitical detonation.

Yermak wasn’t just a chief of staff, he was the shadow architect of the regime, the man through whom every appointment, every oligarchic negotiation, every Western request, and every wartime decision had to pass. And the speed of his resignation makes clear this was less about corruption,  and more about pressure — engineered, timed, and executed by the one actor that can pull such a lever, Washington.

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Brad Setser je v komentarju k nedavni analizi Robina Hardinga v Financial Timesu jedrnato označil kitajski gospodarski model kot enosmeren: Kitajska svetu prodaja izdelke, v zameno pa uvaža le energijo in rude. Gre za zavestno, strateško zasnovano politiko tehnološke avtonomije, industrijske samozadostnosti in globalne izvozne dominacije. Vendar je njegov komentar, da Peking Bruslju in Berlinu “ne pušča izbire”, dvoumen. Če misli na trgovinske ovire, je povsem zgrešen.

Kitajska danes res uvaža skoraj izključno energente, surovine, hrano in majhen del vrhunske tehnologije. Vse ostalo proizvaja sama, bistveno ceneje, hitreje in bolj učinkovito od nas. Izvaža ogromne količine srednje in visoko tehnoloških izdelkov pod lastno blagovno znamko, od elektronike, zelenih tehnologij do električnih avtomobilov, in obvladuje celotne dobavne verige kritičnih materialov. Kitajska je v enem desetletju naredila strateški premik s kombinacijo spremenjene strukture proizvodnje, najbolj naprednih proizvodnih metod in boljše organizacije industrije, kar ji je omogočilo, da pospešeno izriva zahodne proizvajalce tako na domačem in globalnih trgih kot na trgih samih zahodnih držav.

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Ne vem, kje sem živel, da sem šele danes zvečer (po 10+ letih !) naletel na Future Islands.  Izjemna muzika.

Očitno se kolaps v Ukrajini odvija hitreje (oziroma v skladu z naravno evolucijo kolapsa: najprej gredo stvari počasi, nato pa ekspresno), kot sem pisal še popoldne.  Ni več aktualno, koga bodo zaprli prej, saj je vodja predsednikovega urada Yermak sam odstopil. Zdaj je na vrsti Zelenski. Če ne bo prej podpisal kapitulacije, da bi dobil letalsko karto za Tel Aviv.

Iosfina Pascal lays it out with brutal clarity:

Europe’s crisis isn’t “Russia, Russia, Russia.”

It isn’t “disinformation.”

It isn’t “external threats.”

The real threat is the European Union’s own catastrophic leadership.

She exposes the truth:

• The EU failed during COVID
• The EU failed on Ukraine
• The EU failed on energy, industry, and stability
• The EU is hiding behind Russia to avoid accountability
• The EU is collapsing under green fanaticism, censorship, and cultural extremism

Instead of protecting Europe…

They bankrupt their own citizens.

They destroy their own industries.

They silence dissent.

They push gender ideology on children while the continent burns.

And then they point to Moscow and shout: “It’s Russia!”

No.

The blame sits in Brussels.

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Trump očitno lomi odpor Zelenskega. In očitno ga bo zlomil še bolj učinkovito in vehementno, kot je zlomil evropske “pogajalce” glede trgovinskega sporazuma. Vprašanje časa je, kdaj bo Zelenski popustil. Kako hitro bo popustil, se bo videlo po tem, koga bodo zaprli prej: njegovega šefa predsednikovega urada Yermaka ali šefa preiskovalcev (NABU). In naslednje vprašanje po tem bo, v katero državo se bo po zatočišče zatekel Zelenski. No, slednje je bolj retorične narave, saj je Izrael naravna izbira za takšne tipe. Tam ga že čaka njegov največji kompanjon v korupciji Mindich.

Tole je uvod v famozni članek Robina Hardinga v Financial Timesu, ki je ta teden razburkal ekonomsko javnost in ki je podlaga za mojo današnjo kolumno v Dnevniku »Kako preživeti v dobi kitajske prevlade«.

On a recent trip to mainland China, I found myself posing the same question, again and again, to the economists, technologists and business leaders who I met with. “Trade is an exchange. You provide something of value to me, and in return, I must offer something of value to you. So what is the product, in the future, that China would like to buy from the rest of the world?”

The answers were revealing. A few said “soyabeans and iron ore” before realising this was not much help to a European. Some observed that Louis Vuitton handbags are popular and then went on to talk about the export prospects for fast-rising Chinese luxury brands. “Higher education” was another common answer, qualified sometimes with the observation that Peking University and Tsinghua are harder to get into, and more academically rigorous, than anything on offer in the west.

Several of the economists, who had perhaps pondered the issue already, jumped ahead to a different point altogether: “This,” they said, “is why you should let Chinese companies set up factories in Europe.”

It is a train of thought that gives away the real answer to the question. Which is: nothing.

There is nothing that China wants to import, nothing it does not believe it can make better and cheaper, nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to. For now, to be sure, China is still a customer for semiconductors, software, commercial aircraft and the most sophisticated kinds of production machinery. But it is a customer like a resident doctor is a student. China is developing all of these goods. Soon it will make them, and export them, itself.

Vzdržal se bom komentarja

The EU has essentially admitted that it shot itself in the foot.

Due to the introduction of 19 sanction packages against Russia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have suffered chronic effects.

Tourists and investors have left, trade has decreased, inflation has risen, real estate prices have started to fall, and enterprises cannot obtain loans.

Why Europe and the United States Must Pivot From Defensive Trade Measures to Strategic Industrial Reconstruction

Brad Setser’s observation on Robin Harding’s recent FT analysis captures the essence of China’s trade model: excluding iron ore and oil, China’s vision of trade is one-way — all exports, almost no imports. This is not merely a statistical pattern; it is a reflection of a deliberate national strategy to reinforce industrial self-sufficiency while deepening global export dominance. Setser’s conclusion is blunt: “Beijing isn’t leaving Brussels or Berlin with much of a choice.”

If Europe and the United States wish to preserve a viable industrial base, they must abandon illusions about “managing” China through diplomatic signaling, WTO cases, or draconian tariffs. China now possesses the technological autonomy, material independence, scale and cost advantage to withstand Western pressure — and Western economies are the ones most vulnerable to escalation.

Understanding the Challenge: China’s Asymmetric Trade Model

China now imports primarily energy, food, raw materials, and selected high-tech components, while exporting increasingly competitive mid-tech and industrial goods under its own brands. This technological shift—both in production methods and industrial organization—has enabled China to outperform and displace Western firms in their home markets and globally.

This structural shift leaves Western industrial bases exposed. The EU and U.S. face declining trade balances / rising trade deficits, declining manufacturing capacity, completely exposed supply chains, and shrinking technological leadership in several sectors. Traditional policy tools — tariffs, export controls, WTO litigation — have yielded negligible results.

The key question is therefore not how to stop China, but how to rebuild ourselves.

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