Nova nemška vlada načrtuje velik, bilijonski stimulus za spodbuditev nemškega gospodarstva, ki že tri leta stagnira. Toda za uspeh tega infrastrukturno-vojaškega keynesianizma Nemčija potrebuje nizke cene energije, kar pomeni, da potrebuje poceni ruski plin in da se odpove dosedanji kvazizeleni energetski politiki.

V javnosti bilijonski (1000-milijardni) stimulus paket nove nemške vlade, za katerega je bilo treba spremeniti v ustavi zapisano dolžniško zavoro in ki jo je, paradoksalno, izglasoval še parlament v stari sestavi, ker je obstajal realni strah, da nova koalicija zanj ne bi uspela zagotoviti potrebne dvotretjinske večine, popularno imenujejo “Merzev whatever it takes stimulus“. To je referenca na Draghijev “whatever it takes” program kvantitativnega monetarnega sproščanja s strani ECB (z začetkom v marcu 2015), ki je prek vpliva na znižanje obrestnih mer naredil prostor za fiskalno politiko perifernih držav (predvsem Italije in Španije) in s tem rešil evro pred razpadom. To nakazuje, kako velika so pričakovanja v zvezi s tem programom.

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Iz nove publikacije, naročene s strani ECON komisije v evropskem parlamentu: Europe’s policy options in the face of Trump’s global economic reordering (marec 2025).

In this paper, we propose and analyse four scenarios of a second Trump administration’s economic policy and its impact on Europe, ranging all the way from moderate tariffs to full trade war, a full multilateral breakdown with the US leaving the IMF down to a more cooperative exchange rate realignment agreement. We assess two trade scenarios quantitatively and outline broader policy shocks and their economic consequences. Our findings highlight significant challenges for the ECB, requiring responses to trade disruptions, financial instability, and potential global economic reordering. We offer specific policy recommendations for the ECB to navigate these uncertainties.

Conslusions

Trump’s economic policies pose serious risks of trade and financial disruption. An escalating trade war, coupled with retaliatory measures and global exchange rate volatility, could severely impact the economic outlook. The ECB would be forced into uncharted territory, balancing inflationary pressures with slowing growth, creating difficult trade-offs and heightened uncertainty.

A period of economic turmoil could eventually lead to a new global economic agreement. If the crisis leads to international policy coordination, the EU may need to undertake major adjustments to its macroeconomic policy mix, including exchange rate strategy. In its 25-year history, neither the EU nor the ECB has negotiated such an agreement, meaning they would have to establish new policy coordination mechanisms and activate treaty provisions on exchange rate policy for the first time.

A worst-case scenario could see the collapse of the multilateral order, forcing Europe into a greater global financial role. If the US were to withdraw from the WTO and IMF, it could trigger a systemic shift akin to the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 1970s. This would require European institutions to take on greater responsibility for global financial stability. The ECB, in particular, would need to expand its swap and repo operations, acting as a liquidity provider on a much broader scale, including to non-EU and non-bank actors.

The ECB must prepare for multiple economic and financial contingencies. The central bank will need to refine its inflation-targeting framework to account for external shocks, carefully calibrate its balance sheet reduction to avoid excessive financial tightening, and strengthen its financial backstops. It may also need to deepen coordination with EU fiscal authorities, particularly if a large-scale macroeconomic adjustment becomes necessary. In a scenario where the US politicises dollar liquidity or retreats from multilateral institutions, the ECB could face new responsibilities in stabilising global financial markets – requiring a strategic expansion of its crisis-management toolkit.

The ECB and European institutions must urgently prepare for these uncertain but increasingly probable scenarios.

Revija Foreign Policy (ki je morda še bolj jastrebska od revije Foreign Affairs) je v zadnji številki odkrila realpolitiko oziroma (kot ji oni rečejo) geopolitiko. V bistvu je cela številka namenjena ponovnemu odkrivanju realizma v mednarodnih odnosih. V svetu, v katerem sta se pomen in vloga Zahoda močno zmanjšala.

 Za pokušino – uvodni članek z istim naslovom kot zgoraj secira evropsko prebujenje v nov svet realpolitike, ki jo je povsem šokiral. nenadoma se je zbudila brez varuha in dojela, da je v tem novem svetu nepomembna in nebogljena. Stvari se dogajajo mimo nje. Lahko se samo repenči doma na svojem pragu, toda to nikogar ne zanima.

Jamie Galbraith (University of Texas) je naredil odlično analizo kaotičnosti trumpizma. Težko je bolje opisati kaotičnost ukrepanja in kaos, ki ga je povzročila reakcionarna psolovna elita, ki je prevzela oblast v ZDA. Na dolgi rok bo s temi ukrepi, ki kratkoročno škodijo šibkejšim (zaposlenim in potrošnikom) prizadela predvsem lastne interese. Tako kot komunisti, tako kot zeleni, tudi poslovneži nikoli ne bi smeli imeti odločilnega vpliva v vladi. Ker so ekstremisti. Nekaj njihovih idej je dobrih, toda njihov celotni, enostranski in ekstremistični program je katastrofa za družbo in gospodarstvo. Poglejte Slovenijo, poglejte Nemčijo, poglejte Argentino, poglejte Ameriko…

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What to make of the blur of news, revolutionary rhetoric, panicky fundraising texts, economic indicators, the plunging stock market, and, of course, President Trump’s address to a joint session of Congress on March 4, 2025? Are we on the brink of a socioeconomic Armageddon? Or is there—as the great Tallulah Bankhead once said, “less in this than meets the eye”?

Leaving aside the buckets called “culture wars” and “foreign policy,” we may distinguish eight distinct forces at work in Trump’s economics. They are (a) the targeted destruction of specific regulatory agencies, (b) random disruptions of the federal civil service, (c) old-fashioned Reaganism, (d) tariffs, (e) migration, (f) energy, (g) the military, and (h) the general effect of rash and unpredictable policymaking—otherwise called uncertainty and chaos.

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Vsi se trudimo razumeti smisel v ozadju Trumpovega kaotičnega razmontiravanja globalne trgovinske ureditve prek uvajanja visokih carin. Robert Lighthizer je v prvem Trumpovem mandatu (2017 – 2020) opravljal funkcijo predstavnika ZDA za trgovino (USTR) in imel osrednjo vlogo pri oblikovanju ameriške trgovinske politike v času Trumpove administracije. Lighthizer poskuša razložiti racio za Trumpovimi carinami, čeprav…

• (0:00) Why Do We Need to Reinstitute Tariffs?
• (6:10) The Slow Death of America’s Working Class
• (13:35) Donald Trump’s Plan to Fix the Economy
• (14:26) Was There an Organized Effort to Destroy America’s Free Market?
• (19:52) The Trifecta of Stupid
• (26:12) We Are in an Economic Emergency
• (32:16) The Three Ways to Balance Global Trade
• (34:45) Can America Be the World’s Biggest Manufacturing Power Once Again?
• (38:47) Why Lighthizer’s View Differs From Establishment Economists
• (49:13) How Washington and Big Business Benefit From the Death of the Middle Class
• (56:44) The Two Parts to Trump’s Tariff Plan
• (1:03:25) Will We See Inflation Due to Tariffs?
• (1:07:50) The Economic War With China
• (1:11:49) How China Is Trying to Avoid Trump’s Tariffs
• (1:25:50) Reestablishing an Economic Relationship With Russia
• (1:31:34) The Lies You’ve Been Told About the Nasdaq

Večkrat sem že pisal, da je zeleni vodik (proizveden iz viškov elektrike iz vode in vetra) – zaradi katastrofalno nizkega energetskega izkoristka in katastrofalne ekonomike, in to kljub visokim subvencijam – mrtev in da več kot 90 % vodikovih projektov nima niti enega kupca. Zato vsi ti projekti eden za drugim bankrotirajo in vsi resni igralci so se iz zelenega vodika umaknili. Podobno velja za modri vodik (proizveden iz metana, vendar z odvzemom CO2). O tem poročajo vsi poslovni mediji.

Zato se mi zdi zanimivo, ko spremljam nekatere vodiku naklonjene platforme, kako nočejo sprejeti realnosti. Takšen je denimo današnji Newsletter, ki ga pripravlja Hydrogen Economist. Pravi nekako takole:

najprej je bil velik hype, za katerega zdaj vemo, da ni bil realističen, nato je prišla huda ohladitev, zdaj pa smo v fazi ponovnega ovrednotenja vodikove strategije, …vendar “dolgoročni potencial vodika za razogljičenje industrij in zagotavljanje trajnostne surovine za e-goriva ostaja neizčrpen. Stroški se bodo znižali in izboljšanje ekonomije bo omogočilo naložbe v infrastrukturo, vendar bo to lahko trajalo dlje, kot je industrija pričakovala pred petimi leti.“

Torej propagandisti so se – v izostanku dejstev – zatekli v religijo.

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A reassessment of clean hydrogen’s growth trajectory is underway, but the energy vector’s long-term potential to decarbonise remains intact

First came the hype. Then the reality check. Now, the clean hydrogen sector has entered its first full-blown correction, with some developers aggressively scaling back capacity targets and, in some cases, cancelling projects altogether.

French utility Engie is one of the few to go public with its reduced ambition, pushing back a 4GW green hydrogen target to 2035 from 2030. Elsewhere, UK-based BP has shelved its large HyGreen project in northern England, which had been expected to hit 500MW by 2030. The move came amid a broader strategy shift from the oil and gas major that has seen it scale back investment across the transition business.

Talk of reduced near-term capacity targets and cost overruns in other regions, including the Middle East, has also circulated in recent weeks, while projects in Scandinavia have also hit the buffers, including Europe’s largest e-methanol plant.

The industry’s pause for breath has been prompted mainly by prohibitively high production costs, which have in turn deterred offtakers from reconfiguring their processes to run on green or blue hydrogen. Subsidies have failed in many cases to bridge the gap between viable prices and offtakers’ willingness to pay for clean hydrogen, or its derivative and e-fuels.

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No, znanstveniki so očitno nekaj narobe izračunali in uradniki so preuranjeno (ali neupravičeno) zagnali preplah, kajti do dviga morske gladine (zaradi taljenja ledu) ni prišlo. Tropski otoki se kar niso hoteli potopiti. Nasprotno, kot je lani pisal New York Times (The Vanishing Islands That Failed to Vanish), ponekod je bilo celo zaznati znižanje ravni morske gladine (oziroma nekateri otoki so se celo povečali).

And indeed, when the world began paying attention to global warming decades ago, these islands, which form atop coral reefs in clusters called atolls, were quickly identified as some of the first places climate change might ravage in their entirety. As the ice caps melted and the seas crept higher, these accidents of geologic history were bound to be corrected and the tiny islands returned to watery oblivion, probably in this century.

Then, not very long ago, researchers began sifting through aerial images and found something startling. They looked at a couple dozen islands first, then several hundred, and by now close to 1,000. They found that over the past few decades, the islands’ edges had wobbled this way and that, eroding here, building there. By and large, though, their area hadn’t shrunk. In some cases, it was the opposite: They grew. The seas rose, and the islands expanded with them.

No, dve leti pred tem pa so znanstveniki v ZDA in za njimi ameriški vladni uradniki znova zagnali preplah, da se bo gladina vode na ameriških obalah do leta 2050 dvignila za en čevelj (33 cm). New York Times (12.2.2022):

V znanosti zlato pravilo pravi, da če podatki ne potrjujejo teorije, je treba spremeniti / zamenjati teorijo. V podnebni znanosti to očitno ne velja.

Jaz pa bi vseeno rad vedel, kaj se bo zgodilo z morsko gladino, ker bi stara leta rad preživel na otoku Fiji. In zdaj ne vem, ali naj kupim hišo na obali ali jadrnico…

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* Sarkastičen sem. Vendar znanstveniki in razni “klubi znanstvenikov” (Rimski klub) vsakih 10 let zaženejo nov preplah (od tega, da bo zmanjkalo nafte, da bo zmanjkalo pitne vode, da gremo v novo ledeno dobo,…, do tega, da gremo v vročo dobo). Mednarodne organizacije in vlade ter za njimi mediji nato zaženejo splošno histerijo, usmerijo napore in sredstva v tisto smer. … nakar se svarila ne materializirajo – nafte je nenadoma dovolj še za 500 let, pitne vode je več kot dovolj, nismo zmrznili… 

… in znanstveniki, mednarodne organizacije in vlade nato pozabijo na prejšnji splošni alarm in lansirajo nov preplah in novo kampanjo. Zdaj se pač pripravljamo na neznosno vročino in poplavitev južne poloble … če ne bomo znižali izpustov CO2, tako da damo na strehe, polja in travnike, jezera, reke in morje sončne panele in vetrnice.

Vse skupaj se zdi en velik BS. Vprašanje je le, kdo ga lansira, da bi z njim zaslužil.

Ameriški podpredsednik J.D. Vance je prostodušno razkril ameriško idejo globalizacije: 

ideja globalizacije je bila, da se bodo bogate države pomaknile višje v vrednostni verigi, medtem ko bodo revne delale enostavnejše stvari

Vance je sicer govoril o ključni napaki zahodnih podjetij, da so ločile dizajniranje izdelkov od njihove proizvodnje z namenom izkoriščanja nižjih stroškov dela, kar se je nato izjalovilo, da so nekatere države (predvsem Južna Koreja, Tajvan in še posebej Kitajska) osvojile visoke tehnologije in tehnološko prehitele svoje “delodajalce”. In Vance apelira, da dizajn in proiazvodnja ostaneta v ZDA.

Toda Vanceov opis ideje globalizacije, kot so si jo zamislili v zahodnih državah, predvsem v ZDA, drži. Teoretični in učbeniški modeli zunanje trgovine so statični v oziru, da ne predvidevajo spremembe v primerjalnih prednostih med državami, torej da prvotne razlike v faktorski intenzivnosti (med delom, kapitalom in človeškim kapitalom ostanejo nespremenjene), s tem pa tudi nespremenjena konkurenčnost v fazah proizvodnje.

Tudi menedžerski koncepti, kot je Smile curve, predvidevajo, da delitev dela, kot jo je opisal Vance – podjetja v razvitih državah obdržijo kontrolo nad vsemi fazami z visoko dodano vrednostjo (od faz inovacij in razvoja izdelka na eni strani krivulje do marketinga, prodaje in financ na drugi strani “krivulje nasmeha”), medtem ko ostanejo podjetja v manj razvitih državah ujeta v fazah z nizko dodano vrednostjo (proiazvodnja izdelka). Na tak način potekajo tudi neposredne tuje investicije, kjer si zahodna podjetja organizirajo faze z nižjo dodano vrednostjo (proizvodnja) v državah z nižjo ceno delovne sile, sama pa obdržijo nadzor nad vsemi fazami z višjo dodano vrednostjo. Poglejte strukturo tujih naložb kjerkoli v vzhodni Evropi, Latinski Ameriki ali Aziji in boste videli enak vzorec. Ali pa v Sloveniji – vloga slovenskih podjetij v verigi dodane vrednosti znotraj multinacionalk ali v zgolj pogodbeni dobaviteljski verigi ni v razvoju in inoviranju, pač pa v cenejši proizvodnji zaradi nižjih stroškov dela.

No, problem je nastal, ker predvsem Kitajska ni hotela ostati v takšnem statičnem odnosu – kot večna pocenska proizvajalka na zahodu dizajniranih izdelkov. Pač pa je vložila ogromne napore v izobraževanje in tehnološki razvoj, da bi najprej skopirala in nato razvila naprej tehnologije in proizvode, ki jih je prej dobila v fazo izdelave. In v tem se skriva “kitajski izvirni greh”, eden in edini razlog, zaradi katerega so ZDA in za njimi še EU sprožile tehnološko in trgovinsko vojno proti Kitajski – ker ta ni želela ostati na dnu prehranjevalne verige, pač pa je želela splezati proti njenemu vrhu. Na zahodu so si izmislili priročen izgovor, da so kitajska podjetja pod kontrolo kitajske komunistične partije in s tem predstavljajo nevarnost za nacionalno varnost zahodnih držav. Butasto, vendar mediji kupijo to zgodbo.

Spodaj je dober komentar na to temo.

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Glede Donalda Trumpa bi težko našli kakšno pozitivno besedo, toda glede Ukrajine ima prav. Tako pravi Alan J. Kuperman, profesor na Texas University v Austinu, kjer predava vojaško strategijo in obvladovanje konfliktov. V The Hill je objavil zanimivo kolumno, ki pravi, da (1) v primeru Trumpa na čelu ZDA do vojne v Ukrajini ne bi prišlo, (2) da sta Zelenski in Biden enako kot Putin sokriva za začetek in prolongiranje vojne v Ukrajini  in (3) da bo diplomatska rešite te vojne za Ukrajino bistveno slabša, kot če do vojne ne bi prišlo oziroma če bi Zelenski sprejel mirovni sporazum iz Carigrada marca 2022.

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I rarely agree with President Trump, but his latest controversial statements about Ukraine are mostly true. They seem preposterous only because western audiences have been fed a steady diet of disinformation about Ukraine for more than a decade. It is time to set the record straight on three key points that illuminate why Ukrainians and former President Joe Biden — not merely Russian President Vladimir Putin — bear significant responsibility for the outbreak and perpetuation of war in Ukraine.

First, as recently documented by overwhelming forensic evidence, and affirmed even by a Kyiv court, it was Ukrainian right-wing militants who started the violence in 2014 that provoked Russia’s initial invasion of the country’s southeast including Crimea. Back then, Ukraine had a pro-Russia president, Viktor Yanukovych, who had won free and fair elections in 2010 with strong support from ethnic Russians in the country’s southeast.

In 2013, he decided to pursue economic cooperation with Russia rather than Europe as previously planned. Pro-western activists responded with mainly peaceful occupation of the capital’s Maidan square and government offices, until the president eventually offered substantial concessions in mid-February 2014, after which they mainly withdrew.

Just then, however, right-wing militants overlooking the square started shooting Ukrainian police and remaining protesters. Police returned fire at the militants, who then claimed bogusly that the police had killed the unarmed protesters. Outraged by this ostensible government massacre, Ukrainians descended on the capital and ousted the president, who fled to Russia for protection.

Putin responded by deploying troops to Crimea and weapons to the southeast Donbas region on behalf of ethnic Russians who felt their president had been undemocratically overthrown. While this backstory does not justify Russia’s invasion, it explains that it was hardly “unprovoked.”

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