Trump and Netanyahu see the same mirages as Saddam

On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein assembled a force of 50,000-70,000 men, 2,500-3,000 tanks, IFVs and APCs, supported by about 120-150 aircraft and 400 pieces of artillery/MLRS, and invaded the Iranian province of Khuzestan.

The Iraqi army of the era was modern, well-equipped, and technologically superior. Capitalizing on the chaos sown by the Islamic Revolution, it surged across the Iranian plains. With such a massive force, it seemed invincible, who could have possibly stood in its way?

The advance was rapid. In less than a week, the Iraqi tanks crossed the Karun River and surrounded key cities. The flat topography of Khuzestan favored the armored doctrine. Until the advance stopped.

When they tried to enter Khorramshahr, the Iraqi vehicles got stuck in narrow streets and were hunted by Iranian militiamen with grenade launchers (RPGs). This forced Saddam to divert even more troops to the south, turning the place into a meat grinder.

Saddam realized he would not be able to take Khuzestan in a rush. He ordered the total siege of Abadan and the street-by-street invasion of Khorramshahr.

It was the first major tactical error. Troops and armored vehicles entered dense urban areas and came face to face with young Iranians firing RPG-7s from the tops of buildings.

The result was that Iraq took Khorramshahr after 34 days, but at a human cost that broke the morale of the armored divisions.

With the Iraqi momentum exhausted, the southern front turned into a “World War I in the desert.”

In May 1982, Iran surrounded and captured 19,000 Iraqi soldiers in Khorramshahr.

In 1980, small groups of Iranian soldiers and Kurdish militias used the caves and fissures of the mountains to fire anti-tank missiles from top to bottom.

Approximately 20,000 to 30,000 Iraqis were killed on the southern front alone until 1982, and a large part of the tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed or abandoned.

On the Northern and Central Axis, it was a mountain war.

Iraq advanced to the foothills of the Zagros, but was again halted by numerous Iranian positions in that mountain range.

Today the situation is very similar: Iran does not try to hold the border; it lets the enemy enter, because it knows it will have protected positions in the mountains to establish a war of attrition.

At this moment, a CSG with about 5,000 marines is on its way to the region, where it should join Israeli troops to attempt an operation to liberate the Strait of Hormuz and take Kharg Island.

Even if this force carried out the land invasion, where would it shelter?

In the same plain that became hell for the Iraqis, or in the short strip of flat land that exists at some points of Hormuz?

And another question: where will this troop group up in the face of Iranian missiles and drones?

In any point of the Iranian Gulf lands where there might be success in its occupation, there will be positions in the mountains, drones and missiles hitting that occupation to the point of causing many casualties.

Just as the US-Israel sees a chance of occupation on Kharg Island, Saddam also saw it in Khuzestan. In Iran, when the land is flat, it is also surrounded by positions in the mountains and ositions fortified with Iranian UHPC.

To get an idea of the Iranian fortifications, while the high-strength concrete of the USA revolves around 100-150 MPa (megapascals), Iran regularly produces concrete of 200 to 400 MPa.

If the GBU-57 bombs cannot penetrate a few meters of UHPC that protect the entrances of the mountains of the nuclear installations, the sur qgical bombing with GBU-72, which weigh only 20% of the GBU-57, and occurred in the last days in the mountains of the strait, is a myth.

Putting feet on the ground in Iran would require a force that the United States today is incapable of mobilizing.