Nenagradno vprašanje: če domač elektroenergetski sektor proizvaja 95% električne energije po lastni ceni X, odjemalci elektrike pa zanjo plačujejo 2, 3 ali celo 4 X, komu gre ta razlika? Odgovor sicer ni težak (glasi se: trg), je pa mehanizem malce bolj kompleksen in identifikacija zaslužkarjev malce težja. Proizvajalci elektriko prodajo vnaprej za  2 do 3 leta (v odvisnosti od tržnih cen v trenutku prodaje), nakar nastopijo preprodajalci elektrike, ki jo prodajajo naprej velikim odjemalcem in drugim trgovcem na terminskem trgu spet po tržnih cenah, nakar morajo zapreti svoje pozicije do svojih odjemalcev. Včasih jim uspe narediti pozitivno razliko, včasih naredijo izgubo, odvisno od volatilnosti na trgu in ročnosti pogodb. Vmes pa so še špekulanti, ki kupujejo elektriko z namenom, da jo prodajajo, ko je v omrežju zmanjka zaradi nestabilnih proizvodnih virov (zaradi dežja, megle, pomanjkanja vetra itd.).

Bistvo je, da iz osnovne lastne cene elektrike v višini X številni tržni udeleženci s številnimi prodajami in preprodajami, da bi uravnotežili ponudbo s povpraševanjem, med seboj uspejo zaslužiti še za 1, 2 ali 3 X zaslužka zase. Odvisno od dejavnikov nestabilnosti (vreme, naravne katastrofe, politične napetosti, vojne itd.). Slabše kot je, večji so zaslužki za trgovske hijene.

Javier Blas, urednik na Bloombergu za trgovanje s “commodities”, se je odpravil raziskat, kako deluje ta tržni mehanizem v dveh “trgovskih centrih za električno energijo”, lociranih na Danskem. Zanimivo branje. Šolska zgodba, kako iz stabilnega trga z nizkimi cenami in dolgoročnim fokusom z napačno energetsko politiko (forsiranje sonca in vetra s subvencijami) in deregulacijo energetskega trga ustvariti kaos s fokusom pol ure v naprej in ogromne zaslužke za trgovske hijene. Če je nekoč negotovost izhajala iz nihanj povpraševanja, danes negotovost bruha iz nestabilnosti proizvodnje zaradi večjega deleža spremenljivih virov energije (sonce, veter). Evropska energetska politika in preprodajalski monstrum, ki ga je ustvarila, sta katastrofa.

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Before dawn on a recent autumn day, fog set in over large swaths of Eastern Europe. In any other financial market, the weather wouldn’t have mattered much. Perhaps a few delayed flights, maybe some traffic jams, most of little consequence. But in Europe’s electricity bazaar, bad weather equals money.

More than 1,000 kilometers away from the fog, a small group of largely anonymous trading firms based in Denmark was ready to pounce. As soon as the infrared picture from a Meteosat weather satellite arrived at their headquarters, computers automatically dissected it, feeding the data into complex trading algorithms.

 With minimal human intervention, the machines bought millions of euros worth of electricity contracts. Their bet? Short-term power prices in Hungary would climb just after sunrise as the fog meant that solar electricity generation would be much lower than expected. It happened as they predicted. For a few minutes, until the fog lifted, electricity prices spiked, and the computers made money.

This scene — recounted to me by the those who oversaw the computers that morning — is emblematic of a new breed of traders who are upending Europe’s energy markets largely out of sight. They’re mixing computer wizardry and meteorological acumen with the upheaval of the green energy transition and the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And they’re making bank.

“It’s ridiculous the amount of money they are making,” says Mogens P. Sorensen, a former power trader turned consultant. “There are billions being made trading electricity in Europe.”

Where state-owned utilities once dominated, today high-flying startups full of terribly smart PhDs and young engineers sporting hoodies are running things. Call it the “Silicon Valley” of European energy trading. Like its namesake in California, computers — automated trading desks, in industry parlance — rule. But in this case, the headquarters are two picturesque towns in northern rural Denmark, Aarhus and Aalborg, more than three hours by train from Copenhagen.

Only five years ago, the industry was small, with the top firms making combined net income of about $100 million per year, at best. Today, it’s a juggernaut — the same companies produced about $5 billion in combined profits in 2022, according to a Bloomberg Opinion review of their annual accounts.

Despite the riches, the traders aren’t household names. Outside the industry, few, if any, have heard much about firms like Danske Commodities A/S, Norlys Energy Trading A/S, MFT Energy A/S, Centrica Energy Trading A/S, InCommodities A/S and Nitor Energy A/S. Most of them are privately owned, controlled by a handful of their senior executives, who are worth, dozens, and in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. And yet, for Europeans, these are the companies helping to keep the lights on. They’re the ones smoothing out supply and demand on the grid by responding to oscillations in the weather, buying and selling power in advance, with consumers often paying the price.

This short-term electricity trading is a key part of Europe’s push toward renewable energy and fight against the climate crisis. But with governments spending billions on energy subsidies, essentially propping up demand and traders’ business, there’s a real danger of privatizing the gains and socializing the losses — though the industry denies this.

Despite their bewildering growth, the independent electricity trading firms have received very relatively attention from policymakers. Perhaps many saw them as a Danish issue, rather than a truly regional concern. But everyone in Europe should be attentive. The key will be to ensure the industry helps the development of renewable energy and the stabilizing of energy prices for families and businesses. Making a profit from trading is legitimate, but earnings mustn’t come at the expense of a functioning grid.

The origins of Denmark’s trader barons date back to the 1990s, when the Nordic countries embarked on the very liberal experiment of freeing their regional electricity market from the yoke of the state. Others, from the UK to Spain to Germany, followed over the next few decades. For the first time, commodity trading firms could buy and sell electricity across European national frontiers with ease.

Yet trading opportunities were few and far between. The market was still dominated by the big state-owned utilities, and wholesale electricity prices were relatively stable. From 1996 to 2006, day-ahead power prices in the Nordic region, for example, traded in a narrow band of €125 ($137) per megawatt-hour.

The expansion of the wind and solar industries would change that. Traditionally, state-owned utilities planned their electricity generation season by season, relying largely on coal, nuclear and natural gas. The wholesale market was a sedate affair, with buying and selling arranged well in advance; the most popular contract was the one-year-ahead forward. The role of the traders was residual, and prices only spiked when a cold snap triggered a surge in electricity demand for heating.

As renewable sources expanded, the nature of the market changed too. Whereas the biggest impact of weather used to be on demand, the surge of renewables meant it soon began to mostly affect supply. A foggy morning resulted in little solar power; a calm week equaled zero wind generation. And vice-versa: At times, the problem was too much insolation and wind meaning prices could fall below zero, with producers having to pay consumers to use energy. The European electricity grid became much more captive to sharp swings in price.

The trading firms born during the liberalization of the electricity industry saw an opportunity. The variability of wind and solar power required a new set of skills. The traders needed to work alongside meteorologists to anticipate the electricity supply-and-demand balance in real-time. Rather than selling or buying power for delivery months or even years in advance, as the utilities of yesteryear did, they specialized in the shortest of the short-term power market: the next 30 minutes.

Vir: Javier Blas, Bloomberg