New York Times piše o umetnosti ruske “elastične obrambe” v Ukrajini, ki so jo Rusi uspešno uveljavili že v bitki pri Kursku leta 1943 proti nemški vojski (glejte spodaj). Zanimivo pri tem je le to, da smo to rusko taktiko amaterji opazili že pred štirimi meseci, v prvem tednu ukrajinske ofenzive, medtem ko so jo v – s strani Pentagona financiranem – Institute for the Study of War njhovi vojaški analitiki opazili šele ta teden. Ob takšnih vojaških analitikih, ki pred začetkom ukrajinske ofenzive niso uspeli opaziti kompleksne ruske obrambne formacije v štirih linijah v dolžini tisoč kilometrov in ruske izrazite premoči v vseh vojaških elementih ter ki šele zdaj spoznavajo rusko vojaško taktiko, znano iz 2. svetovne vojne, se Ukrajini slabo piše. Ta protiofenziva je bila de facto odločena že pred štirimi meseci, formalno se zaključuje zdaj (pri čemer je Rusija pridobila več ozemlja, kot ga je v ukrajinski ofenzivi doslej izgubila), vendar je Rusija v zadnjih dveh mesecih v zaledju nakopičila ogromne napadalne sile na ključnih točkah obrambne linije, s katerimi bo v naslednjih dneh šla v protiofenzivo. Takoj ko se ukrajinske sile izčrpajo. Če zahodni analitiki tega ne vidijo ali nočejo videti in Ukrajine nočejo spodbuditi k izgradnji lastne obrambne linije, kar bi Ukrajina sicer morala početi celo letošnje leto kot svoj primarni strateški ukrep, bo Rusija to jesen in zimo pridobila ogromno ozemlja. Kot je razbrati, je ruski cilj meja na reki Dnjeper (poglejte na zemljevid, kaj to pomeni).

But one unusually daunting obstacle to Ukrainian troops is a tactic adopted by Russian forces: ceding ground and then striking back.

Rather than holding a line of trenches at all costs in the face of Ukraine’s assault, security experts say, Russian commanders have employed a longstanding military tactic known as “elastic defense.”

To execute the tactic, Russian forces pull back to a second line of positions, encouraging Ukrainian troops to advance, and then strike back when the opposing forces are vulnerable — either while moving across open ground or as they arrive at the recently abandoned Russian positions.

The goal is to prevent Ukrainian troops from actually securing a position and using it as a base for further advances. That is what Ukraine was able to do successfully in the village of Robotyne in the south, its biggest breakthrough in recent weeks.

“The defender gives ground while inflicting as heavy casualties as they can on the attackers with a view to being able to set the attackers up for a decisive counterattack,” said Ben Barry, a senior fellow for land war studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British research group.

…

Elastic defense is not a new strategy, Mr. Barry said. The Soviet Union employed it during its defeat of Germany in 1943 at the Battle of Kursk, one of the biggest on the eastern front during World War II. Russia also appears to have been applying it for some time in Ukraine, especially to hamper this summer’s counteroffensive.

“Historically it’s been used very successfully, but to succeed it requires good leadership and well-trained forces and to deliver decisive counterblows,” Mr. Barry said.

Assessing whether the tactic is being deployed on any given day is difficult without direct access to Russian commanders, experts said. But the Institute for the Study of War, an organization based in Washington, noted signs of it in recent days around the village of Robotyne, which fell to Ukrainian forces at the end of August.

Some significant field fortifications had changed hands several times, it said in a report this weekend, adding that Russian forces had “been conducting successful limited tactical counterattacks.”

Vir: New York Times

Pa še en komentar te taktike:

In a war of attrition, if you have a massive advantage in stand-off weaponry (artillery, AF, drones, missiles) you always want to engage your enemy while your soldiers are a safe distance away from your stand-off attacks

The RF has been absolutely blessed with an enemy that is as obsessed with offensive action as Hitler’s Wehrmacht was. What this does is gather your enemy’s forces to within range of your stand-off weapons as they approach your line

The only way for AFU to overcome their disadvantage in stand-off weapons & still go on the offensive is to try to gain a local superiority in infantry at a specific point on the LOC by quickly closing with the enemy so that they’ll stop using their stand-off weapons on you (or else risk killing their own men)

According to RF’s mobile defense strategy, every effort is made to decimate the enemy with long range fires up to the point when they actually reach your defensive fortifications. At that point, the standard tactic is-if you’re facing superior numbers-to withdraw from your defensive positions to re-establish the distance you require to decimate the enemy with your long range fires, now situated in the trenches you abandoned

In order to optimize the execution of this defense, your troops must be trained to execute a tactical retreat on command. No doubt RF soldiers have been thoroughly trained in executing these maneuvers, since AFU has been so obliging with their insane efforts to gain territory with suicidal offensives

In this war of attrition, the only strategy that has ever made sense for the AFU is to be 100% on the defensive, like they were at Bakhmut, to minimize their losses. But the Gods of War have blessed Russia once again by giving them an enemy that has some kind of psychological fixation on “glorious offensives” that became an unquestioned addiction

The good news for Russia: thanks to NATO’s “advice” on how to fight Russia, AFU has been destroying its combat capability quickly, which means a shorter war & fewer Russian lives lost…

Vir: James Kroeger