Samo Kitajska lahko doseže mirovni sporazum v Ukrajini, ki se ga bo Putin držal

Alfred McCoy je dodal še en aspekt glede Kitajske in potencialnega mirovnega sporazuma med Ukrajino in Rusijo, o katerem do sedaj nihče ni razmišljal. Tudi on ne. Ker se situacija tako hitro, vendar neopazno spreminja. Kitajska ima največji interes za mir, ker si pač želi gospodarske ekspanzije in zanjo ob miru in prosti trgovini potrebuje tudi energente in hrano. Kitajska je tudi največ investirala v dobre odnose, z Ukrajino in z Rusijo. In Kitajska je edina, ki lahko Putina spravi za pogajalsko mizo in edina, ki ga lahko prisili, da se mirovnega sporazuma drži. Zakaj? Ker je s to vojno v Ukrajini iz Rusije naredila svojo ekonomsko kolonijo. Kljub temu, da sankcij proti Rusiji ne podpira 4 petine držav, pa je Rusija lahko neprizadeta zaradi zahodnih sankcij praktično samo zato, ker jih ne spoštuje Kitajska. Ker Kitajska kupuje ruske energente, ruska žita in ruske surovine. Če Kitajska s tem preneha, bodo sankcije začele boleti.

Seveda pa ni kitajski način, da bi grozila Putinu ali Zelenskemu, da morata za pogajalsko mizo, pač pa ju bo Xi Jinping pridobil na svojo stran s strateško pomembnimi ponudbami. Denimo z dogovori o gradnji energetske infrastrukture, dolgoročnih nabavah energentov in vojaške opreme na eni ter dogovori o dolgoročnih nakupih žit ter investicijah v povojno obnovo in v infrastrukturo in industrijo.

Zelo zanimivo na drugi strani pa bo, kaj to pomeni za ZDA. Washington izhaja iz stališča, da Ukrajina ne sme izgubiti, da mora pregnati ruske sile iz Donbasa in Krima in da bodo ZDA lahko tam postavile svoje vojaške baze. Zato morajo Ukrajini dobavljati orožje in biti v nedogled proti mirovnim rešitvam, ne glede na to, kaj se bo z Ukrajino zgodilo. Ne glede na človeško in gospodarsko ceno, ki jo bo Ukrajina plačala. Toda ali lahko kdorkoli pri zdravi pameti verjame, da se bo Rusija umaknila s Krima ali zapustila pretežno rusko govoroči Donbas? Da bo to naredila brez predhodnega poraza v jedrskem spopadu? No, tako negotova usoda in tako visoka cena ne more biti sprejemljiva za ukrajinsko vodstvo. Ker takšna situacija enostavno dolgoročno ni vzdržna. Zato bo Kijev slejkoprej pripravljen na mirovne pogovore z Moskvo. In to v Pekingu.

Zdaj si pa predstavljajte washingtonsko politično elito z vso to silno, tehnološko dovršeno vojaško armado, s katero je do sedaj dominirala ves svet, ko bo tako odrinjena na stranski tir morala opazovati pogajanja med varovanko Ukrajino z večno sovražnico Rusijo pod okriljem novega svetovnega hegemona Kitajske v Pekingu. Kaj to pomeni za prestiž in ponos dosedanjega globalnega hegemona? Kaj to pomeni za obstoj njegove hegemonije? Kdo sploh še potrebuje ZDA v takšni konstelaciji sil? Ali to geopolitično za ZDA pomeni enak zdrs kot je druga svetovna vojna pomenila za hegemonijo britanskega imperija?

Prihajamo v zares zanimivo novo situacijo.

__________

Let’s look at the diplomatic optics that we talked about, where people go to pay court. You know, Iran, Saudi Arabian foreign minister is going to Beijing, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. going to Washington. And let’s wind back to the start of the Ukraine-Russian war.

In February of last year, Putin came to Beijing on the eve, the very start, of the Beijing Winter Olympics. And he desperately needed a strong statement from Xi Jinping, essentially giving him an alliance, because he knew what he was going to be rupturing. He was going to be breaking the decades-long relationship with Europe. If he didn’t know that, he’s a fool, and he’s not a fool, OK? And so, he needed a diplomatic counter on the Eurasian landmass to his loss of support — the antagonism that he would be provoking by his invasion in Europe — by going to China.  And they made that 5,000-word statement, they proclaimed a relationship that was stronger than the Cold War alliance, as a reference to the Sino-Soviet Alliance signed in 1950 between Mao and Stalin.

And then, of course, it was clearly understood that Putin couldn’t disrupt China’s party for the Winter Olympics. They’d hosted this, this was their moment on the global stage. And so, his troops were massed, sitting in frozen February, right on the Ukraine border, 200,000 troops, a couple thousand tanks ready to roll across the border. And they basically had to wait until the Olympics were over, so that, by the time they rolled, the frozen ground of February had become the mud of March. And of course, those very heavy Russian tanks can’t maneuver offroad in mud. They formed the world’s longest traffic jam — a 40-mile traffic jam on that one highway going down to Kyiv. That set them up so that the Ukrainian forces could destroy, I think, 2,500 armored vehicles. And every time they tried to maneuver offroad, they foundered in the mud. And the bold strike to capture Kyiv with his massive armored invasion ended. And that was the sacrifice that Putin had to make.

Now, what does this mean? Is Washington in a position right now to negotiate an end to the Ukrainian war? Clearly not. We’re totally wedded, for good or ill, to Ukraine, you know. Our position is that we don’t want negotiations. We want to arm Ukraine to the point where they can achieve a total military victory and push Russia out of Crimea, push Russia absolutely out of the Donbas region, all the territory they’re occupying. That’s, basically, the U.S. position right now. That doesn’t give us much of a negotiating position. That means that we’re marginalized.

And think about it: Beijing has been very clever. Holding back, making that nice little declaration with Russia. They’ve also, basically, turned Russia into a colony. China is the world’s largest consumer of the two major commodities that Russia exports: China’s the world’s largest importer of grain, and it’s the world’s largest importer of oil and petroleum products, and Russia has both in abundance. And so, they’re getting cut-price on both of these critical commodities that are necessary to feed the Chinese people, and to move that society, and power that society.

And so, they’ve turned Russia very quickly, into an economic colony. Part of their growing control over the Eurasian landmass, because you can’t control Eurasia if you don’t dominate Russia. They are now economically dominant in Russia. And that also puts, with each passing month, Xi Jinping in a position where he could actually make Putin come to a bargaining table.

And they had very good relations with Ukraine. Ukraine was very heavily integrated. China had concentrated, particularly in Eastern Europe they had a formal entente with the Eastern European countries, they were investing very heavily, and they invested very heavily in Ukraine. And so, China’s in a position, just as they were in a position between that equally and even more entrenched rivalry between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. China could mediate that one. China’s a position where they can mediate, and they can negotiate an end to this war. And whatever you might think, whatever side you might be on — You know, how could I put it? The U.S. position, can Ukraine really drive the Russians all the way back to Russia out of Crimea? And if so, at what cost? Maybe some negotiations prior to this bloodletting that has potential for ratcheting up to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, maybe if the Russian Army is pushed out of Crimea? I mean, that’s a pretty powerful emotional symbol for Putin. Wouldn’t he think about deploying tactical nuclear weapons? Do we really want to do that?

And so, China, at that point, can come in and negotiate this, and they’ll probably negotiate it to have perfect diplomatic optics in Beijing. Zelenskyy and Putin turning up, sitting at a table. I mean, what? That would look like a very, very different world. And the United States, with all of its artillery shells and its missiles, and all the rest of it would be sitting on the sidelines. And that would be one more sign of a major diplomatic eruption coming out of that geopolitical substrate of China’s control over Eurasia.

In the end, not only avert a potential thermonuclear war, or at least a use of nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945. Very serious precedent for other powers elsewhere in the world. I mean, very important to preserving global peace and to avoiding nuclear war. And resolving this bloody endless conflict that has so profoundly disrupted the global economy. I mean the loss of low-cost grain shipments to the Middle East and East Africa, for societies that are calories-short. East Africa’s in the midst of a terrible drought and famine. You know, this is important to keep the grain moving, to reestablish the normal function of the global economy, which has got some kind of balance, and which feeds poor people, gives them food, allows them to function.

So, at multiple levels, what Beijing’s intercession, timely intercession, and resolution of this in a way that forges an agreement without a nuclear or bloody military showdown, and restores some guarantees. China could not only press Russia and Ukraine in an agreement, but they could actually, probably, the way things are going, they could make Putin observe the agreement. Not through military pressure, but through diplomatic pressure.

I mean, think about it. You know, if Putin signs an agreement with Xi Jinping sitting at the head of the table, he cannot break that agreement, but with anybody else, he can. So that means that China’s — I mean, I’d never thought of this before. Who asked that question? This is a really smart question.

You know, if Putin actually sat down with Xi Jinping and Zelenskyy, and they signed an agreement, Putin couldn’t break that agreement. But he can break any other agreement, and he’ll break them, he’s done it many, many times. But that’s one he can’t break. That would be a diplomatic agreement that could stick, you know?

Vir: The Intercept

En odgovor

  1. McCoy je malo boljši od povprečja komentatorjev na Zahodu, vendar še daleč od tega, da bi v resnici dojel, kaj se v resnici dogaja.

    “Beijing has been very clever. Holding back, making that nice little declaration with Russia. They’ve also, basically, turned Russia into a colony.”

    V tem je osnovna napaka. McCoy ne vidi tistega, kar je ruski prispevek v de facto zavezništvo.

    Prvo in najpomembnejše je jedrski šćit in sistem zgodnjega opozarjanja. Število jedrskih konic, predvsem pa njihovih nosilcev je na strani Rusije več kot 10-krat večje in je tudi neprimerno bolj tehnološko sofisticiran kot je kitajski. Podobno velja za sistem zgodnjega opozarjanja kjer je ruski radarski sistem state-of-the-art, proti raketna obramba pa brez ekvivalenta v svetu. Z Rusijo na kitajski strani je ameriški jedrski udar na Kitajsko nemogoč. In ne pozabiti, da je jedrski udar edina vojaška možnost, ki jo ima Amerika proti Kitajski. V konvencionalni kopenski vojni nima Amerika niti teoretičnih šans, tudi prevlada v mornariških operacijah je čedalje bolj vprašljiva. Kitajska že ima prednost v številu ladij, flota je v povprečju mlajša od 10 let (vs. več kot 30 let US Navy), dolgometne kitajske hipersonične rakate efektivno eliminirajo prednost, ki jo ima US Navy v velikih enotah (letalonosilke, križarke,..). Ne zanemarit možnosti ruske mornarice, ki je daleč od obsega za časa SZ, vendar še vedno predstavlja eno najbolj sofisticiranih mornaric na svetu, predvsem z uvedbo že operativnih hipersoničnih raket (Zirkon) proti katerim Zahod nima obrambe. Tako je zdaj, ampak nekoč ni bilo kaj drugače. Ko je 1971 v Indijsko-Pakistanski vojni ameriška mornarica poskusila uvesti pomorsko blokado Indije, je SZ zagrozila s potopitvijo ameriških ladij. Američani so se hitro premislili. Ko so v približno istem času v kongresu vprašali legendarnega ameriškega admirala Rickower-ja (očeta ameriške atomske flote), koliko časa bi ameriške letalonosilke zdržale napad SZ, je odgovoril: “2 do 3 dni, tiste v pristanišču mogoče en teden!”. Pa je danes Ruska tehnološka prednost bistveno večja kot je bila takrat.

    Drugo. Povezava z Rusijo in njenimi surovinskimi, energetskimi in prehrambenimi viri v bistveni meri eliminira prednost, ki jo ima Amerika v morebitnem blokiranju malajske ožine, ki je “choking point” za Kitajsko, predvsem za dobave nafte. Ko eliminiraš možnost ameriške pomorske blokade na kitajsko ekonomijo v veliki meri zmanjšaš možnosti pritiska na Kitajsko. Rusija lahko nadomesti (in že nadomešča) velik del energentov (nafta, plin, premog), drugih surovin in predvsem hrane. Ne pozabit kako zelo je Kitajska občutljiva na hrano. Samo v zadnjih letih je Kitajska aktivirala več kot 240 tisoč km2 dodatnih zemljišč (za eno slabo bivšo Jugoslavijo) za pridelavo hrane. Rusija s svojimi neskončnimi kapacitetami (plus večino bivših ukrajinskih) predstavlja zanesljiv vir, ki ga ameriška mornarica ne more blokirati.

    Kitajska je še kako odvisna od Rusije. Ta odvisnost je obojestranska. Kitajska zelo dobro ve, da če Rusija pade, bo ona naslednja. Rusija ja danes za Kitajsko “indispensable nation”.

    Všeč mi je

%d bloggers like this: