Kitajska naj bi razočarala ZDA. ZDA so jo spustile v Svetovno trgovinsko organizacijo (WTO), kar je prineslo znižanje uvoznih carin na kitajske izdelke na enako raven kot denimo na uvoz evropskih proizvodov na ameriški trg, nato pa se Kitajska ni obnašala po pričakovanjih. Kot pravi Stephen Roach, pri čemer pa ne vem, ali misli resno ali pa je samo sarkastičen:

»ZDA so odprle svoj trg za kitajske izdelke, Kitajska pa je prelomila svojo obljubo, da bo postala kot ZDA«.

»Postati kot ZDA« najbrž pomeni, postati liberalna demokracija kot ZDA. In iz tega razočaranja naj bi sledile ameriške akcije proti Kitajski (od pritoževanja nad kršenjem pravic manjšin do nedemokratičnosti kitajskega režima). Kar so seveda za ušesa privlečeni “argumenti”.

Dejstvo je, da je Kitajska gospodarsko in tehnološko postala premočna in da, kot je povedal državni sekretar Alan Blinken lani, ima željo in sposobnosti postati svetovna velesila in ogroziti primat ZDA. Zato finančna ministrica Janet Yellen govori o nacionalni varnosti in primatu nacionalne varnosti nad gospodarskimi vidiki.

In tukaj bo glavni catch. Drugo dejstvo je namreč, da so ZDA, Evropa in vse ostale države gospodarsko preveč prepletene s Kitajsko, da bi se lahko od nje preprosto odklopile. Po eni strani se večina proizvodnih verih začne ali konča na Kitajskem, na drugi strani so zaradi Kitajske v zadnih desetletjih potrošniki v zahodnih državah bili deležni močnega znižanja cen. Odklapljanje od Kitajske pomeni manj in putov in Kitajske in manj proizvodov, outsourcanih kitajskim podjetjem. Odklapljanje od Kitajske zato nižji BDP (IMF škodo ocenjuje na 2% globalnega BDP) in višjo raven cen (ECB kratkoročni učinek na inflacijo ocenjuje na 5%, dolgoročnega pa na 1%). Da ne govorimo o tem, kako si zahodne države obetajo bolj proti podnebnim spremembam brez kitajskih solarnih panelov, brez kitajskih baterij in brez kitajskega gospodarstva, ki bi drastično znižalo emisije CO2.

Ključno vprašanje v celi zgodbi pa je seveda, ali ameriški politiki sploh vedo, v kaj se spuščajo s tem projektom »hladne vojne proti Kitajski«. Odklapljanje ZDA in Evrope (če bo sledila ameriški norosti) se lahko konča kot odklop treh četrtin držav sveta od ZDA in Evrope. Lahko pomeni pospešitev navezave nezahodnih držav na Kitajsko. To je zgodba, ki jo danes gledamo.

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Five years into a once-unthinkable trade war with China, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen chose her words carefully on April 20. In a wide-ranging speech, she reversed the terms of US engagement with China, prioritizing national-security concerns over economic considerations. That formally ended a 40-year emphasis on economics and trade as the anchor to the world’s most important bilateral relationship. Yellen’s stance on security was almost confrontational: “We will not compromise on these concerns, even when they force trade-offs with our economic interests.”

…

Such actions result in “dual bloc” FDI fragmentation. The IMF estimates that the formation of a US bloc and a China bloc could reduce global output by as much as 2% over the longer term. As the world’s largest economy, America will account for a significant share of foregone output.

European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde recently stressed a different channel through which an escalating US-China conflict could adversely affect economic performance. Drawing on research by ECB staff, she focuses on the higher costs and inflation resulting from supply-chain disruptions implied by conflict-driven FDI fragmentation. The ECB study concludes that geostrategic conflict could boost inflation by as much as 5% in the short run and around 1% over the longer term. Collateral effects on monetary policy and financial stability would follow.

Collectively, these model-based calculations of the costs of conflict imply a stagflationary combination of lower output and higher inflation – hardly a trivial consideration in today’s fragile economic climate. And they dovetail with economic theory. Countries trade with others to reap the benefits of comparative advantage. Both inward and outward flows of foreign investment seek to achieve similar benefits, offering offshore efficiencies for multinational corporations that face higher costs in their home markets and attracting foreign capital to support domestic capacity expansion and job creation. Regardless of their different political systems and economic structures, this is true for both America and China. It follows that conflict will reduce these benefits.

Yet there is an important twist for the US: a chronic shortfall of domestic saving casts the economic consequences of conflict with China in a very different light. In 2022, net US saving – the depreciation-adjusted saving of households, businesses, and the government sector – fell to just 1.6% of national income, far below the longer-term 5.8% average from 1960 to 2020. Lacking in saving and wanting to invest and grow, the US takes full advantage of the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” as the world’s dominant reserve currency and freely imports surplus saving from abroad, running a massive current-account and multilateral trade deficit to attract foreign capital.

As such, the economic interests of saving-short America are tightly aligned with its outsize imbalances of trade and capital flows. Barring a highly unlikely resurgence of domestic US saving, compromising those flows for any reason – say, security concerns over China – is not without meaningful economic and financial consequences. The research cited above suggests those consequences will take the form of slower economic growth, higher inflation, and possibly a weaker dollar.

This is hardly an ideal outcome for a US economy that is already at a precarious point in the business cycle. The tradeoff for national security should not be taken lightly. Nor should the US penchant to over-hype the security threat be accepted on blind faith.

Vir: Stephen Roach, Project Syndicate