Dani Rodrik, profesor iz Harvarda in moj priljubljeni razvojni ekonomist, se v zadnji kolumni sprašuje, kakšen je dejanski interes Bidenove administracije glede uvedbe trgovinske in tehnološke vojne proti Kitajski. Ključno vprašanje pri tem je, kako Kitajska ogroža ZDA in ali ameriški protekcionistični ukrepi dejansko naslavljajo probleme, ki jih navajajo ZDA. Ameriški protekcionistični ukrepi so bili podkrepljeni z argumentom, da Kitajska predstavlja pomembno grožnjo za ZDA. Toda kakšno grožnjo? Predgovor k nedavno objavljeni Nacionalni varnostni strategiji Bidenove administracije pravi: »Ljudska republika Kitajska ima namen in vedno bolj zmožnost preoblikovanja mednarodnega reda v korist tistega, ki nagiba globalno igralno polje v svojo korist.”

Kitajska torej ni grožnja zato, ker bi spodkopavala temeljne varnostne interese ZDA, temveč zato, ker bi z naraščanjem njene gospodarske in politične moči lahko vplivala na pravila svetovnega političnega in gospodarskega reda. Dejanski problem, ki ga imajo ZDA s Kitajsko, je torej izključno v tem, da Kitajska lahko ogrozi sedanjo unipolarno svetovno ureditev z ZDA kot edinim hegemonom. In na to kažejo zastavljeni protekcionistični ukrepi. Denimo, ukrepi glede prepovedi izvoza čipov in opreme za proizvodnjo čipov v Kitajsko ne ločijo med čipi za vojaško in civilno uporabo.

By responding this way, the Biden administration is doubling down on US primacy instead of accommodating the realities of a post-unipolar world. As the new export controls make clear, the US has given up on distinguishing between technologies that directly help the Chinese military (and hence might pose a threat to US allies) and commercial technologies (which might produce economic benefits not just for China but for others as well, including American firms). Those arguing that it is impossible to separate military from commercial applications have won.

The US has now crossed a line. Such a broad-brush approach raises significant dangers of its own – even if it can be partly justified by the intertwined nature of China’s commercial and military sectors. Correctly viewing the new US restrictions as an aggressive escalation, China will find ways to retaliate, raising tensions and further heightening mutual fears.

Tudi nobeni drugi ukrepi ali ameriški javno komunicirani dogodki ne kažejo na to, da bi ZDA targetirala kitajska podjetja ali gospodarske sektorje na osnovi varnostnih vprašanj, pač pa gre za navaden trgovinski in tehnološki protekcionizem. Kot se je izrazila Janet Yellen, sedanja finančna ministrica ZDA, naj ne bi šlo za to, da BI ZDA želele “povsem paralizirati kitajsko gospodarstvo in zaustaviti njen razvoj”. Toda ostali ukrepi in uradno izražene simpatije z nekaterimi dejanji posameznih podjetij (kot denimo “friend-shoring”, to je relokacija proizvodnje iz Kitajske v “prijateljske države”) kažejo natanko to. Kot poroča včerajšnji New York Times:

This week, while traveling in India, Ms. Yellen promoted Biden administration’s policy of “friend-shoring” and urged India and other allied nations to diversify their supply chains away from China.

In a speech at Microsoft’s offices near New Delhi, the Treasury secretary highlighted China’s problematic human rights record and praised Apple for shifting some of its iPhone manufacturing from China to India. She also lauded investments that have allowed an American solar manufacturer to set up operations in India instead of China, noting that solar panel materials produced in China’s Xinjiang region are made with forced labor.

The Treasury Department has also been critical of China for obfuscating its foreign exchange practices. In a report on global foreign exchange practices this past week, the United States kept China on its list of countries that it watches closely.

Pri ameriških ukrepih glede Kitajske gre izključno in samo za poskus paraliziranja in zaustavitve razvoja Kitajske, pri čemer ZDA zgolj zlorabljajo argumente glede varnostne zaskrbljenosti. Jasno je, da mora vsaka država zasledovati svoje koristi in globalizacijo izkoristiti v skladu s svojimi strateškimi prioritetami, vendar pa ali je zaradi geopolitike potrebno tudi ubiti globalizacijo? Globalizacija je koristna, če jo seveda znamo ustrezno in kontrolirano usmeriti v korist potreb hitrejšega lastnega razvoja.

Podobnega mnenja je Dani Rodrik, ki je bil vedno kritik hiperglobalizacije, kjer so pravila igre pisali ameriška finančna industrija in velike ameriške korporacije. Pred skoraj četrt stoleta (1998) je napisal knjigo “Has globalization gone too far?”, v kateri je pokazal, da so države, ki so na vrat na nos in povsem brez zaščite šle v popolno liberalizacijo zunanje trgovine in kapitalskih tokov (denimo države Latinske Amerike) napredovale bistveno počasneje (ali celo nazadovale) od držav, ki so šle v globalizacijo postopno in s premišljenim postopnim odpiranjem trgovinskih in kapitalskih tokov (Kitajska).

Danes, ko si razvite države, predvsem pa ZDA, potegnile ročno zavoro glede globalizacije, pa je Rodrik to teh tendenc seveda kritičen. Opozarja, da ni treba ubiti globalizacije zaradi geoplotike, hkrati pa opozarja, da zaostrovanje protekcionizma s strani ZDA lahko ogrozi določene druge skupne politike, kot je boj proti podnebnim spremembam. Toda zdi se, da so se predvsem ZDA, namesto da bi poskušale oblikovati “boljšo globalizacijo”, denimo takšno, ki bi uveljavila višje standarde zaposlovanja (prepoved dela otrok, večjo varnost pri delu in večjo zdravstveno zaščito zaposlenih) in varovanja okolja, odločile, da “predajo ključe svetovnega gospodarstva svojim nacionalnim varnostnim ustanovam, s čimer ogrožajo svetovni mir in blaginjo.“

Great powers (and indeed all countries) look out for their interests and protect their national security, taking countermeasures against other powers as necessary. But as Stephen M. Walt and I have argued, a secure, prosperous, and stable world order requires that these responses be well calibrated. That means they must be clearly linked to the damage inflicted by the other side’s policies and intended solely to mitigate those policies’ negative effects. Responses should not be pursued for the express purpose of punishing the other side or weakening it in the long run. Biden’s export controls on high-tech do not pass this test.

The new US approach toward China also creates other blind spots. The National Security Strategy emphasizes “shared challenges,” such as climate change and global public health, where cooperation with China will be critical. But it does not acknowledge that pursuing an economic war against China undermines trust and the prospects of cooperation in those other areas. It also distorts the domestic economic agenda by elevating the objective of outcompeting China over worthier goals. Investing in highly capital- and skill-intensive semiconductor supply chains – on which US industrial policy currently focuses – is just about the costliest way of creating good jobs in the US economy for those who most need them.

To be sure, the Chinese government is not an innocent victim. It has become increasingly aggressive in projecting its economic and military power, though its actions have mostly been confined to its own neighborhood. Despite previous assurances, China has militarized some of the artificial islands it built in the South China Sea. It imposed economic sanctions on Australia when that country called for an investigation into COVID-19’s origins. And its human-rights violations at home certainly do warrant condemnation by democratic countries.

Vir: Dani Rodrik, Project Syndicate