Japonska je bila po drugi svetovni vojni najhitreje rastoča država skozi štiri desetletja, nato pa je leta 1991 zapadla v finančno krizo, iz katere se ni več pobrala. Začelo se je z enim izgubljenim desetletjem, zdaj je vstopila že v četrto izgubljeno desetletje. Povprečna gospodarska rast je pod 1%, stopnja inflacije pa med 0 in 0.5% (deflacija). Medtem ko se ekonomisti predvsem ukvarjajo z razlogi, zakaj je japonska sekularna stagnacija tako persistentna (od padajoče produktivnosti, nizke demografije do specifičnih kulturnih vzorcev), pa je manj znan trigger (sprožilec) japonskega strmoglavljenja. Na to me je opozoril študent Žiga Bukovec, ki pri meni dela magistrsko nalogo s področja sekularne stagnacije. Na stvari, ki jih prej nisem povezal. Bodite pozorni.

Res je splošno znano, da se je “japonizacija” Japonske začela z globoko finančno krizo kot posledice poka nepremičninskega in kapitalskega balona, manj znano pa je, kaj je privedlo do obeh balonov. Zgodba gre takole. Prvi del: Japonska je bila v 1970-ih in 1980-ih letih kot demokratična različica sedanje Kitajske – visoko rastoča, s svetovnimi industrijskimi šampioni. Leta 1989 se je 32 japonskih podjetij uvrstilo na seznam 50 največjih podjetij na svetu po tržni kapitalizaciji, do leta 2018 jih je večina izpadla s te liste, med prvih 50 je ostala le Toyota. Japonska podjetja so prevzemala druga podjetja – od železarn do holivudskih studijev. In ker so japonski izvozniki postali premočni, predvsem na področju avtomobilske industrije, so ZDA Japonsko prisilile v (sedaj s strani WTO prepovedan) aranžma “prostovoljnih izvoznih omejitev“, s katerimi je Japonska s kvotami omejila svoj izvoz avtomobilov v ZDA. Japonska podjetja pa so nato to omejitev preskakovala tako, da so začela odpirati podružnice v ZDA in tam proizvajati za ameriški trg.

Drugi del: Ker je bila japonska izvozna dominacija sredi 1980-ih let za ZDA še vedno premočna, so slednje Japonsko leta 1985 prisilile v podpis t.i. Plaza accord (poimenovanega po newyorškem hotelu, v katerem je peterica G5 držav podpisala sporazum). V tem sporazumu se je Japonska zavezala, da bo dopustila apreciacijo jena (zaradi izvoznih presežkov), kar bi zmanjšalo njeno izvozno konkurenčnost.

Tretji del: To se je res zgodilo in Japonska je leto kasneje (1986) zapadla v t.i. “Yen appreciation recession“, ko je rast BDP strmoglavila za 70% na vsega 1.9%. Posledično so japonske oblasti uvedle ekspanzivne ekonomske politike: BoJ je znižala obrestno mero iz 4 na 2.5%, vlada pa je povečala javne izdatke, da bi spodbudila rast. Zaradi poceni denarja in povečanega povpraševanja so se v naslednjih štirih letih napihnili finančni in nepremičninski baloni, dokler niso leta 1991 počili in naredili podobnega opustošenja kot pok finančnega balona leta 2009 v Sloveniji. Japonske oblasti so nato naredile serijo napak (od prepozne sanacije bank do izostalih ali nekoordniranih makroekonomskih in strukturnih politik), kar je Japonsko prizemljilo v tridesetletno sekularno stagnacijo.

Pomembno je razumeti sprožilec tega, kar se je Japonski zgodilo, saj tako lažje razumemo ponavljajoč se vzorec. Ker je Japonska postala gospodarsko premočna in japonska podjetja preveč dominantna, jih je zaustavila ameriška interevencija – najprej ponesrečeno prek trgovinskih omejitev, nato pa prek prisile valutnega aranžmaja. In Japonska je bila s tem izločena iz globalne bitke. Če spremljate situacijo skozi zadnje desetletje in pol, ste prav gotovo opazili ameriško negodovanje nad tem, da naj bi Kitajska manipulirala tečaj juana. Drugače rečeno, da kitajska centralna banka ni dopustila apreciacije tečaja, ki bi sicer avtomatsko zmanjšal konkurenčnost kitajskega izvoza. Kitajska za razliko od Japonske nikoli ni pristala na kakšen “Plaza accord”, zato je ZDA na ta način niso mogle zaustaviti. In zato so proti njej uvedle trgovinsko vojno (začenši s Trumpom) in tehnološko vojno (najprej s Trumpom, zdaj pa brutalno z Bidenom).

Kitajska se je iz japonske izkušnje očitno veliko naučila. Ni pristala na apreciacijo tečaja (ki bi zmanjšal njeno konkurenčnost) in hkrati z vsemi silami kroti finančne in nepremičninske balone, da ti ne počijo (ki bi jo poslali na pot sekuklarne stagnacije japonskega tipa).

Torej, kar gledamo danes, je povsem običajna brutalna realpolitika, kjer se globalni hegemon trudi izločiti tekmece, ki bi lahko ogrozili njegovo dominacijo. Vojna v Ukrajini (v kateri so ZDA “izpostavile” Rusijo, da je naredila morda usodno napako z agresijo in se lahko v tej vojni povsem izčrpa) in trgovinsko – tehnološka vojna proti Kitajski sta zgolj akta navadne brutalne realpolitike, ki je sicer pospremljena s spretno ameriško politično propagando (suverenost, demokracija, človekove pravice, pravice manjšin itd.).

Je pa res, da izid tokratne ameriške realpolitike morda za ZDA ne bo tako ugoden, kot je bil v primeru Japonske in Iraka. Zdi se, da so se države (razen seveda držav Evropske unije) iz obeh epizod naučile strateškega nauka in nočejo ponoviti napake Japonske, hkrati pa nočejo asistirati ZDA kot v primeru ameriške agresije na Irak (kjer so ZDA sfabricirale lažne dokaze o obstoju orožja za masovno uničevanje in prepričale ostale države, da so podprle ameriško agresijo ter hkrati države OPEC prepričale, da so s povišanjem kvot črpanja pristale na znižane cene nafte). Kot lahko vidimo danes, sankcije proti Rusiji podpira le 47 držav (praktično le klub razvitih držav), več kot 150 držav jih ne podpira. Sankcij ne podpirajo države OPEC in tudi ne želijo pristati na povišane kvote črpanja ter s tem na nižje cene nafte v lastno škodo. Prav tako sankcij proti Rusiji ne podpira niti Izrael, ki tudi ne želi Ukrajini pomagati z orožjem. Nasprotno, krepi se skupina držav BRICS+ okrog osi Rusija – Kitajska, ki vidi v tej grupaciji zase bolj enakovreden položaj in s tem večje koristi kot v primeru sledenja interesom Amerike.

Seveda pa se tak prehod iz unipolarnega v multipolarni svet oziroma prenos moči od enega hegemona na drugega nikoli ne izvrši po mirni poti. Običajno se razreši prek vojne eskalacije. Škoda je, da v tej eskalaciji sodeluje Evropa, ki bo (ob Ukrajini) tudi plačala največjo ceno v tej ameriški igri prestolov. S to epizodo se bo Evropa deindustrializirala in ZDA bodo z eno potezo ob izčrpa(va)nju Rusije dosegle tudi zmanjšanje gospodarske (in politične) moči Evrope.

Tukaj je nekaj ključnih odstavkov iz teksta Žige Bukovca glede formiranja japonske sekularne stagnacije kot serije napačnih politik pred tem in po finančnem zlomu:

The roots of the great Japanese financial meltdown that pushed the economy into secular stagnation ahead of its time can be found in the G5 Plaza Accord, where the Japanese government agreed upon the appreciation of the yen to the dollar. In 1985, the Plaza Hotel in New York hosted various policymakers and government representatives from five most advanced economies at the time. The main objective was to reach an agreement regarding the possible movement of currencies between the participating nations (Grabowiecki, 2019; Wakatabe, 2015).

The Plaza Accord arrangement prompted the Japanese government to appreciate the yen against the dollar. In only two years since the gathering, the Japanese policymakers saw the rapid appreciation of the yen. Between February 1985 and December 1987 yen appreciated by more than 100% to the dollar, from $1= ¥260,7 to $1= ¥121,4. At the time, Japan and the US had a bilateral trade dispute which presented increased political and economic issues on both sides of the pacific. Although it is sufficient to say, that the US felt more endangered by the so-called “Japanese takeover”. Japan’s high-growth period and a rapid rise in purchasing power were increasingly felt in the US, as successful Japanese companies started to expand outwards. To name just a few, the Japanese conglomerates bought Rouge Steel corporation (formerly owned by Ford) in 1982, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co in 1988, film production studio Colombia Pictures and Rockefeller Center in 1989, and many more. Moreover, the Japanese expansion to the US domestic market became a trending topic all over the continent. The increased tension between both countries can be best depicted with the 1983 picture of American autoworkers smashing the Toyota GM cars in front of the US capitol building (Wakatabe, 2015).

The rapid appreciation of the yen had a major implication for the domestic Japanese economy, as the pacific nation embarked on a “Yen appreciation recession”. The real GDP growth plummeted to values not seen in Japan for most of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1986 the real GDP accounted for 1,9 %, a 69,8% drop from the previous year. Furthermore, the unemployment rate increased from 2,7% to 3,1% year over year. For other advanced economies, such values would not present a drastic condition, however, in Japan, the unemployment rate above the 3% threshold in 1986 and 1987 was the highest value since the unemployment statistics had been collected. Hence, as government institutions feared potential economic turbulence ahead, the Japanese policymakers changed their policy stance. From 1986 onwards Japan engaged in an expansionary macroeconomic policy stance. From the monetary policy standpoint, the Bank of Japan lowered the official discount rate from 4% to 2,5%. On the other hand, fiscal consolidation was suspended and the government drastically increased spending in order to improve domestic demand (Grabowiecki, 2019).

For a brief period of time, Japan’s economy boomed again. The aggressive expansionary policies effectively resolved the yen appreciation recession. Moreover, the real GDP growth rate was valued at 6% in 1987. Stock and land prices increased considerably, outperforming both the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 by a large margin. The Nikkei 225 index grew by more than 200% in less than 5 years. Additionally, the house and land prices appreciated by nearly 50% between 1985 and 1990. At the time it seemed that the Japanese policymakers managed to recreate the high-growth period. The flourishing economy was able to substantially increase government revenue, despite the expansionary fiscal policy. The rise in revenue was so large that the government almost achieved fiscal consolidation without tax increases. Japanese debt-to-GDP peaked in 1987 at 75 %, only to subsequently decrease in the following years to 68,7% in 1991. Furthermore, the account balance reversed into positive values in 1988 (as % of GDP) and maintained a surplus until 1992. However, there were some in both government and BoJ who voiced concerns about the economy’s overheating (Wakatabe, 2015).

The challenge Japan faced was to tighten the policy in order to stabilize the out-of-control asset valuations without tipping the economy into a recession. At the end of 1989, the BoJ’s new governor reacted to the social and political problem of elevated asset prices by increasing the official discount rate from 2,5% to 6%. At the same time, the government imposed the 3% consumption tax in 1989. As a result, asset prices plunged, consequently inflicting a great disturbance on banks’ and firms’ balance sheets. A period of deleveraging and sluggish economic performance was on the horizon. What started with one policy mistake in the aftermath of the Plaza Accord (appreciation of the yen), ended with a series of mistakes that held Japan’s economy crippled for two consecutive decades (Wakatabe, 2015).

The first part of Japan’s Great Stagnation period can be characterized by its sequence of macroeconomic mistakes that followed the 1991 crash. If policy mistakes leading to the bubble conditions are side-lined, as in fact bubbles in various asset classes come and go through history, the policy mistakes in the aftermath of the bubble burst are crucial in understanding prolonged slack in the Japanese economy. For example, in the late 1980s, many advanced economies, including the resilient Nordic countries experienced asset bubbles and consequently their collapse. However, what is distinctive about the Japanese bubble was the prolonged stagnation that followed, which apart from secular tendencies described in the SS part of the master’s thesis can also be attributed to the insufficient and to some extent disordered reaction by the Japanese institutions. The institutional (both government and BoJ) policy responses can be described as “doing too little, too late” with a “stop and go” approach. Consequently, coordination between fiscal and monetary policy was often contradictory, reducing the effects of each policy stance.