Je ohladitev nemško – francoskih odnosov slaba ali dobra za EU?

Wofgang Munchau piše o ohladitvi nemško – francoskih odnosov. Formalno zaradi soliranja Nemčije pri pivotiranju pisma o nameri o vzpostavitvi skupne evropske zračne obrambe, ki temelji na nakupu izraelskega sistema (tudi Slovenija je ena izmed 14 držav, ki je podpisala to pismo o nameri). Francija se je zavzemala za samostojen sistem, ki bi Evropi zagotavljal tudi večjo avtonomnost in neodvisnost od ZDA (Izrael je pač neformalno ameriška zvezna država, in to ena izmed vodilnih). Državi sta na različnih bregovih tudi glede energetske politike, kar se kaže v divergentnih stališčih glede cenovne kapice za plin. Sicer pa se odnosi med državama ohladili po slovesu Merklove, ki je še znala diplomatsko urediti ključne EU politike s Francijo, preden se je o njih razpravljalo na ravni Sveta EU, medtem ko se Scholz ukvarja večinoma le še s svojo težavno skrajno levo – zelo desno koalicijo in kako obdržati Nemčijo nad vodo.

Nemčija ima trenutno na prvi pogled bistveno večje skrbi, saj je razpadel njen poslovni model, ki je temeljil na poceni ruskem plinu, dostopu do kitajskega trga in obrambni zaščiti s strani ZDA. Nemčija mora zdaj reinventirati svoj poslovni model in se nima časa ukvarjati z EU zadevami. In to načeloma sploh ni slabo. Ko se namreč Nemčija in Francija poenotita, običajno pomeni, da so Nemci k francoski obsesiji s federalizmom dodali nemško računovodsko disciplino. Tako smo dobili skupno valuto evro, pakt o stabilnosti in rasti, fiskalni pakt s fiskalnim pravilom ter politiko varčevanja. Če ohladitev nemško – francoskih odnosov pomeni manj (škodljivih) skupnih evropskih politik in več nacionalne avtonomije, dajmo prižgat še kakšno molitveno svečo.

The biggest political development in continental Europe right now is the freeze in the relationship between France and Germany. We have always wondered about France’s seemingly endless tolerance of German unilateralism, during the euro crisis for example. Angela Merkel kept the relationship intact through deft diplomacy. But diplomacy is not a strength of Olaf Scholz. He falls into the large category of Germans who think they are European, but who don’t like to spend too much time with Europeans, let alone coordinate policy with them. He coordinates within the coalition, and presents the German position to others.

Alarm bells should be ringing at the news that the France and Germany have cancelled the scheduled bilateral cabinet meeting, which was set to take place in Fontainebleau next Wednesday. The reason is that Emmanuel Macron is livid about Scholz’s European air defence system. Scholz proposed it at his Prague speech. At the recent Nato ministerial meeting, 14 countries signed a letter of intent to procure a joint system from Israel, the Arrow 3, that is capable of straddling borders. France and Poland are not part of it. Macron sees this as a rebuff of European strategic autonomy, an idea he personally championed, and into which he managed to co-opt Angela Merkel.

France has a long list of issues with Germany right now. The German coalition did not coordinate with France, or any other EU country, on its decision to cap gas and electricity prices. We too argue that the lack of coordination, and the lack of flexibility afterwards, constitute a huge problem for the EU going forward.

The joint cabinet meetings between the countries are enshrined in Art. 23 in the Aachen treaty, where the two sides agreed to meet in full cabinet form once a year. The last meeting took place in May 2021 in the form of a video conference. Macron understands that the current economic crisis has the potential to destabilise the German economic model and that Germany needs to take action. But he is irritated at the generalised lack of coordination.

Sylvie Kaufman writes in Le Monde that the Franco-German engine, which has driven European integration, has given up. We think the following nails it. From the French newspaper L’Opinion:

“Germany is afraid because in six months it has lost its bearings. Its model was based on a triptych: cheap energy, thanks to Russian gas, a defence guaranteed by the United States and broad access to the Chinese market. Germany has entered a phase of reinvention that is pushing it to refocus and turn inward.”

Vir: Wofgang Munchau, Eurointelligence