Podobnosti med Brexitom in Trumpom

Jonathan Portes (seveda) ugotavlja, da so skupni imenovalec Brexita in Trumpa frustracije ljudi, ki se čutijo, da jih je globalizacija opeharila in da migracijski tokovi ogrožajo njihovo prihodnost. Pri tem ne gre nujno za  frustracije ljudi, ki imajo negativne izkušnje z globalizacijo in migracijami, pač pa za tiste, ki živijo v regijah, ki so bile obema bolj izpostavljene. Pomembna je splošna percepcija frustracij in strahu v nekem okolju, ki volilce žene k ekstremnemu glasovanju.

Since the UK referendum, there has been a lively debate about the extent to which the result was driven by immigration. Immigration was indeed a central issue in the campaign, and there is some evidence that at least some areas which have seen rapid growth in migrant populations saw large votes to Leave. But other explanations are available; Leave was particularly strong in areas which suffered most from the decline of manufacturing industry in the 1980s, long before the recent rise in immigration. One analysis suggested that one of the strongest predictors of a Leave vote at a local level was the degree to which the economy was exposed to competition from Chinese imports.

And a similar debate will surely ensue on Trump’s victory. As with Leave, immigration and indeed nativism were central to his campaign. But the key surprise victories in swing states came not in areas where immigration is the biggest issue, but rather in the Midwest “rustbelt” states where well-paying manufacturing jobs have been shrinking for decades.

So one popular thesis is that in both countries those who have been “left behind” by globalisation have chosen to reject its political manifestations: the EU and the political establishment which supports it in the UK, and the Clinton dynasty and the political centre in the US. But what this economic perspective ignores is that in neither the US nor the UK are the losers from globalisation anything like a majority. True, some of the largest Leave majorities were in depressed northern areas, like Middlesbrough or Barnsley; but Leave also won in much of the prosperous south-east, in areas like Aylesbury and Chichester, and it did far better with Conservative than Labour voters. Similarly, in the US, the evidence suggests that Clinton voters are if anything poorer than Trump ones.

But this does not mean that globalisation – or at least its perceived manifestations – was not the main factor. In fact, the key common denominator in both campaigns appears to be their success in putting together a coalition; of those who perceive themselves to have been disadvantaged (at least relatively) in economic terms, and those who don’t like the broader social and cultural direction of Western society. In the UK, about 70% of those who thought “multiculturalism” and “social liberalism” were forces for good voted Remain; about 80% of those who thought the opposite voted Leave. We don’t have the data yet, but I would be astonished not to find a similar divide in the US.

So what does this mean for economic policy in both countries – and indeed globally? It is difficult not to see Trump’s victory, like Brexit, as a defeat for economic liberalism; a turn away from free trade, open markets and a broadly positive attitude to migration. The difference is that Trump’s rejection of free trade and free markets is far more explicit than that of the Leave campaign.

Vir: Jonathan Portes

3 responses

  1. Mehanizmi družbenega nadzora poskrbijo, da sicer nezadovoljni ljudje bodisi v družbi nimajo vpliva ali pa odločajo in odločijo v nasprotju s svojimi interesi v korist tistih, ki vplivajo. Clintonova je v tem kontekstu imela vso podporo medijev, Wall streeta, znanih osebnosti, itd., imela je torej podporo mehanizmov družbenega nadzora.

    Ker Clintonova ni zmagala, je morda to znak, da je nezadovoljstvo v družbi doseglo stopnjo, ko ga z doslej uporabljenimi metodami vplivanja in nadzora ne bo več mogoče imeti pod kontrolo.

    Odgovorov na nezadovoljstvo, ki uhaja izpod kontrole je več, npr.:
    a) vojna
    b) diktatura in popolni nadzor
    c) sprememba sistema na način, ki sistemu prinese minimalno potrebno podporo ljudstva.

    Zasledimo lahko, da so tako a, b kot tudi c stranice istega trikotnika, katerega ploščina mora ostati enaka. Za vzdrževanje vzdržnega stanja se tako uporablja mešanica vseh treh:

    – nekaj vojne, oz. izrednih razmer (Sirija z vojno, begunci v Evropi) – stranica a
    – diktatura/oz. večji nadzor (vedno več diktatorskih režimov, elektronskega nadzora) – stranica b
    – sprememba sistema (malo socialnih pomoči, javnih del, bonov za hrano, kak evro več pri pokojnini) – stranica c.

    Iz zakonitosti trikotnika se za ohranitev njegove površine mora povečati stranica c, če se zmanjšata stranici a, oziroma b in obratno. Zaskrbljujoče je, da se krepi predvsem povzročanje izrednih razmer in krepitev nadzora, zelo malo pa se naredi za zadovoljstvo in socialno vključenost množic.

    Upam, da tako družba kot celota, predvsem pa posamezniki, ki jo sestavljamo, ne bomo dopustili, da ustvarjanje izrednih razmer in nadzor nad posameznikom (stranici a in b) prevladata nad nujnimi spremembami sistemov, ki naj bi omogočali dobrobit slehernika (c).

    • Ja, še vedno je malce neverjetno kar se je zgodilo.

      Poglejmo si trditev, da se “volitve zmaguje s centra”. Ta t.i. center lahko razumemo na vsaj dva načina: kulturno-socialno in ekonomsko. Zdi se mi, da je kampanja Clintonove preveč igrala na to, da je “center” kulturno-socialna zadeva, da je treba (retorično) streči najbolj raznolikim skupinam, od afro-američanov do LGBT skupnosti in vseh vmes in da že nekako bo za zmago. To je do neke mere počel tudi Trump.

      A ljudje niso nasedli. Center so razumeli ekonomsko. Že dolgo časa je center = neoliberalizem. Trump je zmagal zato, ker je šel korak dlje. Kulturno-socialno dimenzijo je združil z ekonomsko dimenzijo. V praksi to zgleda tako, da brezsramno razglašaš določene etnične skupine in narode (Mehičane, Kitajce, itd…) kot ekonomsko grožnjo. To “združevanje” dimenzij je navidez delovalo kot razdruževanje ljudi, ampak je odločilno prispevalo k zmagi.

      Ampak Trump za moje pojme ne more biti zares proti korporacijam, vsaj ne konsistentno, saj so te premočne in še sam Trump je korporacija. Nevaren je seveda že od začetka, ker nastopa proti ljudem. Zanj so korporacije (“združena telesa”) prej kaki priseljenci, kot pa politično vplivne družbe kot so Goldman Sachs in podobne.

      • Stvar je torej v tem, da je izraz “politični center” danes nekaj popolnoma paradoksnega. Iz kulturnega vidika pomeni nekaj najbolj vključujočega, iz ekonomskega vidika pa nekaj najbolj izključujočega, ker pomeni neoliberalizem. Ni čudno, da je britanski avtor Tariq Ali pred časom napisal knjigo z navidez paradoksnim naslovom: “The Extreme Center”.

        Trump je zmagal, ker je center definiral na novo. Stvari je obrnil za 180 stopinj. Zdaj je ekonomska dimenzija centra nekaj vključujočega (če si “native”), kulturna dimenzija pa nekaj izključujočega. Vsaj tega se nadejajo njegovi večinoma beli volilci.

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