Jonathan Portes (seveda) ugotavlja, da so skupni imenovalec Brexita in Trumpa frustracije ljudi, ki se čutijo, da jih je globalizacija opeharila in da migracijski tokovi ogrožajo njihovo prihodnost. Pri tem ne gre nujno za frustracije ljudi, ki imajo negativne izkušnje z globalizacijo in migracijami, pač pa za tiste, ki živijo v regijah, ki so bile obema bolj izpostavljene. Pomembna je splošna percepcija frustracij in strahu v nekem okolju, ki volilce žene k ekstremnemu glasovanju.
Since the UK referendum, there has been a lively debate about the extent to which the result was driven by immigration. Immigration was indeed a central issue in the campaign, and there is some evidence that at least some areas which have seen rapid growth in migrant populations saw large votes to Leave. But other explanations are available; Leave was particularly strong in areas which suffered most from the decline of manufacturing industry in the 1980s, long before the recent rise in immigration. One analysis suggested that one of the strongest predictors of a Leave vote at a local level was the degree to which the economy was exposed to competition from Chinese imports.
And a similar debate will surely ensue on Trump’s victory. As with Leave, immigration and indeed nativism were central to his campaign. But the key surprise victories in swing states came not in areas where immigration is the biggest issue, but rather in the Midwest “rustbelt” states where well-paying manufacturing jobs have been shrinking for decades.
So one popular thesis is that in both countries those who have been “left behind” by globalisation have chosen to reject its political manifestations: the EU and the political establishment which supports it in the UK, and the Clinton dynasty and the political centre in the US. But what this economic perspective ignores is that in neither the US nor the UK are the losers from globalisation anything like a majority. True, some of the largest Leave majorities were in depressed northern areas, like Middlesbrough or Barnsley; but Leave also won in much of the prosperous south-east, in areas like Aylesbury and Chichester, and it did far better with Conservative than Labour voters. Similarly, in the US, the evidence suggests that Clinton voters are if anything poorer than Trump ones.
But this does not mean that globalisation – or at least its perceived manifestations – was not the main factor. In fact, the key common denominator in both campaigns appears to be their success in putting together a coalition; of those who perceive themselves to have been disadvantaged (at least relatively) in economic terms, and those who don’t like the broader social and cultural direction of Western society. In the UK, about 70% of those who thought “multiculturalism” and “social liberalism” were forces for good voted Remain; about 80% of those who thought the opposite voted Leave. We don’t have the data yet, but I would be astonished not to find a similar divide in the US.
So what does this mean for economic policy in both countries – and indeed globally? It is difficult not to see Trump’s victory, like Brexit, as a defeat for economic liberalism; a turn away from free trade, open markets and a broadly positive attitude to migration. The difference is that Trump’s rejection of free trade and free markets is far more explicit than that of the Leave campaign.
Vir: Jonathan Portes