Evropski člani boarda IMF naj bi, po poročanju Ekathimerini, menda poskušali preprečiti objavo IMF-ovega poročila (pdf) o vzdržnosti grškega dolga ta četrtek, ker bi to utegnilo vplivati na izid referenduma. Toda ZDA kot najmočnejša članica IMF ter osebje IMF se niso pustili motiti “osebnim imperativom EU. Kot veste, poročilo IMF pravi, da je grški dolg nevzdržen in da bo potreben nov dogovor, ki naj bi zmanjšal obseg dolga (haircut), podaljšal dobo odplačevanja ter prinesel dodatno finančno pomoč Grčiji. V sedanji situaciji bi to znašalo najmanj 52 milijard evrov dodatne finančne pomoči do konca leta. Toda, ker se situacija slabša, bo potrebno še več.

At a meeting on the International Monetary Fund’s board on Wednesday, European members questioned the timing of the report which IMF management proposed at short notice releasing three days before Sunday’s crucial referendum that may determine the country’s future in the eurozone, the sources said.

There was no vote but the Europeans were heavily outnumbered and the United States, the strongest voice in the IMF, was in favor of publication, the sources said.

The Europeans were also concerned that the report could distract attention from a view they share with the IMF that the Tsipras government, in the five months since it was elected, has wrecked a fragile economy that was just starting to recover.

“It wasn’t an easy decision,” an IMF source involved in the debate over publication said. “We are not living in an ivory tower here. But the EU has to understand that not everything can be decided based on their own imperatives.”

The board had considered all arguments, including the risk that the document would be politicized, but the prevailing view was that all the evidence and figures should be laid out transparently before the referendum.

“Facts are stubborn. You can’t hide the facts because they may be exploited,” the IMF source said.

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Paul Krugman je zadel bistvo: če bodo grški volilci v nedeljo glasovali “proti” programu “pomoči” inštitucij Grčiji, se za Grčijo začne še bolj turbulentno obdobje prehoda na lastno valuto. Toda če bodo glasovali  “za”, bo to pomenilo zmago falirane ideologije “varčevanja in discipline”, ki Evropi ne dovoli, da bi iz izšla iz luknje, v katero je padla zaradi evra. Ali drugače rečeno, zavrnitev zahtev inštitucij pomeni sicer kratkoročno hude čase za Grčijo, vendar ji bo omogočilo samostojne politike in ponovno rast, medtem ko sprejem zahtev inštitucij pomeni za Evropo še večji dizaster, še večjo krizo.

But there are many European officials and politicians who are opposed to anything and everything that might make the euro workable, who still believe that all would be well if everyone exhibited sufficient discipline. And that’s why there is even more at stake in Sunday’s Greek referendum than most observers realize.

One of the great risks if the Greek public votes yes — that is, votes to accept the demands of the creditors, and hence repudiates the Greek government’s position and probably brings the government down — is that it will empower and encourage the architects of European failure. The creditors will have demonstrated their strength, their ability to humiliate anyone who challenges demands for austerity without end. And they will continue to claim that imposing mass unemployment is the only responsible course of action.

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Why are there so many economic disasters in Europe? Actually, what’s striking at this point is how much the origin stories of European crises differ. Yes, the Greek government borrowed too much. But the Spanish government didn’t — Spain’s story is all about private lending and a housing bubble. And Finland’s story doesn’t involve debt at all. It is, instead, about weak demand for forest products, still a major national export, and the stumbles of Finnish manufacturing, in particular of its erstwhile national champion Nokia.

What all of these economies have in common, however, is that by joining the eurozone they put themselves into an economic straitjacket. Finland had a very severe economic crisis at the end of the 1980s — much worse, at the beginning, than what it’s going through now. But it was able to engineer a fairly quick recovery in large part by sharply devaluing its currency, making its exports more competitive. This time, unfortunately, it had no currency to devalue. And the same goes for Europe’s other trouble spots.

Does this mean that creating the euro was a mistake? Well, yes. But …

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Dobra zgodba Neila Irwina:

Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, has spent the last six months, since his left-wing Syriza party came to power, trying to shift the entire political framework of his country’s bailout negotiations. That effort has failed. By indicating that his government could accept much of what Greece’s creditors demanded as conditions for a bailout extension late last week, Mr. Tsipras seems to have finally acknowledged this inability to reset the terms of debate over austerity and democracy in Europe.

For five years, the simple trade-off offered by the richer European countries and the European Central Bank has been this: If Greece accepts massive austerity — like pension cuts and layoffs of government employees — it can remain in the eurozone with the help of bailouts, with central bank credit extended to Greek banks, and so on. Austerity was the price to be paid for keeping the monetary stability created by the euro currency.

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Bine Kordež

Ko je vlada s slavnim ZUJF-om leta 2013 med drugim uvedla dodatni dohodninski razred z najvišjo 50 % obdavčitvijo, so to obrazložili s potrebo po enakomernejši porazdelitvi bremena finančne konsolidacije (vsaj tako danes tolmači Ministrstvo za finance). Ker je gospodarstvo pričelo rasti, naj bi ta dohodninski razred z naslednjim letom odpravili in najvišji dohodki naj bi bili obdavčeni zopet z največ 41 %. V obrazložitvi predloga za parlament bo najbrž preprosto zapisano, da se odpravlja začasni ukrep, kajti vsako podrobnejše pojasnjevanje učinkov te spremembe bo hitro naletelo na odpor javnosti. Poglejmo za kakšne učinke pravzaprav gre.

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Stanko Štrajn

Katarza pomeni očiščenje; v tragediji gre po Aristotelu za duhovno očiščenje zaradi trpljenja s katerim se junak odkupi krivde, pri čemer se tudi gledalec etično očisti. V medicini je katarza izpraznitev črevesja, pa tudi razrešitev kompleksov.

Na svojem blogu je Dr. Damijan opozoril slovensko strokovno javnost na članek Tadeja Kotnika, ki v Financah v interesu razlaščenih imetnikov podrejenih obveznic razkriva, kako je Banka Slovenije napačno ocenila višino bančnih izgub v NLB in NKBM, v posledici česar je Slovenija z razlastitvijo imetnikov podrejenih obveznic in predvsem z denarjem davkoplačevalcev zagotovila večjo kapitalsko ustreznost, kot je potrebna. Gorenjska banka, ki se kljub ugotovitvam Banke Slovenije ni dokapitalizirala, je tudi brez dodatnega kapitala po Kotnikovih navedbah dosegla (celo višjo od nujno potrebne) kapitalsko ustreznost. Primer Gorenjske banke naj bi torej dokazal, da bi tudi NLB in NKBM morali doseči, oziroma bi lahko, tudi brez dokapitalizacije z javnim denarjem, ali vsaj z manjšo dokapitalizacijo od dejansko izvedene dosegli potrebno kapitalsko ustreznost. Ne vem, ali ta Kotnikova teza drži, saj je usoda Gorenjske banke gotovo odvisna od usode Save in Merkurja, a nemara napačna predpostavka o Gorenjski banki ne izpodbija dejstva, da ocena višine bančne luknje ni bila strokovna in je gotovo bolj ali manj pretirana.

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V povezavi z mojim jutrišnjim komentarjem v Financah, kjer se sprašujem, kaj bo grška vlada v nedeljo dejansko vprašala Grke. O kateri verziji sporazuma? O tisti iz četrtka 25.6. (ki ga je vlada zavrnila) ali tisti iz torka 30.6., ki ga je vlada ob prošnji za pomoč ESM sprejela (z nekaj izjemami)? No, spodaj je referendumsko vprašanje. Vlada Grke sprašuje glede stare verzije, pri čemer bi volilci morali prebrati dva zahtevnejša strokovna ekonomska teksta. Uf.

The question:

The Greek people are asked to decide with their vote whether to accept the outline of the agreement submitted by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund at the Eurogroup of 25/06/15 and is made up of two parts which constitute their unified proposal:

The first document is entitled: Reforms for the completion of the current program and beyond and the second is Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis.

Whichever citizens reject the proposal by the three institutions vote: Not Approved / NO

Whichever citizens agree with the proposal by the three institutions vote: Approved /YES

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Joseph E. Gagnon piše o tem, katere ukrepe bo morala izvesti nova grška na poti monetarnega osamosvajanja po nedeljski referendumski morebitni odločitvi za izhod iz evra. In seveda pravilno ugotavlja, da se za uvedbo nove valute, za usklajeno spremembo vseh pogodb, dokapitalizacijo bank, učinkovito monetarno politiko (da ne podivja inflacija) in učinkovito fiskalno politiko z uravnoteženim proračunom ter pogajanja z upnicami glede prestrukturiranja dolga Tsiprasova vlada absolutno ne zdi kompetentna. Potrebna bo vlada narodne enotnosti s tehnično dobro podkovanimi eksperti.

With a referendum scheduled for Sunday and frantic negotiations spilling onto the front pages, the possibility of a Greek exit from the euro area, or Grexit, looms large. It is hard to see how Grexit could be avoided if the referendum results in a “no” vote. Such an exit is fraught with danger, yet it also holds hope for stronger economic growth in Greece over the next few years.

The current government in Greece does not instill much confidence in its ability to handle the technical challenges of Grexit. Indeed, Grexit would be disruptive even under the most competent and experienced of administrations.

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