The Economist v dobrem komentarju zdravorazumsko ugotavlja, da so danes stroški grškega izstopa iz evrskega območja sicer manjši kot leta 2012, toda še vedno so precejšnji za vse vpletene.Na eni strani bi Grčija z izstopom lahko pridobila na konkurenčnosti, vendar za razliko od Argentine nima primerljivega izvoznega potenciala (glej Argentinski recept za Grčijo morda ne bo užiten). Grški izstop pomeni popolni bankrot do tujih upnikov in neznosne težave pri zadolževanju, posledično pa domače “tiskanje drahem” in visoko inflacijo. Na drugi strani pa izgubijo upniki, medtem ko bi negativni učinek na povečanje negotovosti najbrž popolnoma zadušil “disciplinirajoč učinek” na ostale šibke periferne države. Slednje pa bi se seveda odrazilo v še bolj depresivnem učinku na gospodarsko rast ter zvišanju obrestnih mer.

Grški izstop se ne izplača niti Grčiji niti preostanku evrskega območja, zato bo nujen dogovor. Syriza seveda ni pravi odgovor na prave grške težave, je pa ustrezno sredstvo, da do tega dogovora pride.

All of which makes an Argentina-style boom highly unlikely. The economy would probably be pushed back into recession, only a year after it had started to recover. The IMF estimated that Grexit would cause an already sliding economy to contract by an additional eight percentage points in 2012.

The uncertainties would persist as the Greek government found itself stuck in an Argentine-style legal imbroglio, making it impossible to borrow from abroad. Although the Greek government could redenominate domestic debt it could not do so for foreign debt. That burden, still in euros, would grow dramatically overnight in relation to the devalued drachma-based economy and the Greek tax base, which would make a fresh default unavoidable. Long legal battles would be inevitable, especially with private holders of the new Greek bonds issued in a restructuring in 2012, which were written under English law.

In some respects, Greece is better-placed now to cope with an exit than in 2012. According to the European Commission, the government ran a primary surplus (ie, before interest payments) of 2.7% of GDP in 2014, whereas two years earlier it was still heavily in deficit (3.6%). Greece’s once forbiddingly large current-account deficit (which reached 15% of GDP in 2008) is more or less back in balance. Grexit would therefore not cause a sudden budgetary crunch, and the balance of payments would be more resilient to the immediate effects of rising import prices and would gain from bigger exports.

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For the euro zone, the balance of benefits and costs is also unfavourable, though less so than in 2012. The gain for Greece’s creditors from Grexit would be one of discipline. A departure would show that members of the currency club have to abide by its rules, sending a strong message to rebellious politicians elsewhere on the periphery to fall into line. The risk that Grexit might cause a wider break-up is lower than in 2012 thanks to various new defence mechanisms, including a permanent rescue fund and the readiness of the ECB to come to the aid of countries facing a buyers’ strike on their government bonds.

Even so, Grexit would still be a shock. Its detrimental impact on an already weak economic recovery could cause GDP across the rest of the euro zone to be lower by 1.5% in 18 months’ time than it would otherwise have been, according to JPMorgan Chase, a bank. Grexit would shatter the principle that membership of the single currency is for ever. A sell-off in the bonds of other countries that might appear susceptible would naturally follow. The euro zone might now cope better with Grexit, but the cost of showing that the currency club can fracture would still outweigh the gain of enforcing discipline.

Vir: The Economist