Nobelovec Joseph Stiglitz pravilno ugotavlja, da problem sedanje krize v evrskem območju ni Grčija, pač pa dizajn evro območja. Pravilno tudi ugotavlja, da tovrstnega invalidnega dizajna ni mogoče uveljavljati v demokraciji. Če v Evropi ne bo prevladal razum, bosta evro in EU razpadla.
Eden izmed znakov razuma, je danes objavljeno mnenje generalnega pravobranilca evropskega sodišča (ECJ), Pedra Cruza Villalona, da je program odkupovanja obveznic, ki ga načrtuje ECB, legitimen in v skladu z monetarno politiko. Da gre za ukrep, ki je legitimen in v skladu z monetarno politiko ECB, je itak jasno vsem, ki nekaj malega vedo o monetarni politiki. Kajti odkupovanje državnih obveznic na sekundarnem trgu spada med tradicionalne instrumente vsake centralne banke (CB), s katerimi CB poskuša vplivati na obrestne mere. Pri tem ne gre za financiranje države, pač pa za običajne instrumente CB. Potencialni problem z legalnostjo je zgolj odkupovanje državnih obveznic v primarni emisiji (kot to denimo počnejo Fed, BoE ali BoJ). Zanimivo je le, da je nemško ustavno sodišče spregledalo ta vidik (in v izogib lastni odgovornosti) pristojnost o tem preneslo na evropsko sodišče.
Zdaj si velja pogledati reakcijo popolnoma zmešanega Hansa Wernerja-Sinna, direktorja muenchenskega Ifo inštituta. Najbrž bo v svoji maniri objavil furiozno kolumno v Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung in v Project Syndicate ter pisal ognjevito pismo vsem 15-im članom senata evropskega sodišča naj ne upoštevajo mnenja pravobranilca Villalona. Sinna razum prav gotovo ne bo nikoli srečal.
Those who thought that the euro could not survive have been repeatedly proven wrong. But the critics have been right about one thing: unless the structure of the eurozone is reformed, and austerity reversed, Europe will not recover.
The drama in Europe is far from over. One of the EU’s strengths is the vitality of its democracies. But the euro took away from citizens – especially in the crisis countries – any say over their economic destiny. Repeatedly, voters have thrown out incumbents, dissatisfied with the direction of the economy – only to have the new government continue on the same course dictated from Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin.
But for how long can this continue? And how will voters react? Throughout Europe, we have seen the alarming growth of extreme nationalist parties, running counter to the Enlightenment values that have made Europe so successful. In some places, large separatist movements are rising.
Now Greece is posing yet another test for Europe. The decline in Greek GDP since 2010 is far worse than that which confronted America during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Youth unemployment is over 50%. Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’s government has failed, and now, owing to the parliament’s inability to choose a new Greek president, an early general election will be held on January 25.
The left opposition Syriza party, which is committed to renegotiating the terms of Greece’s EU bailout, is ahead in opinion polls. If Syriza wins but does not take power, a principal reason will be fear of how the EU will respond. Fear is not the noblest of emotions, and it will not give rise to the kind of national consensus that Greece needs in order to move forward.
The issue is not Greece. It is Europe. If Europe does not change its ways – if it does not reform the eurozone and repeal austerity – a popular backlash will become inevitable. Greece may stay the course this time. But this economic madness cannot continue forever. Democracy will not permit it. But how much more pain will Europe have to endure before reason is restored?