Včeraj smo na GZS imeli okroglo mizo z naslovom “Kako drugače kot pa s Keynesom“, katere namen je bil v bistvu, kako financirati investicije, da bi zagnali gospodarsko rast. Jaz sem na začetku, zadolžen za makro, namerno malce sprovociral debato in pokazal slike, kako našo misteriozno gospodarsko rast v zadnjih dveh četrtletjih v bistvu (polovično, drugo polovico pa izvoz) poganja “stric Keynes“. Torej lokalne investicije v komunalno infrastrukturo, ker morajo občine “pokuriti” evropski denar do konca leta 2015. Nato pa dodal, s katerimi investicijami v javno infrastrukturo bi – v kombinaciji s strukturnimi reformami ter ustrezno monetarno in fiskalno politiko – lahko zares zagnali gospodarski cikel in spodbudili tudi zasebne investicije.

Zanimivo je bilo seveda, kako so mnogi hiteli zatrjevati, da “stric Keynes”, torej stabilizacija oziroma spodbujanje gospodarstva z javnimi sredstvi, ko popolnoma odpovesta zasebno trošenje gospodinjstev in naložbe podjetij, ni dober odgovor. Da investicije v infrastrukturo pomenijo investicije v 19. stoletje. Da je treba spodbujati “kvalitetno rast” prek spodbujanja izvoza in inovacij. Ter da nujno rabimo strukturne reforme. Jasno, vse to je res, in jaz to že vsaj desetletje govorim, toda problem je, da v času globoke depresije doma in trajajoče recesijske luknje na naših izvoznih trgih to na kratek rok ne deluje. Zato je potrebna kratkoročna stabilizacija prek “Keynesa”, da zažene gospodarsko kolesje, šele nato strukturne reforme in inovacije lahko primejo. Toda bojim se, da je “Keynes” na okrogli mizi vseeno izzvenel kot psovka. 

Noah Smith v kolumni v Bloomberg View lucidno opisuje, kako je “Keynes” postal psovka v javni debati in blogerskem svetu. Tukaj pomeni “keynesiansko” enako kot socialistično, progresivno ali liberalno (vendar v ameriškem pomenu besede). Toda v našem, akademskem, svetu se “Keynes” uporablja v povsem drugačnem kontekstu. Čeprav se glavni makroekonomski modeli danes imenujejo “neokeynesianski”, so v bistvu “neomonetaristični”, torej bolj Friedmanovi kot Keynesovi. Gre za fuzijo “freshwater” neomonetarizma in “saltwater” neoklasike s keynesiansko idejo stabilizacije. Kar je keynesianskega v teh modelih, je, da lahko država z monetarno (obrestne mere) in fiskalno politiko (deficiti) kratkoročno gladi poslovne cikle in stabilizira gospodarstvo. Keynesianska je torej ideja stabilizacije gospodarstva, ko se trgi zapletejo, vse ostalo je, če zanemarim “lepljive” plače in cene, neoklasično oziroma monetaristično.

One reason is because this isn’t how academic economists use it. In academia, there is a class of models called “New Keynesian” models that try to describe how monetary policy might affect the economy. But the thing is, despite the name, these models aren’t actually very close to anything Keynes ever conceived. In fact, they’re very close to the ideas of Milton Friedman, who was a rhetorical and political opponent of Keynes. My doctoral adviser, Miles Kimball, actually tried to change the name of the models to “Neomonetarist,” to be more faithful to Friedman’s legacy, but no one went along with it, and the “New Keynesian” label stuck.

In fact, many of the people who invented New Keynesian economics were politically conservative, and deeply opposed to wealth redistribution and to government intervention. The New Keynesians included Greg Mankiw and John Taylor, who are among the most prominent conservative economists writing in the popular media today.

OK, so why should you care about the arcane jargon of academia? Well, because there’s a good reason Taylor and Mankiw chose to name their theory after Keynes.

New Keynesian economics says that monetary policy — and even fiscal policy — is all about stabilization. It’s about smoothing out the fluctuations in the economy, reducing risk for everyone concerned. When the economy is doing well, raise interest rates to slow things down; when it’s doing badly, lower interest rates to give it a boost.

And that’s it. No wealth redistribution, no regulation, no command economy. Stabilization theory says that you can smooth out the wrinkles of the business cycle without messing with the deep structure of how the economy works. The expectation is that if the government does just that — just that one small, minor intervention — then recessions won’t be a big problem, and angry unemployed people won’t demand more lasting government interventions.

In other words, stabilization policy is supposed to guard against socialism. This, in fact, is what Keynes intended. Keynes lived during a time when communism and socialism were considered real, viable alternatives to capitalism. He devised his theories as an alternative to socialism — a way to save capitalism with the smallest possible intervention.

Now, it is true that stabilization policies do inevitably involve some redistribution. Boosting inflation to fight recessions will benefit those who are in debt — companies, for example, that borrow to invest, or people with mortgages — while hurting people living on a fixed income. But the expectation is that this redistribution will be reversed in the good times, when the Federal Reserve hikes interest rates to put on the brakes. Fiscal stimulus is a bit of a different story, since the unemployed reap the benefits while taxpayers pick up the bill. But the point here is that Keynesian policies are fundamentally not about redistribution — they’re about economic stability.

So why do people think Keynesianism is socialism-lite? It might be the fault of Keynes’s main intellectual opponent, Friedrich Hayek.

Preberite več v Noah Smith, Bloomberg View