Mark Thoma iz University of Oregon se v Fiscal Times sprašuje o tem, kako je možno, da se makroekonomisti sedem let po izbruhu krize ne strinjamo o tem, kaj je povzročilo krizo, zakaj je (bila) tako huda in zakaj je okrevanje tako počasno. Ker se ne strinjamo niti o tem, se seveda ne moremo poenotiti niti glede tega, katere politike uporabiti za izhod iz krize. Nekateri trdijo (trdimo), da je potrebna kombinacija ukrepov monetarne in fiskalne politike, drugi prisegajo samo na monetarno politiko, tretji pa so proti kakršnemukoli vmešavanju države. In ker se ne moremo strinjati, je tudi za ustvarjalce ekonomske politike težko najti prave rešitve (ki ne bi takoj doživeli hudih kritik iz enega izmed sprtih taborov).
Thoma še pravi, da je – s čimer se absolutno strinjam – ključni problem v apriornih ali ideoloških prepričanjih, ki preprečujejo, da bi posamezni ekonomisti bili pripravljeni neobremenjeno primerjati podatke in stvarnost in pripoznati empirična dejstva, pač pa raje zastopajo skrajna ideološka stališča. In zaključuje, da je makroekonomske šarlatane nemogoče zaustaviti, lahko pa jih omejimo tako, da jih identificiramo in označimo kot šarlatane.
The considerable lack of agreement on these issues is of concern for three reasons. First, it makes it difficult to design regulatory policies that will avoid similar problems in the future. If we don’t know for sure what caused the crisis, how do we insulate against it? We can take a broad-spectrum approach and close every possible way a crisis could occur, but that risks imposing unnecessary constraints on economic behavior.
Second, it makes it harder to know what types of monetary and fiscal policies work best to fix these types of problems. If we can’t agree on the cause of our problems, and how it worked its way through the economy, we won’t be able to figure out what types of policies are most effective.
As it stands, there are economists who believe that both monetary and fiscal policy should be used to fight deep recessions, others who think only monetary policy should be used, and still others who think government should simply get out of the way as much as possible and do nothing. And within each group there is quite a bit of difference as well, e.g. whether to use government spending or taxes, or, as another example, the type of target the Fed should pursue.
Third, and this gets at the state of macroeconomics as a science, we won’t be able to determine what types of theoretical models work best. How do we sort one model from the other if we cannot agree on what the evidence says?
Why can’t we agree? […] One reason is that most of the time our macro econometric models do not give answers that are clear enough to settle questions – the non-experimental nature of the data we are forced to use in carrying out tests makes the search for precise answers very difficult.
Even when the econometric models do give clear answers, those answers are often ignored in the public debate over these issues. This is due, in large part, to economists who are willing to ignore clear empirical evidence in order to sow confusion and promote ideological goals, and the culture within the profession that does little to penalize such behavior.
If we don’t have the ability to settle debates decisively with empirical evidence, then each side will retain its beliefs and preconceptions. Perhaps “big data” and digital technology will help, but it’s hard to foresee these problems going away anytime soon. What we can do is change the professional culture that allows some economists to create confusion for political reasons through distortions and misrepresentations of the evidence that does exist.
For example, many of the explanations of the crisis listed above are based upon ideological underpinnings as much as actual evidence, or ignore the evidence altogether. We can’t stop the charlatans and cranks from speaking out, but we can do a much better job of labeling them as such when they do.
Vir: Mark Thoma, Fiscal Times
Kako, na primer, ekonomist samega sebe izloči iz kroga šarlatanov? To je namreč predpogoj, da prične druge identificirati kot šarlatane.
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