Ran Bi, Haonan Qu in James Roaf iz IMF so pravkar objavili novo raziskavo (‘Assessing the Impact and Phasing of Multi-year Fiscal Adjustment: A General Framework’) o timingu fiskalne konsolidacije. Kjučno vprašanje raziskave je, ali naj države fiskalno konsolidacijo (varčevanje oz. “austerity”) izvedejo takoj ali jo nekoliko zamaknejo. Pri tem – s simulacijami na podlagi “splošnega okvirja” – pridejo do sklepov, da v visoko zadolženih državah večletna takojšnja fiskalna konsolidacija ni nujno v nasprotju z visokimi fiskalnimi miltiplikatorji. No, pri tem so zgrešili ključno napako: v svojem “splošnem okvirju” niso upoštevali monetarne politike, ki bi (z njihovimi besedami) “lahko imela pomemben vpliv na BDP”. Hja, kaj naj si potem začnemo z njihovimi izsledki?

Prav ta zanemaritev ene izmed dveh ključnih makroekonomskih politik (ali polovice makro orodij, ki so na voljo državi) je ključna. Problem je seveda v tem, da je tako kot pri zdravljenju pacientov tudi pri zdravljenju držav potrebno pogledati njihovo stanje, torej postaviti diagnozo. Šele nato začeti s terapijo. V “splošnem okvirju” je tako seveda nujno pogledati, v kakšnem stanju je država. Je problem visoka brezposelnost ali previsok dolg? Kakšno je stanje likvidnosti v gospodarstvu? Je mogoče gospodarstvu zagnati z monetarno politiko? Če je država v stanju likvidnostne pasti, ko je monetarna politika impotentna, potem drastična fiskalna konsolidacija seveda naredi veliko škodo v obliki poglobitve recesije in povečanja brezposelnosti.

Simon Wren Lewis iz Oxford University se je na še vročo objavo zgornje raziskave odzval z ostro kritiko  uporabljenega pristopa:

We need to go through the logic one more time. When monetary policy is not constrained (we are not at the Zero Lower Bound – ZLB), monetary policy can (and to a first approximation should) completely offset the impact of any fiscal consolidation. The multiplier in that case will be approximately zero. However if we are at the ZLB, then within the current monetary policy framework (essentially inflation targeting), and unless you are really optimistic about unconventional policy, the ability of monetary policy to stimulate aggregate demand is severely compromised. As a result, any fiscal multiplier will be substantially greater than zero.

 

Now consider two periods. In the first, we are at the ZLB. In the following period, we are not. Consider two fiscal consolidation programmes. In the first, everything is front loaded into the first period. In the second, nothing happens in the first period, and all fiscal consolidation takes place in the second. Design the two programmes so that we end up with the same debt to GDP ratio by the end of the second period, so they are neutral in this respect.

 

What is the overall impact on output of the two programmes? Frontloading hits output in the ZLB period, with possible hysteresis effects in the second. Delaying consolidation until the second period has no impact on output whatsoever, because any impact on output is offset by monetary policy. Simple. So the choice is a no-brainer – you delay fiscal adjustment until the ZLB period has ended.

 

You would think that with these very dramatic implications for the optimal path for fiscal consolidation, allowing for monetary policy would have to be part of any ‘general framework’. Not the whole of any such framework, of course. You would want to consider the particular situation of countries without their own monetary policy. You would also want to consider countries where credibility was so low that delay would raise interest rates on debt (which the paper does do). And of course many countries are not at the ZLB. However some rather large ones are (like the US or the Eurozone as a whole), so ignoring monetary policy in any ‘general framework’ is just crazy.

…

This is by now such an obvious and basic point I can only wonder why it is not incorporated into the analysis. By ignoring this point, what has been done is just inapplicable to some major economies. I do not like being so critical and blunt, but this is no academic debating point. And I would hate to think that this reasoning has been ignored precisely because its implications about the timing of fiscal consolidation are so clear.