Evropski Green Deal je mrtev

Revija Nature je objavila članek, kjer poskuša revidirati evropski Green Deal, gelde na yo, da so se okoliščine po njegovem sprejemu bistveno spremenile. Specifično, avtorji pravijo, (1) predpostavka, da bodo vse države sodelovale pri uvedbi ogljičnega davka se ni uresničila, izvaja ga samo EU; (2) po začetku energetske krize in izbruha inflacije so se obrestne mere zelo povečale, javni dolgovi držav pa se po pandemiji in energetski krizi močno povečali, in (3) geopolitična situacija se je zaradi geostrateške tehnološke vojne drastčno spremenila – Kitajska in ZDA subvencionirata razvoj novh “čistih” tehnologij, ki pa so v osnovi zelo umazane (proizvodnja baterij in panelov ter proizvodnja energije za njihovo proizvodnjo), medtem ko se EU foikusira brezogljične cilje in v procesu z visokimi ofljičnimi davki in cenami energije ubija konkurenčnost svoje industrije. Nature:

The Green Deal was predicated on three presumptions, each of which has not been borne out.

First, it was widely expected that a global carbon tax would emerge, and it has not. Most economists view carbon taxation as the optimal policy for pushing carbon-intensive industries to lower their emissions2. Carbon taxes also bring in revenue to help finance the green transition. Yet Europe now stands alone in implementing carbon pricing on a large scale.

However, most countries worldwide do not levy carbon taxes. And those that do put a relative value of at most a few dollars on each tonne of emitted carbon dioxide equivalent, once they have corrected for the many firms that are exempted. That low value doesn’t reflect the real damage done, now and in the future — the ‘social cost of carbon’3.

Why has carbon taxation not taken off? International coordination of climate policies has fallen victim to geopolitical fragmentation and technological rivalry. The United States and China are competing fiercely over green technologies — each has issued massive subsidies for research and development (R&D) and manufacturing in areas such as batteries, solar panels and wind power.

Second, the Green Deal was designed and adopted at a time when long-term interest rates were historically low or even negative in real terms, and when levels of public debt were moderate. These economic conditions were conducive to financing the massive investments necessary to accomplish the transition to net zero, especially electrification. The aim was also to extend financial support to help European populations to bear the early costs of the green transition4.

However, the post-pandemic environment is very different. Public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has soared in most advanced and European economies to more than 80%, on average. Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium have public-debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 100%. This will limit the possibilities for helping households to absorb the costs of the transition, and will force careful selection of public and green investments.

Third, geopolitical trends challenge the Green Deal. As currently designed, the deal impedes European competitiveness by increasing the cost of energy substantially, mainly to cover the cost of building infrastructure around renewables and decommissioning those around fossil fuels. Europe also depends heavily on external suppliers for ‘critical minerals’ — sources of elements such as lithium and cobalt — for renewable energy and other green technologies.

Like the United States, Europe is facing challenges from China — which has control of 60–80% of the world’s production and processing of critical minerals. China is also the biggest emitter of CO2, the largest producer of coal-based electricity and the world leader in batteries and electric vehicles. China’s strategy is to act as a monopolist with low pricing, undercutting others.

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Podnebni COP29: Kres prestižnega elitizma in ničevosti

Glavno sporočilo spodnjega članka o podnebni konferenci COP29:

Glavna ovira za doseganje naložbenih ciljev za omejitev globalnega segrevanja ni cena obnovljivih virov v primerjavi z energijo fosilnih goriv, pač pa donosnost obnovljivih virov v primerjavi s proizvodnjo fosilnih goriv. Tržne rešitve ne bodo delovale, ker zasebnim podjetjem preprosto ni donosno vlagati v blažitev podnebnih sprememb.

No, jaz bi k temu dodal dvoje. Prvič, večina ljudi, ki se ukvarjajo s podnebnimi spremembami, ne razume, da v njihovem modelu človeškega vpliva na povečanje CO2 izpustov ključno vlogo igra globalizacija svetovne trgovine. Ko smo proizvodnjo industrijskih izdelkov preselili v Azijo in na globalni Jug, smo v globalnem Severu nekoliko znižali izpuste CO2. Toda v Aziji in na jugu zdaj proizvajajo te izdelke bistveno bolj umazano (nižji okoljski srandardi) in za potrebno energijo za njihovo proizvodnjo dnevno odpirajo nove elektrarne na premog in plin, nato pa te izdelke na daleč najbolj umazan način s kontejnerskimi ladjami vozimo nazaj na Sever. Bistvo zgodbe je, da se bodisi odpovemo globalizaciji ali da manj razvite države, ki za nas proizvajajo vse izdelke, prepričamo, da energijo proizvajajo na bolj čist način in da izdelke k nam vozimo na bolj čist način.

In drugič, subvencije za obnovljive vire, ki povečujejo donosnost v njihove naložbe, ne delujejo in ne vodijo k vzdržnim rešitvam. Takoj, ko jih umaknemo ali zmanjšamo, donosmost “obnovljivih projektov” kolapsne, dolgoročno pa si nobena država ne more privoščiti v nedogled subvencionirati zasebna podjetja. Rešitev je treba iskati drugje – ne v sončnih in vetrnih elektrarnah, gromozanskih baterijah in zelenem vodiku, ker je ta koncept tehnično nevzdržen in ekstremno drag, pač pa v hidro in jedrski energiji, ki sta izdatna, stabilna, brezogljična, prijazna do okolja (glede na alternative) in dolgoročno daleč najcenejša vira. In ne potrebujeta nobenega subvencioniranja. Tu pa je treba angažirati javne finance, ki edine lahko zagotovijo nizko ceno financiranja. Zasebni kapital si bo hotel odrezati prevelik donos, zato pozabimo nanj pri teh ključnih strateških naložbah v prihodnost.

There was a tortuous and painful end to COP29, the international climate change conference held in oil-rich Baku, Azerbaijan. The main issue was how much would the rich countries hand over to the poor countries to pay for the measures to mitigate global warming and handle the damage caused by rising ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions. The finance target set was for more than $1.3trn a year by 2035. But the final deal was based on just $300bn in actual grants and low-interest loans from the developed world. The rest would have to come from private investors and perhaps levies on fossil fuels and frequent flyers – the details of which remained vague.

The offer from the ‘developed’ countries, funded from their national budgets and overseas aid, is supposed to form the inner core of a so-called ‘layered’ finance settlement, accompanied by a middle layer of new forms of finance such as new taxes on fossil fuels and high-carbon activities, carbon trading and ‘innovative’ forms of finance; and an outermost layer of investment from the private sector, into projects such as solar and windfarms. This was a ‘copout’ from providing real money transfers.

Mohamed Adow, director of the Power Shift Africa thinktank, said: “This [summit] has been a disaster for the developing world. It’s a betrayal of both people and planet, by wealthy countries who claim to take climate change seriously. Rich countries have promised to ‘mobilise’ some funds in the future, rather than provide them now. The cheque is in the mail. But lives and livelihoods in vulnerable countries are being lost now.”

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Skriti stroški elektrike iz sončnih elektrarn

Obvezno branje za “sončne ideologe”. John Schla na pedagoški način razloži dejansko ceno elektrike iz sončnih elektrarn. In ta v sončno privilegiranih ZDA seveda ni enaka ne subvencionirani LCOE v višini  34,66 $/MWh in tudi ne nesubvencionirani LCOE v višini 67,11 $/MWh. Problem sončne energije je, da je občasna. Da bi bila sončna energija enako zanesljiva kot jedrska, bi bilo treba njene kapacitete povečati na 4,21-kratnik porabe elektrike (zaradi variabilnosti proizvodnje) in dodati baterije za 55 ur delovanja ali namesto njih dodati plinsko elektrarno enake kapacitete kot jo imajo sončne elektrarne. Tak energetski sistem pa postane izjemno drag. Stroški elektrike iz sončnih elektrarn se s tem dvignejo na 488 $/MWh, z emisijami v življenjskem ciklu 120 g/kWh. Pa še to v ZDA, kjer je izkoristek sončnih elektrarn (capacity factor) v povprečju okrog 24 %, medtem ko je v Nemčiji zgolj 11 %. Za primerjavo – skupen strošek jedrske energije (brez dodatnih skritih stroškov kot pri elektriki iz sončnih elektrarn) je 66 $/MWh (nižje od proizvodne (LCOE) cene elektrike iz sončnih elektrarn in za več kot 7-krat nižji od polne cene elektrike iz sinčnih elektrarn), hkrati pa ima samo 5 g/kWh izpustov.

Zelo dolgo branje, vendar se splača.

Solar power is the fastest growing source of electrical energy in the US. In the last year solar power generation grew by 15.52%, followed by wind at 8.27%, then natural gas at 4.17%. Solar power has captured the imagination of many as way to get unlimited “free” energy from the sun. It has been declared the cheapest and cleanest form of electrical energy by mainstream scientists and thought leaders alike.

Solar power has a much higher energy density than wind power (~7 acres/MW vs. ~60 acres/MW). This means that solar power is more suitable for constructing micro grids as there is simply no space for wind power. Micro grids are an important concept because it is becoming more difficult to get new solar and wind farms connected to the grid. The viability of industry is highly dependent on the price of energy, so it is critical to understand the real cost of a solar micro grid.

To judge solar power, four criteria will be considered: cost, reliability, CO2 emissions, and land use. The purpose of this paper is to thoroughly understand these most relevant issues.

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Kako so ZDA izgubile vojno s Kitajsko pri solarnih panelih

David Fickling je v ponedeljek v Bloombergu objavil izvrstno analizo, kako so ameriška podjetja, ki so bila začetniki in imajo za seboj šest desetletij razvoja na področju solarnih panelov, v zadnjih petnajstih letih izgubile vojno s kitajskimi na področju proizvodnje solarnih panelov. Vendar zgodba ni takšna, kot nam jo poskušajo prodati ameriške administracije – da je kitajska vlada s subvencijami na nedovoljen način pomagala kitajskim podjetjem. Tako ameriška kot kitajska vlada sta subvencionirali razvoj solarne industrije. Zgodba je bolj enostavna – proizvodnja solarnih panelov je izjemno nedonosna in potrebuje velik obseg proizvodnje, da pokrije stroške. In samo kitajski trg je bil dovolj velik, da je omogočil tovrstne ekonomije obsega. Hkrati pa omogočil znižanje stroškov in cen panelov na sedanjo raven, s katero ne more konkurirati nihče, ki ni vložil v obseg proizvodnje podobne velikosti.

In seveda,uvedba carin na kitajske panele ne more rešiti problema nekonkurenčnosti ameriške solarne industrije. Le podražila bo panele in upočasnila instalacijo solarnih kapacitet. Ergo, carine bodo zgolj upočasnile boj proti podnebnim spremembam. Če so sončni paneli seveda sploh pravi način boja proti podnebnim spremembam, kot zatrjujejo njihovi ideološki podporniki. Toda če so, bodo carine samo upočasnile celoten proces.

Za tiste, ki se vam ne ljubi brati, je spodaj kratek video s ključnimi ugotovitvami. Ostali pa nadaljujte za tem z branjem kratkega povzetka, še bolje pa z originalnim člankom.

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