To pomeni zaprtje Bab El-Mandeb (prehoda v Rdeče morje), to pomeni 7 milijonov sodčkov/dan manj savdske nafte (ko bodo onesposobili savdski terminal Yanbu; leta 2019 so ga že) in to pomeni podaljšanje plovnih poti med Azijo in Evropo za 4 do 6 tednov.

Izrael ima zdaj odprte tri fronte: na severu Hezbolah, iz vzhoda Irana in na jugu Hutije. Pri čemer je ostal brez radarjev in so njegove kapacitete protizračne obrambe na kritičnem minimumu.

In Hutiji so žilavi. Pred tem so premagali koalicijske sile Savdske Arabije, ZAE in ostalih zalivskih držav in pred tem so prisilili Trumpa v premirje in umik ameriške vojaške flote. Poglejte spodnji zapis.

Houthis Are Back: How an Improvised Force Humiliated Regional and Global Powers

On March 27, 2026, the Houthis announced their entry into the ongoing war alongside Iran by launching ballistic missiles toward Israel, the first such direct involvement in the current conflict.

This move raises a deeper question:

what does it truly signify?

These Yemeni rebels have not only survived one of the largest Arab military coalitions in modern history but defeated it in humiliating fashion. They forced Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to retreat in panic once their vital infrastructure came under direct attack.

What began as an internal civil war in 2015 evolved into a global masterclass in asymmetric warfare, oriented by Iranian strategists.

Neither overwhelming air superiority, a total naval blockade, nor a Western-led fleet of nearly 30 warships with air support could silence Houthi launches.

Instead, the rebels absorbed years of intense bombing, preserved, and even expanded, their offensive capabilities, and fielded an Iranian-adapted arsenal sophisticated enough to threaten F-35 stealth fighters.

A growing portion of their weaponry is now assembled or manufactured locally in Yemen.

This resilience traces back to 2015 and the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, which intervened in Yemen’s civil war.

The coalition initially included ten countries led by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It deployed more than 185 combat aircraft (including F-15s, F-16s, Eurofighters, and Mirages), mobilized around 150,000 ground troops (with significant Sudanese contingents), enforced a complete naval blockade, and received logistical and intelligence support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

On paper, it was one of the most formidable Arab military forces assembled in decades.

Yet the coalition failed. The rugged, mountainous terrain of northern Yemen favored Houthi guerrilla tactics and ambushes, while low-cost Iranian-supplied drones and missiles turned billion-dollar targets into easy prey.

The Houthis did not need to win conventional battles, they simply needed to strike where it hurt most. And they did.

US Seeking “End” to its Own War on Iran Will Lead to a “Pause” at Best.

The primary long-term goal of the US is toppling Iran and stopping the flow of energy from Iran and the rest of the region to China.

The US will settle temporarily for destroying as much of Iran’s military and civilian infrastructure as possible within the operational window US munition stockpiles allow just as it did last year.

The US can still impose a blockade on Iranian-approved shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during and then continuing after the end of this phase of the ongoing war.

The US will simply pause, reorganize, rearm, and prepare for the next phase – just like the US did to attack, degrade, destabilize, and eventually defeat Iraq from the 1990s to 2003, or Syria from 2011 to 2024 or the previous US attack on Iran just last year leading to this attack taking place now.

In other words, a failure at this juncture, or following last year’s attacks on Iran, does not mean a failure overall.

US claims of seeking to end its war on Iran could also simply be a distraction ahead of greater escalation still – the US could pose as “ending” its hostilities only to have its proxy Israel cite “US abandonment” as a pretext for up to and including the use of nuclear weapons against Iran helping further shape events favoring a US-preferred outcome while affording the US plausible deniability.

A potential US success in Iran will put in danger the remaining members of the multipolar world – US success anywhere means greater danger for everyone everywhere;

This process will continue indefinitely until the US succeeds or multipolarism finally displaces/neutralizes US unipolar hegemony and the means by which it threatens the multipolar world.

Iran and the rest of the world will only be safe when the US is not only no longer attacking Iran and other nations, but no longer has credible capabilities to do so – either because they have been significantly degraded, and/or because the multipolar world’s ability to defend itself has significantly expanded.

Iz moje PPT prezentacije pred dnevi:

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Tako izgleda zmaga po Trumpovo. In to je šele začetek

Dream team za doskusijo tega konflikta. Mearsheimer je globalna zvezda, Trita Parsi pa je (kot Iranec) najboljši poznavalec iranske situacije in zaradi svoje pozicije v ZDA eden najbolj pogostih gostov zahodnih medijev. V zadnjih tednih ga je videti povsod.

Parsi je doktoriral na Johns Hopkins University, ustanovil National Iranian American Council ter kasneje sodeloval pri ustanovitvi Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, kjer je podpredsednik. V svojih knjigah in javnih nastopih zagovarja diplomacijo, zmanjševanje napetosti in realistično razumevanje geopolitičnih interesov velikih sil. Parsi je bil pred to vojno izrazit kritik vojaških rešitev v odnosu do Irana in dosledno opozarjal, da bi vojna z Iranom imela katastrofalne regionalne in globalne posledice. Namesto eskalacije je podpiral obnovo jedrskega sporazuma (JCPOA), dialog in postopno gradnjo zaupanja med Iranom in ZDA. No, po začetku te vojne je jasno, da je ta vlak odpeljal in Parsi pravi, da so se pogajalske pozicije dramatično izbopljšale in da bodo ZDA morale pristati na ukinitev sankcij in vojaški umik iz regije.

Trumpa so že vsi pogruntali. Iranski oficirji se na TV odkrito norčujejo iz njegovega vzorca eskalacijske / deeskalacijske retorike. Trump, kar se tiče njegove in Netanyahujeve zasebne vojne proti Iranu, vedno retorično eskalira po zaprtju finančnih trgov (običajno pred vikendom), nato pa pred odprtjem finančnih trgov (običajno v ponedeljek) spet retorično deeskalira, da borzne kotacije ne bi padle in da terminske cene nafte ne bi porasle. Spodnja slika iz Financial Timesa lepo ilustrira ta vzorec.

Drugače rečeno, Trump je zelo glasen, ko to nima finančnih posledic za njega in njegovo druščino. Oziroma vse dela z namenom maksimiranja finančnih koristi zase in njegovo druščino.

Toda vzorec Trumpovih preobratov je še globlji. Na finančnih trgih se je v zadnjem času uveljavila anekdotična ideja o tako imenovanih »TACO momentih« (TACO = Trump Always Chickens Out) – trenutkih, ko politični pritisk in tržni signali prisilijo Trumpa v spremembo retorike ali konkretnih ukrepov. Kar se je sprva zdelo kot neformalna interpretacija njegovega vodenja politike, je zdaj dobilo tudi bolj strukturirano analitično obliko. In sicer, ekonomist Maximilian Uleer, eden izmed strategistov pri Deutsche Bank, je namreč razvil t. i. »pressure index«, ki naj bi služil kot približek za napovedovanje prihodnjih političnih prilagoditev Trumpa. TACO indeks kaže, kdaj se bo Trump umaknil oziroma sprejel odločitev, ki negira njegovo prejšnjo odločitev pod vplivom bolečine – kombinacije političnih, makroekonomskih in tržnih pritiskov.

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