Trump in zahodni politiki dajejo Ukrajini prazne obljube. Zgolj besede brez mesa. Obljube, ki jih ne morejo uresničiti.

Trump deceived again: Europe has big problems sending Patriots to Ukraine  The Patriot SAM from Germany for Ukraine will be ready only in 6-8 months, Bild writes citing a source in the German government.  Initially, it was planned that Washington would transfer air defense systems to Ukraine from its own reserves, and Germany would pay for their replenishment. However, Trump stated that the US Army cannot give up a single unit. Europe must provide air defense from its own arsenals.

Thus, the publication writes, paying for weapons for Ukraine is not enough. Europe must dismantle its own stockpiles and order replacements from the American defense industry. At the same time, Europe is short of air defense. Closed negotiations have been going on for several days about who can help Ukraine.

Currently, according to Bild, a decision is being formed: Switzerland is moving back in the queue for Patriot systems. The first unit will be sent not to Bern, but to Ukraine – at Germany’s expense. But the system is still being finalized by the American company Raytheon and will be ready no earlier than in 6-8 months.

Vir: Simplicius

Tudi zato se je Ukrajini začelo muditi z nadaljevanjem prekinjenih pogajanj z Rusijo. Rusiji pa ne tako zelo. Prvič, ker se Ukrajina ne more nadejati nobene resne pomoči od zahodnih držav v doglednem času (resnici na ljubo ji tudi Patriot protizračni sistemi niso mogli pomagati doslej in ji ne morejo nič bolj pomagati v prihodnje, boljšega napadalnega orožja ne bo dobila in četudi bi ga dobila, ne bi imela uspsobljenih vojakov za upravljanje z njimi). Zahodne države nimajo s čim pomagati Ukrajini, razen da začnejo neposredno vojno z Rusijo. Tega pa si ne upajo tvegati. Ker so pač ruske rakete bistveno hitrejše od zahodnih. In drugič, ker je Ukrajina danes v najslabšem pogajalskem položaju v zadnjih treh letih in pol. Jutri bo še v slabšem. In kot sem v zadnjih letih napisal že neštetokrat – z vsakim dnem vojne je pogajalski položaj Ukrajine slabši in Ukrajina manjša.

Nadaljujte z branjem→

Kot vedno dobro poučeni Seymour Hersh:

In fall of 2023, Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in chief of the country’s armed forces, gave an interview to the Economist and declared the war with Russia had become a “stalemate.” It took three months for President Volodymyr Zelensky to fire him. The general, who is the most popular public figure in Ukraine, was named ambassador to London a month later and has served there with distinction, if quietly.

Zaluzhnyi is now seen as the most credible successor to Zelensky. I have been told by knowledgeable officials in Washington that that job could be his within a few months. Zelensky is on a short list for exile, if President Donald Trump decides to make the call. If Zelensky refuses to leave his office, as is most likely, an involved US official told me: “He’s going to go by force. The ball is in his court.” There are many in Washington and in Ukraine who believe that the escalating air war with Russia must end soon, while there’s still a chance to make a settlement with its president, Vladimir Putin.

There are indications that Zelensky knows what is coming. He has just shifted or fired three officials: the minister of defense, the prime minister, and the ambassador to the United States. As the US official told me, Zelensky “is beginning to read the danger signs.”

What happens next, the official added, in terms of political violence inside Kiev and elsewhere, depends largely “on the degree to which the population has reached the point where they have no other choice. Zelensky will not go willingly but feet first. Herein lies a US internal debate. Smart side says let the Ukrainians sort it out by themselves and not get the CIA involved to seal the deal. So far, good sense drives the policy. But some unnamed leaders are impatient and this will take time—more than fifty days.”

Vir: Seymour Hersh

In ko to rečejo šefi v Washingtonu, se nenadoma vsi mediji čredno zaženejo v Zelenskega in ga raztrgajo. Po tem, ko so ga tri leta in pol branili na vse pretege in mu oproščali naciste, totalitarizem in milijardno korupcijo. Le kdo neki vleče te niti v medijih? 

Mlajše generacije morda tega ne vedo. Problem pa je, da so starejše generacije, ki so to vedele in se tega zavedale, izumrle.

Ruska vojaška taktika temelji na obkolitvi – na oblikovanju žepa, v katerega privabijo vse nasprotnikove okrepitve, nato pa v zaprtju žepa in presekanju dobavnih poti ter na koncu na usklajenem postopnem napadanju z vseh strani do bridkega konca (t.i. mesoreznica). S pridom jo uporabljajo tudi v sedanji vojni izčrpavanja  v Ukrajini. 

Zadnje mesto v seriji je Pokrovsk, ki bo padel tekom poletja.  Glejte spodnji zemljevid. Zanimivo je, da vsi padejo na to rusko finto, da gojijo iluzije, da je mogoče zdržati obrambo v ruskem žepu, namesto da bi se pravočasno umaknili.

Lani se je The Japan Times razpisal o tveganjih za nacionalno varnost, ki naj bi jih predstavljale kitajske globalne pristaniške naložbe. Pri tem je izpostavil dva anekdotična primera. Prvi se nanaša na to, da. naj bi (menda) kitajski operater pristanišča v Gdansku sprva zavrnil pristanek ladje z vojaško opremo, drugi pa na to, da nja bi (spet menda) kitajski operater pristanišča v Pireju od grške vlade izposloval relaksacijo sankcij, ki veljajo za rusko floto. Kitajska vlada naj bi, v skladu s strategijo Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) iz 2023 vlaganja v pristaniško in drugo infrastrukturo izkoriščala za

Članek seveda zaključi, da je “agresivno prizadevanje Pekinga” za izgradnjo in razvoj infrastrukture v tujih državah lahko problematično, ker podjetjem, ki upravljajo te objekte, “omogoča uveljavljanje interesov kitajske vlade namesto interesov držav gostiteljic.” Ter seveda, da naj bi tudi evropske države “varnostno pregledale” te kitajske investicije in da ne bi smele pasti na finto, da bi interes dobrih odnosov s Kitajsko prevagal nad varnostnimi interesi držav.

If true, this is the first evidence of a problem long anticipated: Aggressive efforts by Beijing to build and develop infrastructure in foreign countries that allows the companies operating those facilities to advance Chinese government interests rather than those of the host nations. While considerable attention has focused on the dangers associated with a Chinese role in national telecommunications grids, equally worrisome is a presence in conventional infrastructure, such as transportation hubs like ports.

…

National security reviews will come to nothing, however, if political authorities decide that good relations with China prevail over other considerations, as the German chancellor concluded this spring after reviewing COSCO’s planned purchase of a minority share in the port of Hamburg. Recent events in Gdynia might be grounds for a reassessment.

Nadaljujte z branjem→

Kdor pozna sodobno kitajsko ekon-poliitčno strategijo ali kdor je vsaj bral The House of Huawei, mu je jasno, da je ameriška strategija omejevanja kitajskega tehnološkega razvoja vnaprej obsojena na propad. Kitajska oblast preprosto določi strateške prioritete, ki jih največja podjetja morajo spoštovati (Huaweijeva preusmeritev v mobilno telefonijo in v razvoj čipov je tipičen primer), pri čemer so deležna finančne podpore (kreditne linije za financiranje razvoja, širitev proizvodnje in prevzeme), v te prioritete pa se nato preusmerijo tudi nova podjetja.

To je zahodnjakom tuje, ker stavijo samo na tržne impulze. Toda tržni impulzi so slabo vodilo, če država zelo zaostaja v nekih segmentih, zato je potrebna državna strateška intervencija. In Kitajska to počne perfektno. Pri nas pa se moramo tega spet priučiti.

Nadaljujte z branjem→

Andrew Korybko

His threatened secondary sanctions could majorly backfire by harming the US’ own interests.

The “major statement” on Russia that Trump earlier hyped up turned out to be a clumsy attempt to thread the needle between radically escalating US involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict and walking away from it. His new three-pronged approach includes: 1) the rapid dispatch of up to 17 Patriot missile systems to Ukraine; 2) more arms sales to NATO countries who’ll in turn transfer them to Ukraine; and 3) up to 100% secondary sanctions on Russia’s trading partners if a peace deal isn’t reached in 50 days.

In the order that they were mentioned, each corresponding move is aimed at: 1) bolstering Ukraine’s air defenses in order to decelerate the pace of Russia’s continual on-the-ground gains; 2) helping Ukraine reconquer some of its lost land; and 3) coercing China and India into pressuring Russia into a ceasefire. The first two goals are self-explanatory, with the second being unrealistic given the failure of Ukraine’s much more heavily armed counteroffensive in summer 2023, while the third requires some elaboration.

Nadaljujte z branjem→