Politična pokrajina (tudi) v Evropi se hitro spreminja. “Skrajna” desnica je na pohodu (v empirični analizi, ki jo delava s kolegom, se pokaže, da sta glavna dejavnika njenega porasta povečana neenakost (manj socialne države) in povečan delež tujerodnega prebivalstva, kar povzroča frustracije naraščajočemu deležu domačega prebivalstva). Vprašanje pa je, ali se – za razliko od socialistov – “skrajna” desnica lahko poenoti na evropski ravni (praktično: se eni rasisti lahko odpovejo svoji apriorni superiornosti nad drugimi rasisti?).

Spodnji intervju z Maximillianom Krahom iz nemške AfD ter dober Bertrandov komentar o fundamentalnih razlikah med nemško AfD in francosko RN odpirata pomembne perspektive.

Absolutely fascinating to read how profoundly different the AfD is to France’s Rassemblement National (RN).

The two key differences that I can see are:

1. The AfD, or at least @KrahMax, openly calls for a multipolar world order. RN, on the other hand, is for continued Western hegemony.

2. The AfD recognizes that attempting to convert other cultures to “Western values” should be abandoned. From the interview: “We must abandon the idea that the whole world must follow the same political and legal culture. Asia has its traditions, and they should govern themselves accordingly. The same goes for the Islamic world. Let Muslims follow their own order without trying to impose Western values on them. So, the first step is to accept that major regions in the world should govern themselves by their own ideas of political and legal order.” The RN on the other hand is course Western Supremacy par excellence, establishing a hierarchical order between cultures, with very little respect for other cultures, and even open hatred.

In fact Krah openly recognizes these differences in the interview: “Unfortunately, the European right is completely divided. You have a part of the European right, which in my view is the majority, that has a Cold War thinking, which has more to do with the 1980s than with 2024. So for them, international politics is not about the shift of power from the Atlantic to the Global South, etc. They still believe in the old rhetoric of war between the free world against the world of darkness. They are deep state agents when it comes to foreign policy, even more sometimes than the Socialists. We have a move to the right when it comes to questions of migration, etc, etc. But the front lines are completely different when it comes to foreign and global policy. And there we don’t have a shift to the right. Unfortunately.”

Funnily enough, listening to his positions Krah in a French context is much closer to a Mélenchon… Although undoubtedly their views on immigration would differ widely.

Anyhow this is why the broad brush “extreme right” makes very little sense. There are some absolutely fundamental and immense differences between these different parties’ positions.

Vir: Arnaud Bertrand

Vladimir Putin:

The danger for Europe does not come from Russia. The main threat to Europeans lies in the critical and ever-growing, now practically total dependence on the US: in military, political, technological, ideological, and informational spheres. Europe is increasingly being sidelined in global economic development, plunged into chaos by migration and other acute problems, and deprived of international subjectivity and cultural identity.

Sometimes it seems that ruling European politicians and eurobureaucrats are more afraid of falling out of favor with Washington than losing the trust of their own people, their own citizens. Recent elections to the European Parliament also show this. European politicians swallow humiliation, rudeness, and scandals involving surveillance of European leaders, while the US simply uses them for its own interests: making them buy expensive gas – incidentally, gas in Europe is three to four times more expensive than in the US – or, as now, demanding European countries increase arms supplies to Ukraine. By the way, there are constant demands here and there. And sanctions are imposed on them, on economic operators in Europe. Imposed without any hesitation.

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V vednost. Splača se pazljivo prebrati. Sploh konture in načela potrebne nove varnostne arhitekture v Evraziji.

Putin’s Full Speech: BRICS, NATO Expansion and Ukraine Peace Talk Conditions

Last year the Canadian intelligence analyst Patrick Armstrong published this sound advice:

“LISTEN TO WHAT HE’S SAYING”

I’m fond of quoting the Duke of Wellington on intelligence:

All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don’t know by what you do; that’s what I called ‘guessing what was at the other side of the hill.’

“Find out what you don’t know by what you do“. It’s not easy, it’s not necessarily pleasant but it’s what you have to do in order to minimise your surprise when whatever it is actually comes over the hill at you.

Here’s former British Ambassador to Russia Laurie Bristowsaying the same thing:

My advice to all young diplomats and analysts [is that] if you want to understand Mr Putin’s foreign policy, listen to what he’s saying. You won’t like it, but you need to understand it, you need to listen to it. The place to start is the Munich speech in 2007.

“Listen to what he says”. It’s quite easy to. Putin has said a lot and most of it appears on the Presidential website in English as well as the original Russian. Never read what the Western reporters say he says – they almost always distort it – read the original. I’m sure that both Wellington and Bristow would agree.

And that’s what intelligence is all about. Try and understand how the other guy sees things.

Every few years Putin comes out with a speech or memorandum which explains – past, presence and future –  and argues for the position at large Russia is taking.

People who read these speeches will understand Russia. People who don’t won’t.

The later will miss the facts and come to false conclusions. Acting upon those they will weaken their own positions.

One can avoid doing so by reading Putin’s latest speech held yesterday at the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is quite long but has to be so as it necessarily touches on everything. It includes a kind of peace offer for Ukraine: Hand over the provinces Russia has recognized at its own and gain peace. It was and is not expected that the ‘West’ will move towards that direction. In consequence the aims of the war will have to change.

With nearly 10,000 words the speech is very long. No summarization will do it justice. I therefore urge you to read it in full.

The English language version was published in full by Sputnik. The authoritative official translation, which will soon appear on the Kremlin website, is not yet complete. As access to both sides may be limited a full copy of the speech is attached below.

What follows is a full reproduction of the English language version Sputnik put out.

Putin’s Full Speech at Foreign Ministry: BRICS, NATO Expansion and Ukraine Peace Talk Conditions – Friday, June 15 2024

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Tule je današnji ruski predlog glede “zaustavitve ognja” v Ukrajini. Ki seveda ne bo niti obravnavan na nasprotni strani in pri njenih sponzorjih. Pa čeprav je blizu temu, kar bo (zelo verjetno) nekoč tudi uveljavljeno v obliki uradnega mirovnega sporazuma. Ampak do takrat bo preteklo še nekaj vode. In se ne bo zgodilo, dokler Ukrajini ne bo zmanjkalo za orožje sposobnih moških. Takšne so pač zakonitosti vojne izčrpavanja med veliko in majhno državo.

Spodaj pa je finska izkušnja z vojno z Rusijo iz leta 1939 in s kakšnim sporazumom se je vojna končala.

Ni se treba strinjati ne z enim in ne drugim. Velja pa poznati.

Finland and Russia (Soviet Union) fought two wars between 1939 and 1944, where Finland eventually lost 12% of her landmass. First was an aggression by the Russian side and the second from Finland.

The aggression of Russia in the fall 1939 was based on the secret amendment of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, where Finland was placed on the “sphere of influence” of Russia. Russian leadership staged a ‘false flag’ attack, of Finland to Russia, in the village of Mainila.

Four days later, on 30 November 1939, Russia attacked Finland with an overwhelming force (in some parts of the front the ratio was 10:1 for Russia).

Finland kept her independence in the “Miracle of Winter War”, but lost 11% of her territory. War ended on 12 March 1940.

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Andrew Korybko

Wednesday’s meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg saw the two leaders reach an agreement on the bloc’s military aid to Ukraine. Hungary won’t oppose NATO’s decisions in this regard like it briefly did the EU’s in exchange for NATO not forcing Hungary to participate in a conventional intervention there, allow its territory to be used to facilitate that, and fund the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Simply put, they agreed to disagree and not interfere in the other’s affairs.

While some observers abroad who are favorable towards Orban might be disappointed by this, they’d do well to reflect on how unrealistic it was for them to imagine that he alone could stop NATO’s plans. The Hungarian leader has become a cult hero among Western dissidents who oppose the bloc’s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine after bravely warning over the past two years about how irresponsible and dangerous this policy is. His strongly worded statements perfectly channeled their views on this issue.

Nevertheless, he’s ultimately just one man in charge of a comparatively small country whose role in this proxy war is overshadowed by nearby Poland’s and neighboring Romania’s. It was therefore impossible for him to throw a wrench in NATO’s plans and all that he could ever hope for at best was to get public guarantees that Hungary wouldn’t be drawn into this imbroglio. That’s precisely what he received on Wednesday, which Stoltenberg gave him in an attempt to improve the bloc’s reputation.  

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Slovenski NEPN, ki se zgleduje po nemškem energetskem modelu, temelji na predpostavki, da bomo v prihodnje povečali učinkovitost rabe energije (URE),zaradi česar se bo poraba energije lahko zmanjšala. No, realno življenje je drugačno. Dejansko imamo opravka s paradoksom, da se s povečanjem učinkovitosti rabe energije njena poraba še dodatno (praktično linearno) povečuje. Ta paradoks je odkril britanski ekonomist Williams Jevons leta 1865, ko je napisal knjigo o tem, da bo V. Britaniji zmanjkalo premoga, in to prav zaradi povečane učinkovitosti strojev. Paradoks je v tem, da bolj kot so naprave, ki jih uporabljamo, energetsko učinkovite, bolj povečujemo njihovo uporabo in jih širimo v vedno širše polje uporabe. Denimo, če so računalniki postali milijardokrat bolj učinkoviti, se ni za toliko zmanjšala njihova poraba energije, pač pa smo za milijardokrat povečali uporabo računalnikov, ki so danes vsepovsod, od podatkovnih centrov do avtomobilov in pametnih telefonov.

(In mimogrede, podoben paradoks se dogaja pri lastnikih samooskrbnih sončnih elektrarn: namesto da bi prišlo do zmanjšanja njihove porabe elektrike iz omrežja, se ta po namestitvi sončnih elektrarn še povečuje. Za polnjenje e-avtov, za toplotne črpalke in nasploh bolj razkošne porabe elektrike, ki je “zastonj”)

Spodaj je nekaj odlomkov iz odličnega zapisa Blaira Fixa, ki dokazuje, da Jevonsov paradoks glede učinkovitosti / rabe energije ne velja samo za človeško aktivnost pri uporabi tehnologije, da za to ni kriv samo kapitalizem, ampak da gre za lastnost vseh živih bitij. Z eno izjemo – bakterije, ki so omejene s svojo velikostjo. Iz tega Fix, ki verjame, da so fosilni viri omejeni, izpelje trditev, da je namesto spodbujanja povečevanja učinkovitosti naprav za izkoriščanje toplotne energije fosilnih goriv, potrebno povsem zmanjšati podpore v ta namen in jih nameniti za spodbujanje izkoriščanja, ja, uganili ste, obnovljivih virov energije. Ja, Fix navija za “odrast”. Padel je sicer v isto past kot ostali “odrastniki”, ki ciljajo na zmanjšanje potrošnje ob hkratnem naslanjanju na vire energije z ekstremno nizko gostoto energije, ki so hkrati nestanovitni ter odvisni od vremena (solarne in vetrne elektrarne), namesto denimo na jedrsko energijo, ki ima gromozansko energetsko gostoto.

Ampak pustimo zdaj to. Fixov zapis je zelo zanimiv zaradi odpiranja enega izmed ključnih vprašanj sedanjosti in bodočega razvoja – koliko energije bomo potrebovali in kako jo bomo najbolj učinkovito in planetu prijazno pridobili.

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Drago Babič

V javni obravnavi je zadnja verzija posodobitve Nacionalnega energetsko podnebnega načrta, ki bo usmerjal naše aktivnosti na področju energetike do leta 2030 s pogledom do leta 2040. V energetiki se načrtuje najmanj za 10 let vnaprej, zato je obdobje do leta 2030 prekratko, da bi zajelo vse nujne aktivnosti za doseganje podnebne nevtralnosti v energetiki do leta 2050.  Potreben bo bolj ambiciozen pogled v prihodnost, najmanj v leto 2033, ko naj bi TEŠ prenehala s proizvodnjo elektrike iz premoga, in nato še v leto 2042, ko naj bi prenehala proizvodnja v Nuklearni elektrarni Krško. Ob tem moramo računati, da se bo poraba električne energije v tem obdobju podvojila, predvsem zaradi nadomeščanja fosilnih goriv z električno energijo.

Ta dolgoročni pogled je v gradivu premalo izražen, preveč poudarka je na podrobnem navajanju kratkoročnih aktivnosti do leta 2030. Gradivo je preobsežno za namen krovnega dokumenta, zaradi obsežnega navajanja podrobnosti se izgubljajo glavne usmeritve, ki so ponekod vprašljive. Zdi se, da so avtorji zaradi ukvarjanja s posameznimi drevesi izgubili (pogled na) gozd. Osnovno gradivo bi moralo biti krajše in naj bi vsebovalo glavne usmeritve, podrobnosti pa bi se morale obdelati v Strokovnih prilogah.

Glavna pomanjkljivost gradiva je ideološki pristop namesto znanstvenega. Vnaprej se arbitrarno določijo cilji razogljičenja energetike, vključno z doseganjem deleža OVE v skupni koriščeni energiji, in cilji zmanjševanja porabe različnih vrst energije, ki ne izvirajo iz znanstveno ugotovljenih izhodišč in ukrepov. Zato lahko upravičeno pričakujemo, da ti cilji ne bodo doseženi ali pa bodo povzročili predrago oskrbo z energijo, z energetsko revščino prebivalstva in deindustrializacijo gospodarstva. To bo povzročilo splošno gospodarsko nazadovanje, kot se sedaj dogaja  v Nemčiji.

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Hiter komentar na odločitev Evropske komisije o uvedbi višjih (in diferenciranih) carin na uvoz kitajskih e-avtomobilov:

Najprej je treba pričakovati, da se bo Kitajska pričakovano (zaradi ohranjanja kredibilnosti) odzvala s povišanjem carin na evropske avte in druge proizvode (grozila je z uvedbo carin na evropska letala, francoski konjak in živilske izdelke). (običajno se, zaradi pokritja v WTO pravilih, povračilne carine uvedejo na enak obseg trgovine, kot je bil prizadet z enostransko uvedbo zaščitnih ukrepov nasprotne strani).

V posledici bo prišlo do relokacije evropske proizvodnje tradicionalnih avtov za kitajski trg v Kitajsko in (zgolj) delne relokacije kitajskih e-avtov za EU trg v EU.

Vendar to zaradi nižjih stroškov proizvodnje v Kitajski pomeni nižje cene za kitajske potrošnike in višje cene za evropske kot bi bilo brez teh carin.

Prizadeti bodo predvsem nemški proizvajalci avtomobilov (in zaposlenost v nemški avtomobilski industriji), francoski pa bolj malo, ker niso veliki izvozniki v Kitajsko. Zato je še včeraj Politico pisal o trenjih med Berlinom in Parizom, kjer so v prvem navijali za izenačitev 15 % kitajskih carin (dvig EU carin iz 10 % na 15 %), v Parizu pa za drastične več kot 30 % carine.

Hkrati je treba gledati še tri učinke. Prvi je, kakšen bo neto učinek relokacije evropske in kitajske proizvodnje avtov zaradi carin. Ta je odvisen predvsem od uravnoteženosti obsega uvoženih avtomobilov in od delovne intenzivnosti avtomobilske proizvodnje. Denimo, če bi bila brez carin uvoz in izvoz avtov med EU in Kitajsko izenačena in če bi bila delovna intenzivnost proizvodnje enaka, bi bili neto učinki na zaposlenost in davke majhni. Ob izravnani trgovini in če bi kitajska podjetja v Evropo prinesla popolno robotizacijo proizvodnje avtov (kot jo imajo v Kitajski), pa bi v EU bili negativni učinki na zaposlenost in proračun precej večji, saj bi izgubili več delovnih mest, s tem pa tudi davčnih prilivov in hkrati morali plačevati nadomestila za brezposlenost.

Drugi učinek je, ali bodo zaradi carin evropski proizvajalci e-avtov bolj konkurenčni? Ne, ker so tehnološko zaostali in ker stroškovno drastično zaostajajo.

Tretji učinek pa je, da carine na kitajske e-avte pomenijo višje cene in počasnejši prehod na e-avte v EU. Iz vidika boja proti podnebnim spremembam to vsekakor ni ohrabrujoče. Pred časom je Dani Rodrik iz Harvarda v Project Syndicate svaril pred tem učinkom. Ampak geopolitika ima seveda absolutno prednost pred drugimi cilji.

Odličen, zelo poveden skeč

… bi za 73 % bolj znižala izpuste CO2 in izdatki bi bili za polovico nižji. Tako izhaja iz pravkar objavljene študije, ki jo je objavil Jan Emblemsvåg v International Journal of Sustainable Energy. Te ugotovitve potrjujejo ugotovitve analize za Slovenijo, ki sva jo naredila s kolego Babičem (polna verzija v fazi objave). Zgolj s sončnimi in vetrnimi elektrarnami ni mogoče bistevno znižati CO2 izpustov (ker potrebujejo nadomestne kapacitete v obliki fleksibilnih elektrarn na plin ali premog), medtem ko je s kombinacijo hidro in jedrske energije ter nekaj sončnih / ali vetrnih elektrarn (max do 15 %) mogoče doseči razogljičenje proizvodnje električne energije, hkrati pa so potrebne investicije za polovico nižje kot v primeru čistega OVE koncepta.

Kako dolgo bodo politiki in politični funkcionarji še ignorirali stroko in znanost?

Germany has one of the most ambitious energy transition policies dubbed ‘Die Energiewende’ to replace nuclear- and fossil power with renewables such as wind-, solar- and biopower. The climate gas emissions are reduced by 25% in the study period of 2002 through 2022. By triangulating available information sources, the total nominal expenditures are estimated at EUR 387 bn, and the associated subsidies are some EUR 310 bn giving a total nominal expenditures of EUR 696 bn. Alternatively, Germany could have kept the existing nuclear power in 2002 and possibly invest in new nuclear capacity.

…

Thus, this paper poses the simple question – what if Germany had spent their money on nuclear power and not followed their policy from 2002 through 2022 (20 years); would Germany have achieved more emission reductions and lower expenses? To answer this research question requires first an assessment of the results of the German policy covering the period of 2002 through 2022 to establish a baseline. Then, two choices occur that could have been dealt with independently given Germany’s long nuclear history and competence – (1) to keep existing NPPs running, and/or (2) to invest in new NPPs. As noted, Germany has opted out of both these choices and invested in VREs, which makes the case particularly interesting.

…

The analysis of these two alternatives shows that Germany could have reached its climate gas emission target by achieving a 73% cut in emissions on top of the achievements in 2022 and simultaneously cut the spending in half compared to Energiewende. Thus, Germany should have adopted an energy policy based on keeping and expanding nuclear power.

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