Since the brutal Hamas attack on October 7 nearly a year ago, Israel has consistently demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in its fight against Hamas’s regional backers, including Iran and Hezbollah. Over the last year, Israel has targeted leaders in both Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), systematically killing hundreds of top operatives. It steadily degraded Hezbollah and Iran, judging that although both would maintain low-level conflict, neither wanted a full-scale war with Israel. Domestic dynamics encouraged Israel’s operations, too. Many Israelis feel that a return to the pre–October 7 status quo would be unacceptable. A key lesson from the attacks was that Israel could no longer afford merely to manage and contain the threats on its borders. It would need decisive military wins—regardless of the costs.

Israeli leaders thus became highly motivated to restore the country’s shattered deterrence and the aura of invincibility punctured by Hamas’s attack. Unable to definitively defeat Hamas in Gaza, Israel may see more opportunity in the fight against Hezbollah and Iran. Its military has spent years preparing for a fight on the northern front and, as recent Israeli attacks in Iran and Lebanon have demonstrated, its intelligence services have extensively penetrated both Iranian and Hezbollah networks.

In the current escalatory environment, U.S. and international efforts to encourage a diplomatic settlement to the war in Lebanon or Gaza are unlikely to succeed, even as calls for a cease-fire have become still more urgent in the face of the new direct confrontation between Israel and Iran. But at the moment Israel is not seeking a diplomatic off-ramp; it is looking for total victory. Adding to the strategic calculations are political considerations that link Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival to continued wars that seem only to boost his popularity and the stability of his governing coalition.

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After a year of war, there is a real possibility of no better “day after” in Gaza or the rest of the region. Talk in Washington of capitalizing on Nasrallah’s death and Iran’s weakness to “reshape” the Middle East harks back to the misguided beliefs that drove the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to disastrous effect. Continued military conflict harms the region, and it harms U.S. interests. Without a change in the current Israeli government, Israel and its neighbors could be moving toward a very different day after: Israeli reoccupation of Gaza and potentially even of southern Lebanon, as well as reinforced control over, if not annexation of, the West Bank. This is a recipe not for victory but for perpetual war.

…

The other potential path toward full-scale war was a change in strategic calculus—that one of the powers involved would see greater value in waging a war than in avoiding one. This is the mindset that led Israel to scale up its attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although Iran and Hezbollah appeared to believe that a low-grade conflict with Israel was manageable as long as Israel was preoccupied in Gaza, Israel’s calculus had already shifted as its attention increasingly turned north during the summer.

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Israel has been willing to go to great lengths to weaken Hezbollah and Iran, and it has already made significant strides on those fronts. But the war in Gaza and increased militarization in the West Bank raises the question of how far Israel is prepared to go in the Palestinian territories. The past year suggests that Netanyahu’s government is aiming for nothing less than the creation of a new reality on all of Israel’s borders.

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If these operations continue, Israel could, by design or by default, end up reoccupying parts or all of Gaza, the West Bank, and even southern Lebanon. Needless to say, this is a far darker day after than many envisioned. But it is a real possibility with potentially dire repercussions. Reoccupations would threaten Israel’s longer-term security, quash Palestinian aspirations for independence and dignity, and destabilize the entire region.

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Such an endgame appears more likely by the day. But it cannot bring the long-term security Israel seeks. Instead, it would leave Israel locked in a cycle of war and global isolation, dragging the United States with it.

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Bidnov mandat bo šel v zgodovino po njegovi katastrofalno konfliktni zunanji politiki: sprovociranje vojne v Ukrajini, provociranje vojne okrog Tajvana, spoznoriranje izraelskega masakra in genocida nad Palestinci v Gazi, sponzoriranje vojne s Hezbolahom v Libanonu in provociranje vojne z Iranom. Je bil kateri ameriški predsednik bolj konflikten?

Israel is now tempted to risk an all out war with Iran. There is little chance that such a war would achieve anything but an all out war in the Middle East, a rapid increase in oil prices and a severe hit on the Democratic chances in the ongoing election campaign.

Iran, who’s ballistic missiles had no problems in passing Israels air defenses, has threatened an all out attack on Israel’s infrastructure – electricity and gas installations as well as harbors – should Israel attempt to take revenge against Iran.

U.S. media still spreading the myth that the Biden administration is trying to hold back Israel.

The Washington Post for example headlines:

Biden works to limit conflict as Mideast edges closer to all-out war

However the piece admits that some views disagree strongly with its headline:

American officials say they are encouraging Israel to respond in a measured way, but U.S. allies in Europe are concerned that Washington is not putting sufficient pressure on the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Our understanding is the Americans are not holding them back,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive military matter.Further down it comes to the heart of the issue:

Biden has been unwilling to use the most significant source of U.S. leverage — conditioning or suspending military aid to Israel — to try to change the dynamics of the war, as Israel has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. advice and counsel. Nadaljujte z branjem→

Marko Golob

Pred nekaj urami je udarila bomba (tokrat samo figurativna) v obliki intervjuja na CNN razvpite novinarke Christiane Amanpour z libanonskim ministrom za zunanje zadeve Abdalallah Bou Habibib-om en dan pred iranskim napadom na Izrael.

»Bomba« je bila izjava libanonskega zunanjega ministra, da se je Hezbollah pod vodstvom generalnega sekretarja Nasrallaha z Izraelom in s soglasjem ne samo izraelskega predsednika Bibija Netanyahuja, temveč tudi ob vednosti Združenih držav Amerike in Evrope dogovoril za premirje.

Samo nekaj dni za tem je Izrael nanj odvrgel za 80 ton bomb. Zakaj? Zakaj je bil pred dvema mesecema v Teheranu ubit glavni pogajalec in sekretar Hamasa Haniyeh, ki je veljal za voditelja Hamasa, ki si je najbolj prizadeval za mir? Zakaj je bil atentat izvršen ravno v Iranu na dan ustoličenja nove vlade (ki si je javno prizadevala za pomiritev z zahodom), kjer je bil Haniyeh, kot diplomat in mednarodno priznani predstavnik svojega ljudstva uradni gost? Zakaj javno ponižanje Irana?

Komu je nadaljevanje klanja Gaze, invazija v Libanonu in vojna z Iranom v interesu?

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Dobra numerična analiza v spodnjem tvitu.

Izumrli bomo. Mi zahodnjaki. Kot dinozavri. Vendar brez padca kometa ali jedrske vojne. Sami se bomo uničili. Ker se nočemo več razmnoževati.

Profesor Marandi je dobro pošolal britanskega novinarja glede morebitne vojne med Izraelom in Iranom.

Ne glede na zahodno proizraelsko propagando (“Izrael bo uničil iranske vojaške kapacitete, rafinerije, kritično infrastrukturo in Izrael bo zmagal”), je izid te vojne zelo negotov. Obe državi imata jedrske konice (Iran jih uradno nima, Izrael pa tega tudi uradno ne priznava), vendar ima Iran hipersonične rakete, ki jih izraelski Iron Dome, kot se je izkazalo včeraj, ne more prestreči. ZDA (in s tem Izreal) še nimajo hipersoničnih raket (LRHW je šele v testni fazi). Na drugi strani naj bi Iran, kakor je bilo mogoče zaslediti v medijih, v preteklih dveh mesecih od Rusije dobil nekaj globalno najboljših protizračnih sistemov obrambe S-400 (morda celo S-500), ki lahko prestrežejo hipersonične rakete (hitrost raket v sistemu S-400 je v razponu med 3.5 in 5.9 macha, kar je seveda hitrejše od vseh balističnih raket, ki jih premore ameriška vojska – in s tem Izrael. Torej, če bosta v nekem trenutku Izrael ali Iran presodila, da je ogrožena njuna eksistenca in bosta aktivirala rakete z jedrskimi konicami, je večja verjetnost, da bodo te explodirale na ali nad izraelskim teritorijem. Lahko pa seveda Izrael preseneti s kakšno diverzijo.

Če je še ostalo kaj razuma med neokoni, ki namesto Bidna vodijo ameriško administracijo, bi bil zdaj skrajni čas, da zaustavijo konje in umirijo Netayahuja. Jedrska vojna Izraelu ne bo pomagala glede eksistence judovske države, če je to glavni cilj ameriškega preferiranja Izraela. Tudi če bi Izrael zmagal v tej vojni, je njegova eksistenca ogrožena, ker bo moral pobiti vedno več ljudi. Izraelska eksistenca je možna, kot pravi Nassim Taleb, zgolj v miru s sosedi, kar pa pomeni priznanje Palestinske države.