Resnično fascinantno je, kako je Trump z nepremišljenim in nespametnim začetkom vojne proti Iranu z eno potezo zradiral 47 let ameriškega (ilegalnega) stiskanja Irana in 52 let ameriške petrodolarske vladavine na bližnjem vzhodu in kako je iz osamljenega in geopolitično minornega Irana ustvaril četrto veliko silo sveta. Iranu to ne bi nikoli prišlo niti na misel, niti mu svet tovrstne enostranske akcije ne bi odobraval. Z eno idiotsko potezo Trumpa je nova geopolitična vloga Irana s kontrolo Hormuške ožine postala naravna in samoumevna.

Trumpu bodo morali Iranci nekoč postaviti spomenik. V čistem zlatu.

This is a crucial point on Iran by Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defense and, relevant to the topic, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (also, incidentally, one of the very rare former senior US officials who’s a genuinely thoughtful diplomat as opposed to a sociopathic neocon).

What Freeman explains is that Iran’s control of Hormuz, which Trump implicitly admitted is beyond the US’s ability to contest (by saying in his speech it’s not his problem to solve, that “others” should deal with it), will necessarily lead to a reshaping of the regional order in Iran’s favor.

As Freeman says, “the Gulf Arabs have no alternative but to negotiate with Iran because they cannot survive indefinitely with the Strait of Hormuz closed to their exports.” Meanwhile, countries like China, India, Japan, and Turkey have already worked out transit agreements with Tehran – de-facto recognizing Iranian authority over the strait.

In effect, Iranian control of Hormuz is now a fait accompli: they control the valve on the single largest concentration of hydrocarbon exports on earth. This is a long-term reality with immense implications.

In fact it’s such a massive long-term win for Iran that the way the war may ironically be remembered by history is Trump giving Tehran the ideal casus belli to seize control of Hormuz – something the world would have never accepted had they done it unprovoked.

It remains to be seen how the war ends – if it ends at all – but this may end up proving even more valuable to Iran than nuclear weapons.

For instance, as Freeman points out, one of the conditions Iran set for Hormuz passage is an end to sanctions and hostility toward them. The logical endpoint is the collapse of the entire sanctions regime – Iran trading openly with the world (save, presumably, for the US and Israel), without having to make any guarantees on its nuclear program.

In other words Trump tore up the JCPOA calling it “the worst deal in history,” and his war may have replaced it with something infinitely more favorable to Tehran.