Pascal Lottaz v komentarju What Goes Around: The EU’s Extralegal Sanctions Regime obravnava pojav, ki ga razume kot enega najresnejših premikov v delovanju Evropske unije v zadnjih letih: uporabo sankcij proti lastnim državljanom in rezidentom kot političnega orodja, ki obide temeljna načela pravne države.

Uvrstitev evropskih državljanov in rezidentov na sankcijske sezname EU je povzročila presenečenje in zaskrbljenost, zlasti zato, ker so prizadeti posamezniki novinarji, analitiki in aktivisti, ki niso obtoženi nobenega kaznivega dejanja. Sankcije, sprva namenjene tujim akterjem v okviru zunanje politike, so se postopoma razširile na ljudi znotraj evropskega pravnega prostora.

Učinki teh sankcij so izjemno hudi. Prizadetim se zamrznejo bančni računi, prekličejo kreditne in debetne kartice, onemogoči sklepanje pogodb ter dostop do osnovnih finančnih in komunikacijskih storitev. Posledično se posamezniki znajdejo v položaju ekonomske in socialne izključenosti, ki lahko v praksi pomeni nezmožnost normalnega življenja, v skrajnih primerih celo otežen dostop do osnovnih življenjskih potreb.

Posebej problematično je, da se sankcije ne izvajajo zgolj znotraj EU. Banke in podjetja v tretjih državah, kot so Švica, Norveška ali Združeno kraljestvo, pogosto ravnajo v skladu z režimom sankcij iz strahu pred sekundarnimi posledicami. Tako sankcije dobijo globalni učinek, ki presega formalno pristojnost EU in dodatno poglablja izolacijo prizadetih oseb.

Osrednje vprašanje, ki ga besedilo odpira, je vprašanje zakonitosti. V pravni državi bi bilo pričakovati, da so tako drastični posegi v temeljne pravice brez sodnega postopka nedopustni. Obstajajo tudi pravna mnenja in poročila, ki ugotavljajo, da sankcije posegajo v pravice, zagotovljene s pravom EU, vključno s svobodo izražanja, svobodo gibanja in pravico do lastnine.

As of early January 2026, there were 59 private individuals on the EU’s Russia sanctions list. Originally, this tool was levied only against Russian businessmen and people living in Russia (which was already problematic in my view), but since 2024, the EU has begun using sanctions as a political sledgehammer to crack down on various forms of dissent. Yamb, for instance, was sanctioned mostly for her activism against France’s neocolonial behavior in Africa, and Dogru for being a vocal German journalist for the Palestinian cause. The little text snippets that serve as justifications for the decision to include them in the sanctions list even mention those non-Russia-related activities for their listing.

Naturally, one would assume that in a free and liberal society, based on the rule of law, sanctions against citizens and residents must be illegal. Right? In fact, the EU parliamentarian Michael von der Schulenburg has commissioned a report that is very clear in its verdict. Sanctions, it holds, break existing EU law on individual freedoms (see my interview with him here).

Sankcije hkrati razkrivajo temeljni paradoks: čeprav sankcije posegajo v temeljne pravice, imajo formalno pravno podlago v pogodbah EU, ki Svetu Evropske unije v okviru skupne zunanje in varnostne politike omogočajo sprejemanje restriktivnih ukrepov. Ker se sankcije obravnavajo kot zunanjepolitični instrument, niso podvržene istim pravnim omejitvam kot notranji represivni ukrepi.

Foreign Policy, For Domestic Purposes

However, the problem we have is that while sanctions are doubtlessly a breach of some EU law, there is other EU law that allows the Council to take these measures. Procedurally, the EU is not in breach of its competences because sanctions are not a domestic policing matter but a foreign policy decision.

I will not go into the details of the accusations against the sanctioned individuals. That would be beside the point. Whether the reasons given for the sanctions have merit or not is not the issue. The problem everyone should understand is that the accusations don’t need to constitute illegal behavior. There are no laws in the EU or its member states that forbid doing what the people on the Russia-Sanctions list have been doing. On the contrary. Many of the activities, including civil activism (Nathalie Yamb), journalism (Hüsseyin Dogru), or the publication of geopolitical analysis (Jacques Baud) are explicitly protected liberties.

That’s the point. Since the acts committed are not crimes, the sanctions against them are not judicial measures, either. The EU explicitly says so on its sanctions explainer homepage:

Restrictive measures or ‘sanctions’ are an essential tool of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. They allow the EU to respond to global challenges (sic) and developments that go against its objectives and values.

Decisions on sanctions are taken by the Council of the European Union by unanimity.

EU sanctions are targeted and aim at those responsible for the policies or actions the EU wants to influence. They do not target a country or population.

Sanctions are not punitive (sic) and instead seek to bring about a change in the policy or conduct of those targeted, with a view to promoting the objectives of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Great. Isn’t it?

The EU has managed to create a system under which the executive branch is within its legal rights, under its foreign policy arm to designate behavior of its citizens as “undesirable” and then impose the most draconian measures imaginable—all without trial or conviction. Everything Baud, Yamb, Dogru, and others did (and still do) is perfectly legal in the EU. But the Council of the European Union has the power to impose coercive measures on them to “encourage” a change of behavior. And because member states are treaty-bound to implement EU sanctions, there is no recourse to domestic courts for the victims.

What an accomplishment. The EU has sneakily outmaneuvered the legal safeguards of its member states against arbitrary political persecution.

Ta razvrstitev ima daljnosežne posledice. Sankcije niso utemeljene na nezakonitem ravnanju, saj dejavnosti sankcioniranih posameznikov – novinarstvo, politična analiza, civilni aktivizem – niso kazniva dejanja in so pogosto izrecno zaščitene pravice. Posledično sankcije niso sodni ukrepi, temveč politične odločitve izvršilne oblasti.

EU sankcije uradno predstavlja kot nekaznovalne in usmerjene v spremembo vedenja. Prav ta opredelitev pa razkrije njihovo bistvo: posameznike se z izjemno hudimi sredstvi poskuša prisiliti k spremembi političnih stališč ali izražanja, ne da bi bili obsojeni ali sploh obtoženi kršitve zakona.
S tem nastane sistem, v katerem lahko izvršilna oblast označi določeno ravnanje kot nezaželeno in brez sodnega nadzora uvede ukrepe, ki po svojem učinku presegajo številne kazenske sankcije. Nacionalna sodišča pri tem nimajo pristojnosti, saj so države članice zavezane k izvajanju sankcij EU, kar prizadetim odvzame možnost učinkovitega pravnega varstva na nacionalni ravni.

Edina formalna možnost pravnega varstva je pritožba na Sodišče Evropske unije. Vendar je obseg presoje tega sodišča zelo omejen. Sodišče preverja predvsem, ali je bil postopek sprejetja sankcij formalen in ali je utemeljitev skladna z navedenimi dejstvi, ne pa tudi, ali so sankcije sorazmerne ali ali kršijo temeljne pravice.

Tudi kadar sodišče ugotovi napake v utemeljitvi, to ne pomeni dejanske zaščite. Svet EU lahko posameznika ponovno uvrsti na seznam sankcij z nekoliko spremenjeno obrazložitvijo, s čimer se pravni postopek začne znova. Tako se vzpostavi položaj, v katerem ima izvršilna oblast skoraj neomejeno možnost sankcioniranja.

Pravica do sodnega varstva tako ostaja predvsem formalna. Hkrati zahteva, da prizadeti najprej izčrpajo to omejeno pravno pot, otežuje dostop do drugih mehanizmov varstva človekovih pravic, saj je izpolnjevanje pogoja izčrpanja domačih pravnih sredstev pogosto predpogoj za obravnavo na drugih sodiščih.

Lottaz opozori, da tovrstna uporaba sankcij ni nova v širšem zgodovinskem kontekstu. Zahodne države so sankcije že desetletja uporabljale kot orodje pritiska proti aktivistom in novinarjem zunaj Evrope, zlasti v državah globalnega juga. Gre za kontinuiteto praks, ki izhajajo iz neokolonialnega načina razmišljanja.

Novost je v tem, da se ista orodja zdaj obračajo navznoter. Tako kot so po terorističnih napadih v ZDA zunanja varnostna pooblastila postopoma postala del notranje represije, se tudi sankcije EU preoblikujejo iz zunanjepolitičnega v notranjepolitični instrument.

Lottaz komentar zaključi z opozorilom, da takšen razvoj predstavlja resno grožnjo demokraciji in pravni državi v Evropski uniji. Če se sistem ekstralegalnih sankcij utrdi, omogoča politično represijo brez sodnega nadzora in brez zaščite temeljnih pravic. Tisti, ki danes takšne ukrepe podpirajo, se lahko v prihodnosti znajdejo v enakem položaju. Demokracija v tem okviru ne propade nenadoma, temveč postopoma – z birokratskimi odločitvami, sprejetimi daleč od javnega nadzora.

The Eurocratic Death of Democracy

The only hope I have is in popular uproar against this sanctions regime of doom. Political repression needs political answers. However, it will take a lot to put this genie back in the bottle. Even on a national level, the member states seem pretty happy with the new tool.

Florian Warweg, a courageous German journalist who was on my show before, actually asked his government spokespeople at the Federal Press Club (Bundespressekonferenz) on December 17 about the case of Jacques Baud and the legality thereof. The smug answer he got from Martin Giese of the German Foreign Ministry tells us most of what we need to know about how these gray bureaucrats perceive their actions and what they have in store:

(…) people who do such things can be sanctioned if the legal grounds exist and if there is a corresponding decision by the Council of the European Union. That happened this Monday, it will continue to happen, it has happened in the past, and anyone operating in this field must expect that it could also happen to them. (…)

All those who do not agree with their sanctioning have all possible legal means to challenge it. They can appeal to the Council, and they can also bring the case before the European Court of Justice.

What a blatant intimidation attempt. Seems like a pretty straightforward admission that there is more to come. After all, as I established above, the sanctions do have legal grounds in the purely formal sense, and the victims can indeed call on the very institution that took the sanctions decision and its rubber-stamp court that will only check the formalities. Seems very fair, right?

Here you go. This is how democracy dies (again). By executive decree and bureaucratic smug. Well done, European Union.

V kaj se je spremenila EU! Tisti, ki so bili veseli konca totalitarnega režima v bivši skupni socialistični državi in odpravi razvpitega 133. člena Kazenskega zakonika za preprečevanje svobode govora, so se danes zbudili v novi skupni politični tvorbi, ki je šla še korak naprej v politični represiji nad posamezniki, ki si upajo izraziti drugačno mnenje od uradnega.